New Order still alive and kicking

Some policies instituted by the government recently are reminiscent of those of the New Order. Political analyst J. Soedjati Djiwandono zeros in on the issue.

JAKARTA (JP): "'The New Order is dead. Long live the New Order'. Am I being too cynical?"

That was the last line of an e-mail message I received the other day from a friend in London. I responded immediately, "No, I don't think you are being too cynical. The New Order is alive and well. The empire strikes back".

We have, indeed, a change of president with his new Cabinet. But the new government is part of the old system of the New Order. It is part and parcel of the old regime despite its self- designation as a reform Cabinet.

Surely, it is not fair to put all the blame on Habibie, who has been, as it were, catapulted to the presidency unprepared. He had been vice president only for two months. Just as his predecessors, his vice presidency was an integral part and result of typical manipulation and machinations gradually, but surely and blatantly, developed by the New Order under Soeharto.

It is small wonder then that Habibie seems to be confused, not really knowing what to do. In a sense, one should rightfully feel sorry for him.

That seems to apply also to the entire outfit of his government. A clear example is the behavior of the governor of Jakarta. Apparently so as to appear reform-minded and concerned over the increasing number of unemployed -- albeit naively without anticipating the possible consequences -- he allowed pedicabs to operate again in Jakarta. A few days later, however, he rescinded his own decision as though expecting it to be accepted without further ado.

It is too much and unrealistic, therefore, to expect the present government to implement reform, let alone "total" reform, covering all the aspects of the nation's life. On the contrary, it may well stand in the way of reform. In fact, this government is preparing a bill on freedom of expression that would practically put a ban on demonstrations, the very form of expression that forced Soeharto to relinquish his presidency.

Indeed, Habibie has now begun to reveal his true self as a scion of the New Order. Some time ago he said he was not going to run for president after the projected general election. Then recently, now that he has had a taste of honey of the power of the presidency, he expressed second thoughts.

Of course, it is basically everybody's right in a democracy to aspire to be president. But something else President Habibie has done falls in disturbingly with the manipulative pattern of the Soeharto New Order regime. He replaced several People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) members with his own friends. If this is not cronyism or nepotism, I don't know what is.

It seems to indicate that President Habibie himself is not sure of the legitimacy of his own presidency and thus that of his government. His action appears to be an effort to ensure a confirmation of his full term as president.

To that end, not only has he followed the old pattern of manipulation, but has also resorted to a revamped MPR, which will be no more legitimate than the one that had appointed Soeharto and himself as president and vice president respectively. Indeed, he turns out to be a true disciple of Soeharto's.

The lack of legitimacy of the MPR, even after a revamp of its membership, is reinforced by the internal wrangling of the ruling Golkar political organization, reflected in the recriminations tossed back and forth between its national board and the board of patrons. Meanwhile, the United Development Party (PPP) has long lost its legitimacy since it betrayed its voters by joining Golkar in nominating Soeharto and B.J.Habibie.

One cannot say the so-called Soerjadi branch of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) has also lost its legitimacy for the same reason. Even worse, it never had legitimacy in the first place.

What may be the alternative?

We need a new national consensus, promoted by a fresh coalition among all proreform nationalist groups beyond racial, ethnic, religious, cultural and other sectarian boundaries. It should have a view to forming a provisional government to overcome the worsening economic crisis and to prepare a free and fair election for a totally reformed Indonesia. We must return to the spirit of the Youth Pledge.

Would that be constitutional? Yes, in the substantive, if not formal sense. It would bring back sovereignty to the people in what could be termed the Indonesian style of people power.