New avenues to growth, security
New avenues to growth, security
By Juwono Sudarsono
The following article is based on a paper presented at the
Australia-Indonesia Defense and Science Technology Seminar in
Nov. 20, 1996.
DENPASAR, Bali: The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an attempt
to transpose the success of the ASEAN security model to the wider
Asia Pacific canvass. ASEAN is the "primary mover" in the
continuous process to balance and stabilize the evolving
strategic situation among the powers as well as the resident
powers in both Northeast and Southeast Asia.
Its principal instruments are confidence building measures,
preventive diplomacy and the search for new approaches at
resolving conflicts affecting nations in the region.
Increased linkages between economic imperatives through Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the need to periodically
review military strategies result in five trends that merit
attention.
* The scope and direction of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
will largely be determined by the balance of relative forces
among China, Japan and the United States. Both China and Japan
are rising political and strategic powers just as the United
States sustain the burden of combat reluctance;
* The availability of surplus weapons and equipment from
industrialized countries have encouraged substantial increase in
defense expenditure. Though these developments do not necessarily
lead to a regional arms race, even graduated modernization
sustained into the next century affect priorities and perceptions
of security. There is urgent need to identify trends in defense
policies that over time affect the overall strategic balance;
* Given the uncertainties of the evolving strategic
environment, Asia Pacific countries are developing their defense
industry capabilities. In the past five years Japan, China, the
two Koreas, Singapore and other countries in the region have
invested in local defense industries. Although no country can be
completely independent of foreign suppliers the emphasis towards
greater self-reliance will remain significant.
* Following the adoption of the Law of the Sea Convention in
November 1994, many nations in the region have legally acquired
territorial rights of exclusive economic zones. Substantial
resource opportunities have led to expanded security concerns and
responsibilities. Since jurisdiction over these territorial
waters overlap, there is greater need to coordinate policies
exploring options based on establishing joint responsibilities
rather than on claims based on national sovereignty.
* The paradox of growing economic success leading to
affordability in purchasing new weapons and new defense equipment
pose serious challenges to building confidence among nations that
have facilitated, if not stimulated, defense spending. Intra-
regional defense cooperation on a bilateral and/or multilateral
dimensions require skill and patience to match progress reached
in economic cooperation. More importantly, the advent of new
defense technologies will affect both the structural as well as
operational readiness of each country, depending on its strategic
location, geographical make-up and level of economic development.
The seriousness of the above defense issues are compounded by
the evolving region's economic dimension. In the past, energy
requirements were met from the Middle East supplemented by local
production, principally from China and Indonesia. But in the next
15 years, the Malacca and Singapore Straits as well as the Lombok
and Makassar waterways will be subject to three times the current
amount of oil traffic from the Gulf. By the year 2010, it is
estimated that the dependence ratio will reach 60 percent of
OPEC-produced oil. Barring new oil strikes in the South China
area, this energy dependence factor means that many countries in
Southeast Asia will have to reach agreement on a security regimes
which would guarantee the flow of such energy requirements for
the entire East Asian region.
Economic growth and success in the broader East Asia region
has led to escalating changes in the balance of military power,
especially in naval capability. Where previously the United
States provided strategic assurance throughout the 1960s until
the early 1990s, the situation now and in the future merits a
different set of approach. The sea routes that link Yokohama,
Shanghai and the Persian Gulf regions encompass 60 percent of oil
traffic and 78 percent of Japan's sea-borne trade.
Additionally, territorial claims are being contested by states
whose disputes over jurisdiction and potential energy deposits
are as yet unsettled. This means that a carefully calibrated
joint endeavor to match the interests of all the states in the
region will have to be carefully charted, lest miscalculation
result in unwarranted military confrontation. Scientific and
technological transparency and cooperation have to be developed,
based on the principles of mutual benefit as well as confidence-
building.
Common efforts at providing mutual assistance is particularly
urgent where the interests of the great powers intersect. China's
sustained growth increases its dependence on external supplies
from the Gulf states that may have be affected by the volatile
nature of the Middle East politics. In return for weapons sales
(missiles, weapons of mass destruction) China's access to energy
supplies will be secured, albeit through shifting geo-strategic
environments in the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the South
China Sea.
The conflicting claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the
East China Sea are clear indications that energy needs and
security concerns are inseparable issues of vital concern.
Although Japan's defense modernization is relatively modest, an
increasingly assertive China may drastically change Japan's
defense posture, the effects of which will have far-reaching
consequences to the future of all countries throughout the
region. Economic transformation can only proceed through the year
2010 if the security dimension in the South China and East China
seas are stabilized.
These plans will have to take into account the possibility
that a sharp decline in oil and gas supplies may spur programs in
nuclear power development. By 2010, 48 percent of the world's
energy output from nuclear power will be produced in Asia. Japan
alone currently has more than 100 tons of plutonium for its
breeder reactor program, allowing it to produce fuel more than
necessary for its domestic economic consumption.
Since the East Asia will need 15 million barrels of oil per
day (constituting 20 percent of global consumption), the
political and economic strains affecting Northeast Asia and
Southeast Asia nexus will be even more compelling. It is
estimated that by 2010, dozens of supertankers a day will travel
between the Gulf region and East Asia.
Comprehensive security must incorporate transparency in the
energy requirements of each country in both regions. These would
complement the APEC process, taking into account the need for a
stand-by Energy Reserve Fund that would allow each country bound
by the agreement access to short term emergency needs. These
would then complement the ASEAN Regional Forum on security so
that each country's security concerns will be tied to the energy
requirements of each party to the agreement.
New approaches incorporating both economic as well as security
tracks require a high degree of fast-moving updating of
individual country needs at various stages in its economic
development and its effect on the region's overall strategic
balance.
Arms modernization has progressed furthest in Asia and the
Pacific just as military spending in other regions of the world
are declining. In East Asia alone, regional arms purchase have
increased by 10-15 percent a year since 1991.
Northeast Asia alone currently spends US$75 billion annually
on arms purchase and military modernization; the Southeast Asia
region about $12 billion. Naval mobility and maritime capability
will be increasingly important for the long-term security and
development of the Asia-Pacific region.
Dr. Juwono Sudarsono is Professor at the University Indonesia
and Vice Governor of the National Resilience Institute.