New Jakarta masterplan justifies past violations

By Marco Kusumawijaya

JAKARTA (JP): Without much publicity, the old masterplan of Jakarta 1985-2005 has been replaced by a new one named Jakarta 2010. Local legislation enacted it in June 1999.

The fact that it was made in a hurry six years before the old one expires has raised suspicion, that it will (like previous plans) only acknowledge land-use violations of the past masterplan in order to justify current "trends", and will cover up many governor decrees against local legislation that would be considered illegal if stipulated by the old masterplan of 1985- 2005.

Local legislation, as it is enacted by local parliament, is higher than any governor decree.

The violations that are now justified in the new master plan will concern many big issues across the capital.

Take "green areas" as an obvious example in comparing the old and new master plans. The protected mangrove forest in Kapuk (north of Jakarta, alongside the toll road to Soekarno-Hatta Airport, on the luxurious estate of Pantai Indah Kapuk), has now been reduced in terms of area coverage to less than one third of the area stipulated in the former plan.

Don't be fooled by the two or three rows of mangrove trees along the northern side of the toll road between the Daan Mogot exit and the entry to Jakarta: behind them there is no more "forest", but an estate with a golf-course!

One can rightly wonder how such a small area of remaining mangrove forest can survive ecologically in the near future. It still provides an important habitat for some rare species of Javanese sea gulls.

There has been a noticeable reduction, or in some cases eradication, of different categories of former "green areas" which previously covered the metropolis: green areas surrounding the airport now cover only a quarter of their former area; nothing is now left of "agricultural green" areas in Kapuk and Koja; and "recreational green" spots have now disappeared from where megastructure Taman Anggrek Mall and Hotel Mulia in Senayan now stand.

These dramatic changes are often suggested without much deliberation and public consultation. The most notorious of all is the reclamation of coastal areas. How this will influence the mangrove forest, the livelihood of fishing communities and the overall ecosystem is not made clear.

The property crash that marked the start of the economic crisis should have made it clear that there is not a sufficient argument for creating more land supply in such a dangerously irresponsible way.

The only people who can afford the extra land supply are those who already have first or second plots and houses. Even if that sector of society is targeted, the existing Pantai Indah Kapuk provides a good testament to the current situation and economic climate as it still remains largely vacant speculative plots.

If it is about creating a new "water front", the existing infrastructure, and environmental and accessibility problems should be solved first rather than creating new problems. Priority over the heritage of Old Batavia is also not clearly stated.

Another example of fundamental decision-making concerns major public transport infrastructure development. The plan to build (underground) subways along the North-South axis is now stipulated in the master plan. Who will benefit from it? Certainly not the majority of poor workers in the metropolis, who happen to live and work along the East-West axis.

No cost-and-benefit analysis of the underground subway option has ever been disclosed to the public. (Does any actually exist?)

The fact is that the world admires, for example, Curitiba's bus-based system of mass rapid transport in Brazil. With the same carrying capacity and efficiency, it costs only 3 percent of an underground system.

But it requires an enlightened mayor and a disciplined population to achieve a vision for a better future. It requires leadership that works alongside the public, instead of solely with investors. Currently this approach is apparently not possible.

A fundamental flaw of the masterplan is that there is no conceptual relationship with the surrounding Bogor-Tangerang- Bekasi region shown. With an ever growing, stronger functional relationship between them and the metropolis, as well as an increasingly interdependent ecological relationship between them all, it is unimaginable how any plan about Jakarta can work without their co-ordination.

Two of the main concerns of common citizens, are the annual floods and the dilapidated public transport (certainly not the "water-front"!), which are crucially dependent on what happens in the three cities. These should have been treated more seriously and in detail, while the local MP's went on study tours to the water-front cities in Hong Kong, Australia and Japan.

Changes in land-use and intensity are detailed in larger scale blocks in the new master plan. This clarifies what will happen to almost every individual plot in the city.

Any sensible city administration, moreover one in a "reform" era after a traumatic reductionist modernization, would automatically think about, and promptly conduct, public consultation, especially with direct stakeholders--citizens living in the respective blocks--before making it legislation.

It concerns not only a concept of general participation within a framework of "good governance", but also and more fundamentally, their human rights on land ownership and use.

There are actually several available acts of legislation (mentioned by the new masterplan itself, ironically, in articles 85-87) that demand some sort of public consultation: Law No. 24/1992 and Government Regulation Number 69/1996. The new laws on autonomy and decentralization, by the way, are an important basis for public participation.

For the first time, the masterplan also mentions a "vision" and "mission" which it hopes to achieve through the collective commitment of all stakeholders. How could a collective commitment be drawn up though, if there is no collective deliberation in formulating commitments?

The case of this new masterplan is the worst example of how Jakarta is so backward in good governance. It is indeed already common knowledge that after Ali Sadikin (the only true governor, some would say) Jakarta has been declining from being a good to a bad (if not the worst) example to learn from for other regions and national governments. The largest cases of KKN (Indonesian acronym for corruption, collusion and practices of nepotism) have been related to city development projects.

Violations of Jakarta's masterplan have been "national" issues for years. Now, how can we be sure that the new masterplan will not be further violated and the violations simply "justified" by the formation of the next plan again and again?

The case of the masterplan shows that it is incompetent, both technically and in the skills of "good governance". It neither offers any sound innovative solutions to problems nor clearly states the problems themselves.

International consultants and donors have assisted many regions, towns and cities all over Indonesia in the areas of good governance. Participatory approaches in planning, programming and budgeting have been tried out for several years in towns like Kendari in Southeast Sulawesi and Mataram in West Nusa Tenggara, just to mention a few. The World Bank and UNDP, as well as several bilateral aid agencies such as the German GTZ, have been pleased to engage.

However, nothing for Jakarta.

Ironically, almost all of the offices of good-governance programs are situated in Jakarta. There is an apparent silence and reluctance about intervention in metropolitan governance. There has been a legacy from the past which appears to indicate that one should not get involved with the capital!

The fact that Jakarta is also a "region" is covered-up by it being a "capital" of the nation. Only national issues are dealt with. The physical infrastructure and services of the city appear to be considered "local", and therefore not necessary to be dealt with effectively.

The "strength" of its bureaucracy, the protection they have from "above", as well as the solidity of their closed-system, have been treated with "respect" which has made intervention impossible. Jakarta has paradoxically been avoided and forsaken by the international community.

The case of the masterplan, within the framework of good governance and the reform movement, must now make us realize, I think, that it is time for the international community of consultants and donors to change their attitude about the metropolis.

To do that, they need only to imagine the conflict and consequences that will result from this masterplan which defies any principle of good governance and sound technical competence.

They need to talk to the city's bureaucrats and citizens soon.

The writer is architect and urbanist, Governance Program Specialist at the British Council, Jakarta.