New avenues to growth, security

By Juwono Sudarsono

The following article is based on a paper presented at the Australia-Indonesia Defense and Science Technology Seminar in Nov. 20, 1996.

DENPASAR, Bali: The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an attempt to transpose the success of the ASEAN security model to the wider Asia Pacific canvass. ASEAN is the "primary mover" in the continuous process to balance and stabilize the evolving strategic situation among the powers as well as the resident powers in both Northeast and Southeast Asia.

Its principal instruments are confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy and the search for new approaches at resolving conflicts affecting nations in the region.

Increased linkages between economic imperatives through Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the need to periodically review military strategies result in five trends that merit attention.

* The scope and direction of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) will largely be determined by the balance of relative forces among China, Japan and the United States. Both China and Japan are rising political and strategic powers just as the United States sustain the burden of combat reluctance;

* The availability of surplus weapons and equipment from industrialized countries have encouraged substantial increase in defense expenditure. Though these developments do not necessarily lead to a regional arms race, even graduated modernization sustained into the next century affect priorities and perceptions of security. There is urgent need to identify trends in defense policies that over time affect the overall strategic balance;

* Given the uncertainties of the evolving strategic environment, Asia Pacific countries are developing their defense industry capabilities. In the past five years Japan, China, the two Koreas, Singapore and other countries in the region have invested in local defense industries. Although no country can be completely independent of foreign suppliers the emphasis towards greater self-reliance will remain significant.

* Following the adoption of the Law of the Sea Convention in November 1994, many nations in the region have legally acquired territorial rights of exclusive economic zones. Substantial resource opportunities have led to expanded security concerns and responsibilities. Since jurisdiction over these territorial waters overlap, there is greater need to coordinate policies exploring options based on establishing joint responsibilities rather than on claims based on national sovereignty.

* The paradox of growing economic success leading to affordability in purchasing new weapons and new defense equipment pose serious challenges to building confidence among nations that have facilitated, if not stimulated, defense spending. Intra- regional defense cooperation on a bilateral and/or multilateral dimensions require skill and patience to match progress reached in economic cooperation. More importantly, the advent of new defense technologies will affect both the structural as well as operational readiness of each country, depending on its strategic location, geographical make-up and level of economic development.

The seriousness of the above defense issues are compounded by the evolving region's economic dimension. In the past, energy requirements were met from the Middle East supplemented by local production, principally from China and Indonesia. But in the next 15 years, the Malacca and Singapore Straits as well as the Lombok and Makassar waterways will be subject to three times the current amount of oil traffic from the Gulf. By the year 2010, it is estimated that the dependence ratio will reach 60 percent of OPEC-produced oil. Barring new oil strikes in the South China area, this energy dependence factor means that many countries in Southeast Asia will have to reach agreement on a security regimes which would guarantee the flow of such energy requirements for the entire East Asian region.

Economic growth and success in the broader East Asia region has led to escalating changes in the balance of military power, especially in naval capability. Where previously the United States provided strategic assurance throughout the 1960s until the early 1990s, the situation now and in the future merits a different set of approach. The sea routes that link Yokohama, Shanghai and the Persian Gulf regions encompass 60 percent of oil traffic and 78 percent of Japan's sea-borne trade.

Additionally, territorial claims are being contested by states whose disputes over jurisdiction and potential energy deposits are as yet unsettled. This means that a carefully calibrated joint endeavor to match the interests of all the states in the region will have to be carefully charted, lest miscalculation result in unwarranted military confrontation. Scientific and technological transparency and cooperation have to be developed, based on the principles of mutual benefit as well as confidence- building.

Common efforts at providing mutual assistance is particularly urgent where the interests of the great powers intersect. China's sustained growth increases its dependence on external supplies from the Gulf states that may have be affected by the volatile nature of the Middle East politics. In return for weapons sales (missiles, weapons of mass destruction) China's access to energy supplies will be secured, albeit through shifting geo-strategic environments in the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.

The conflicting claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea are clear indications that energy needs and security concerns are inseparable issues of vital concern. Although Japan's defense modernization is relatively modest, an increasingly assertive China may drastically change Japan's defense posture, the effects of which will have far-reaching consequences to the future of all countries throughout the region. Economic transformation can only proceed through the year 2010 if the security dimension in the South China and East China seas are stabilized.

These plans will have to take into account the possibility that a sharp decline in oil and gas supplies may spur programs in nuclear power development. By 2010, 48 percent of the world's energy output from nuclear power will be produced in Asia. Japan alone currently has more than 100 tons of plutonium for its breeder reactor program, allowing it to produce fuel more than necessary for its domestic economic consumption.

Since the East Asia will need 15 million barrels of oil per day (constituting 20 percent of global consumption), the political and economic strains affecting Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia nexus will be even more compelling. It is estimated that by 2010, dozens of supertankers a day will travel between the Gulf region and East Asia.

Comprehensive security must incorporate transparency in the energy requirements of each country in both regions. These would complement the APEC process, taking into account the need for a stand-by Energy Reserve Fund that would allow each country bound by the agreement access to short term emergency needs. These would then complement the ASEAN Regional Forum on security so that each country's security concerns will be tied to the energy requirements of each party to the agreement.

New approaches incorporating both economic as well as security tracks require a high degree of fast-moving updating of individual country needs at various stages in its economic development and its effect on the region's overall strategic balance.

Arms modernization has progressed furthest in Asia and the Pacific just as military spending in other regions of the world are declining. In East Asia alone, regional arms purchase have increased by 10-15 percent a year since 1991.

Northeast Asia alone currently spends US$75 billion annually on arms purchase and military modernization; the Southeast Asia region about $12 billion. Naval mobility and maritime capability will be increasingly important for the long-term security and development of the Asia-Pacific region.

Dr. Juwono Sudarsono is Professor at the University Indonesia and Vice Governor of the National Resilience Institute.