New moves on the Kashmir chessboard

SINGAPORE: Four months ago, a cease-fire in the murderous Kashmir operations was declared by Hizbul Mujahideen, the strongest of the pro-Pakistani separatist groups fighting for sovereignty in the disputed territory.

The group began talks with India, but a tantalizing peace effort was abandoned within 15 days after India refused the Hizbul demand that Pakistan be included in the talks.

Bomb and grenade attacks with fatalities followed, a sickening affirmation of the truism that violence shattered by peace is the natural order of things in that part of the world.

Now, another cease-fire is in force. This time, it has been at the initiative of India, the first time it has done so since the insurgency began in 1989.

India said it was honoring the Muslim fasting month of Ramadhan. Is there any reason to suppose this effort would fare better?

There is a mix of hope and utter negativism that makes it hazardous to ascribe any sort of fate to this venture.

If this small step leads to talks between India and Pakistan, with the separate political and military elements of the resistance in attendance, it would be a miracle.

And that is just agreeing to sit together at the same table. All things considered, it is not smart to expect too much of the season's goodwill.

The problem is that two crucial parties on the other side of the divide -- Pakistan and the Hizbul -- are acting at cross purposes.

The Hizbul, with the experience of last August still fresh, accuses India of executing a cynical ploy.

It not only rejects the cease-fire deal, but has also set off more bombs in the summer capital of Srinagar to register its opposition.

The Hizbul stand has the support of its fellow guerrilla operatives that make up the United Jihad Council, the armed wing of the resistance.

Pakistan, on the other hand, has responded cautiously to India's offer.

It has ordered its forces deployed at Kashmir's Line of Control to desist. But how much influence it can assert over the guerrilla forces will prove pivotal in this scenario.

The Pakistani authorities have always insisted the guerrillas are free agents, but now that the United Jihad Council stands between failure and success, how might Pakistan respond?

Its position has been that it provides only moral support to the insurgents.

What transpires in the weeks to come will be revealing.

On another count, Islamabad is to be commended for making a major policy shift.

It is permitting talks -- without its participation -- between India and the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), nationally the political wing of the resistance.

Leaders of the APHC are in New Delhi meeting Indian officials, and the Pakistani Embassy there is being kept fully briefed by them.

Islamabad is offering its cooperation on the understanding that, at some stage of the APHC-India contact, it will come in as the third party in the discussions.

At which point, one could justifiably ask, how different is the formulation from the August attempt when the Hizbul Mujahideen pulled the plug on the talks with India because it (India) said no to Pakistan's entree?

A Kashmir resolution would not be possible just with Pakistan and India agreeing to talks.

The United Jihad Council and the APHC have to be equal participants, as these native Kashmiris are the ones who will have to live the peace or endure the consequences of failure.

These two sides are just now at opposite poles of the equation -- and therein lies the perfidy of the Kashmir conundrum.

Pakistan has said it hopes the end of Ramadhan will see the start of three-party talks.

But, what might the United Jihad Council do in the interim?

-- The Straits Times/Asia News Network