NATO tries to reassure Russia

LONDON: NATO has presented Russia with radical proposals for revising the 1992 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The plans, unveiled at a meeting of the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna on Feb. 20, 1997, are designed to meet Russian concerns about the military consequences of NATO enlargement. Combined with other conciliatory measures that are expected to lead to a NATO-Russia charter and a joint council, it is hoped that CFE revision will play a critical role in reducing Moscow's fears and its private, if not public, hostility to Alliance expansion. Unlike other aspects of the package, CFE adjustment will be legally binding.

The CFE Treaty specifies alliance or group limitations on five categories of military hardware: battle tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), combat aircraft and attack helicopters. These 'treaty-limited equipment' (TLE) restrictions apply to an area extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. A series of geographic zones further circumscribes bloc limits for NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, within these bloc totals, national limits were subsequently determined in negotiations between the respective organizations.

The CFE Treaty was designed to create a stable balance of reduced conventional forces and to eliminate the capability for surprise attacks. By the Nov. 17, 1995 deadline for full implementation, over 58,000 pieces of TLE had been destroyed, and approximately 2,500 monitoring missions had been conducted to ensure compliance. These included inspections of U.S. forces in Germany before their deployment with the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995.

The CFE Treaty was also adapted to accommodate other political changes. The Baltic states -- Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia -- were removed from the area of CFE application on Oct. 18, 1991 after they regained their independence. The other former Soviet states met in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on May 15, 1992 and agreed on respective totals consistent with the total Soviet allocation. The Czech Republic and Slovakia also allocated individual limits as part of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on Dec. 31, 1992.

Full compliance with the Treaty was, however, endangered by Russia's refusal to comply with troop limits in the 'flank zone' - including both the Leningrad and North Caucasus military districts. However, a framework was adopted as an interim solution to the problem on Nov. 16, 1995. A final compromise was reached at the CFE Review Conference in May 1996. This allowed Russia higher force levels in the flank zone, extended the time- scale for meeting these levels until 1999 and reduced the geographic size of the zone.

To help strengthen European security, any adjustment to the CFE Treaty must help assuage Russian fears about the military consequences of NATO enlargement take account of the concerns of new NATO member-states; not adversely affect other countries, such as the Baltic states and Ukraine.

The original CFE mandate has been achieved and must now be consolidated. In contrast to the original negotiations, political goals are now more important than military objectives. NATO appears to agree on maintaining four essential aspects of the CFE agreement: ceilings on the five TLE categories; inspection regime; regular information exchanges between signatories; and structure that allows for political change.

Alliance countries accept that progress in these discussions should parallel enlargement. However, they oppose any direct linkage or artificial deadlines.

In February 1997, NATO proposed replacing the bloc-to-bloc and zonal limits with national limits. Each country would declare its national ceiling for the five TLE categories, probably at the level of current entitlements. Signatories would also be allowed a limited number of foreign troops on their territory, known as 'stationed forces'. But the total of a state's own equipment plus any stationed hardware must not exceed its national limit. Consequently, if the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland maintain their current TLE levels they would be unable to station any significant amounts of TLE from other NATO countries on their territory. These restrictions would, however, only apply to ground equipment, not to attack helicopters or combat aircraft. All Treaty members would have to agree that the declared national levels were acceptable before the CFE Treaty could be formally adjusted.

NATO's proposal also clearly defines 'temporary deployments' for exercises and creates a new 'stabilizing zone' encompassing the Visegrad Four states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), the Kaliningrad military district, Belarus and western Ukraine. Greater restrictions would apply to 'stationed forces' in this area. Territorial ceilings for ground equipment could not be set any higher than current national maximum levels. More information would also be provided on stationed forces or temporary deployments, and special inspection quotas would apply to certain sites.

Western signatories are also keen to introduce an 'accession clause' allowing other European states to join the CFE regime. This could have positive ramifications for both the Baltic and Balkan regions. Entry of the Baltic states into the CFE regime would now seem to underscore their sovereignty, offer additional security reassurances and could be viewed as a prerequisite to future NATO membership.

As for the Balkans, the December 1995 General Framework Agreement on Peace for Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Accords) calls for sub-regional discussions to establish an arms balance in and around the former Yugoslavia. These negotiations would include the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Slovenia and possibly other regional states (such as, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania). A CFE accession clause would allow signatories to the Dayton Accords to join the regime once they had achieved their required residual TLE levels. This could then remove the need for separate negotiations.

Alliance members also agree on two other issues. First, they want to improve the flow of information to all CFE signatories, and enhance the verification regime. This must include changing the allocation of inspection quotas created by moving from a group to a national structure. Moreover, relatively minor adjustments to the verification regime would ensure that opportunities to cheat remained minimal. The former members of the Warsaw Pact have frequently requested 'East-on-East' reviews. This trend has reduced the available inspection quotas for NATO countries, and several Eastern European states (most notably Russia) have complained that it is especially burdensome.

Second, negotiations to achieve a compromise over Russian flank levels were both difficult and divisive, and all member- states agree that this issue must not be reopened in the revision talks.

NATO might also accept additional reductions in certain types of conventional weapons, such as tanks. This would diminish the disparity between Alliance and Russian forces which is currently two to one in some categories. If this occurs the reductions would probably come from U.S. TLE stocks. Furthermore, Russia wants limits on stationed forces - which would prevent the Alliance from placing any equipment on the territory of new member-states - as well as the elimination of the flank zone; exemptions for equipment assigned to forces involved in 'peacekeeping' operations; and the addition of new pieces of equipment to the combat aircraft category (such as electronic warfare, refueling and transport aircraft).

A successful conclusion to the talks may take some time, however. Some NATO members were upset about how the flank problem was resolved. Many believe that Washington became frustrated with the Alliance's inability to agree on a compromise and subsequently conducted bilateral negotiations with Moscow. The resulting agreement was then, in effect, forced on NATO and other signatories. There is thus concern in Europe that the U.S. might do the same again if the adjustment negotiations stall.

The flank compromise has not yet been endorsed by the U.S. Senate because of problems with the ratification of other arms- control agreements, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). CFE Treaty signatories should have approved the flank compromise prior to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Lisbon summit in December 1996, but all countries agreed to a six-month extension. Some states (notably Ukraine and Azerbaijan) may not support an additional extension if the Senate does not ratify the compromise.

Finally, time is also rapidly becoming an issue. An adjusted CFE agreement is unlikely to be negotiated before NATO's summit in Madrid on July 8-9 at which the Alliance will announce new candidates for membership. Nevertheless, the opportunity exists for significant progress towards an adjusted Treaty. The planned summit between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President Bill Clinton on March 20-21 in Helsinki may result in renewed high-level impetus for these negotiations.

Although it will have to be accompanied by discussions about nuclear issues and the establishment of a formalized relationship between NATO and Russia, revising the CFE Treaty is likely to be the key to reducing Moscow's concerns with NATO enlargement. Without Treaty adjustment, Moscow may obstruct other security and arms-control arrangements, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II. Consequently, the U.S. and its NATO partners have placed great importance on CFE adjustment in the run-up to the Madrid summit. However, there is still a possibility that the Treaty revision negotiations will run into difficulties.

Window A: NATO might also accept additional reductions in certain types of conventional weapons, such as tanks. This would diminish the disparity between Alliance and Russian forces which is currently two to one in some categories.

Window B: Finally, time is also rapidly becoming an issue. An adjusted CFE agreement is unlikely to be negotiated before NATO's summit in Madrid on July 8-9 at which the Alliance will announce new candidates for membership.