Nature of political culture in SE Asia

By James Gomez

Culture and political development in SE Asia Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimming the Banana Tree, London and New York: Routledge, 199 pages

SINGAPORE: Improvement in democracy and human rights will take place in South-east Asia. However, such changes will be slow. The final model of government will not mirror Western ideals. Instead, it will reflect a mixed system tempered by the various cultural traditions of the region.

The above is the prediction made by Far Eastern Economic Review's Bangkok bureau chief, Michael R J Vatikiotis, in his book Political Change in Southeast Asia.

A short book of just 200 pages, it discusses current political developments primarily in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore and speculates on the outcome of political change in the region.

The author argues that political systems in South-east Asian countries have traditionally featured strong leadership. This explains why Western models of government, adopted in the early years of independence, were soon abandoned or are now only symbolically maintained. The dominance of traditional culture was too strong a challenge for western political influence to survive.

However, unconditional surrender to strong leadership does not mean that South-east Asians condone tyranny. People of the region only allow strong leaders to rule as long as the economy is well managed. In fact, throughout the region's history, the people overthrew leaders who could not deliver the economic goods. Thus, it is unlikely that unproductive and abusive tyranny will be tolerated in present times.

The economic boom in the region, argues the writer, has also provided South-east Asian leaders with new political confidence. It has prompted regional leaders to define and articulate a set of core "Asian" values.

Western demands for greater democracy and human rights in the region, therefore, are now faced with counter arguments that political development in South-east Asia must take into account cultural sensitivities. Thus, the articulation of Asian values is seen as continuing the cultural impact on political development into contemporary times.

Religion is also offered as another reason for explaining continued political conservatism in South-east Asia. With increased economic development, Vatikiotis says, many people in the region are turning to religion. They do this in order to make sense of urban and capitalist living brought on by economic growth. Hence, there is a religious revivalism, with Islam and Buddhism featuring as important traditional religions that affect the nature of political development in the region.

Finally, frequent travel, emigration, business interests and communication are cited as increasing the integration of the region and concern in outside affairs. For instance, he mentions how the environmental interests of one non-governmental organisation in Thailand have spilled over as a condemnation of deforestation activities in Burma.

In this regard, he highlights the role of the Asean as providing a forum for managed integration to take place. He also highlights how the economic growth of China and overseas Chinese in South-east Asia would shape the nature of political development in the region.

Written in journalistic prose, the book draws together many examples in contemporary South-east Asian politics. The discussion ranges from the significance of the monarchy in Cambodia and Thailand for continuing traditional leadership to the explanation why Western theories of a middle-class revolution do not hold water in South-east Asia. Instead, the traditional cultures of the region and their contemporary re-interpretation as Asian values are offered as explanations why the political systems of the region will develop in a conservative way.

Not exactly ground-breaking, Political Change in Southeast Asia brings together the major arguments and projections for political development in the region into one book. It is a fairly easy read and gives a good sense of how politics in the region is configuring. However, the author's reasons for political conservatism can be stretched further. There is a need to go beyond culture and look at some of the political processes that affect political development in the region.

For instance, the ideological hold of the dominant authorities in some countries is an important factor. In these countries, almost all political expression tends to assume the shape of the dominant discourse. Independent and alternative discourses find it difficult to break free from the hegemony of the dominant discourse.

Living in an environment of political hegemony (or strong leadership, as the author puts it), political space is minimal. Further, there is inadequate separation between the political authorities in power and the structures of the state. This makes any private political expression outside the state defined channels immediately seem illegitimate. The illegitimacy attached to alternative political expression also makes such expression to be viewed in purely oppositional terms.

Vatikiotis' attempt to explain the nature of political development in the region is not a new exercise. There have been many attempts made to explain the region's political conservatism. The bulk of them have focused on institutional and political constraints laid down by incumbent governments and political parties. Although, this book takes another approach, by focusing mainly on the cultural aspects, the author fails to bring out the political processes that also influence the way the region will develop politically.

It is a combination of culture and the internal political structure of the region that is likely to provide the best explanation of why political conservatism will be the feature of South-east Asia's future political development.

James Gomez is a doctoral candidate of the Department of Political Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies. He was recently a Visiting Associate at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.