New Japan-U.S. security treaty angers China

By S.P.Seth

NEW DELHI (JP): Beijing is unhappy with the proposed revamping of the U.S.-Japan security treaty to give Japan a more active role in regional security.

The new guidelines, according to an interim report, "appear to allow the U.S. to get Japan's assistance when the former dispatches troops in an emergency on the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea or anywhere else in areas surrounding Japan". The guidelines, to be finalized next month, were released in an interim report in June.

In other words, short of committing combatants and weapons, Tokyo will be fully involved in almost any regional military conflict involving the U.S. For instance, it would be required to provide air and naval facilities, materials and fuel, and might as well be asked to deploy minesweepers.

Though China is not specifically named as a possible security threat in the new guidelines, the reference to Tokyo's supportive role in "situations in areas surrounding Japan" is pretty comprehensive.

The 1960 treaty had limited Japan's role in the defense of its own homeland under a U.S. security umbrella. In the new guidelines, its geographical scope is sought to be expanded to cover almost all of the Asia-Pacific region.

Though the new security blueprint has to go through the relevant constitutional procedures before it is adopted, it nonetheless has set the tone and direction for regional security in the post-Cold War era.

China's hostile reaction to it is quite predictable, with Beijing perceiving itself as the intended target of an enhanced U.S.-Japan security relationship.

It fears that the upgraded treaty will threaten regional stability. Beijing questions its rationale when the security situation in the region is supposedly better than ever before; though conveniently ignoring its own saber-rattling over Taiwan, South China Sea islands and so on.

Until quite recently, Beijing was believed to have been quite comfortable with treaty which curbed the possibility of a Japanese military resurgence. But all that is now changing.

The Chinese media is predicting a U.S. military withdrawal from East Asia and portraying the nation as an external power interfering in Asian affairs. In April, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said: "Asian security should be decided by Asians."

To this end, China has started wooing ASEAN countries and indicating that it might be willing to modify its position on the South China Sea islands.

But any substantive modification of its sovereignty claims over the Spratly Islands will be problematic because the claims are now enshrined in domestic legislation passed in 1992.

The dubious legitimacy of China's communist regime now rests on its nationalist credentials and any compromise on China's territorial and maritime sovereignty will further erode its legitimacy. Therefore, its margin of maneuver is rather limited, making it hard for Beijing to sell its new "benign" image to its regional neighbors.

Another Chinese tactic appears to be a new advocacy of multilateral regional security structures to replace bilateral arrangements. At present, the U.S. has bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines.

In any multilateral security framework, China would loom large -- especially if the U.S. were excluded. But it won't work. While regional countries are all for multilateral regional arrangements, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), they are not for jettisoning their bilateral U.S. security connection as the ultimate guarantor.

They certainly do not want to offend China by openly endorsing the enhanced relationship between the U.S. and Japan but they are not yet ready to accept China as a benign regional power.

China will, of course, seek to drum up the fear of a revivalist Japan based on its atrocious war-time crimes. Japan is still not trusted regionally in a powerful political and military role. However, it might be safer to have Japan as a junior U.S. security partner (where it is under watch) than to contemplate the possibility of it becoming a powerful, independent political and military power.

Whether or not China is prepared to live with the new security structure, the U.S. nevertheless appears to have made up its mind.

In a recent address to the Asia Society in Washington, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen bluntly told China: "We can work together toward our common interests, or we can work against each other in a zero-sum game, driving our relationship into a spiral of confrontation."

"As the world's most powerful, dynamic nation, the United States will succeed in either world," he said.

"But it is the first course (of working together) that promises the greatest advances for our security and prosperity, as well as China's and the region's as a whole. While the second course (of working against each other) would not only be harder but more dangerous.

"It is China's choice to make."

In other words, China can take it or leave it. And it is argued that China does not have much of a choice.

The Clinton administration is China's best bet in U.S. politics because it is a strong advocate for a policy of "constructive engagement" with the communist nation.

Despite considerable popular and political opposition, President Clinton continues to advocate the Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status for China. His speech, after the Denver summit of the world's eight leading industrial nations, was light on China.

In regard to Hong Kong, he declared it would be a mistake to assume bad faith on Beijing's part regarding its commitments. He reiterated his opposition to linking MFN trade status for China with its human rights record.

Clinton sought to put the best gloss on China's human rights by arguing that China had indeed made progress since President Nixon's China visit in 1972.

"Our frustrations with China are not measured against the standard of 1979 (when the U.S. recognized China) and 1972 (when Nixon went there)," he said. "They are measured against our deep disappointment and disagreement with 1989 and Tiananmen Square."

With Clinton pushing engagement and moderation with China, Beijing will have to think very hard about letting its opposition to an enhanced security relationship between Japan and the U.S. take too abrasive a turn.

As Cohen's speech to the Asia Society indicated, Washington is prepared to use it as a litmus test. Of course, China will continue to explore alternatives to counter U.S. moves as is already evident in the Beijing-Moscow "strategic partnership". But its options are rather limited.