NATO summit to focus on revision
LONDON: The formal decision has yet to be taken, but there is little doubt that there will soon be a NATO summit, at the latest by summer 1997. It will prove a defining moment as the Alliance emerges from a long and fitful process of reform.
NATO summits are not regular events. During the Cold War they were a rarity: from 1957 to 1988 there were only two. Since then, four summits have been held at important moments for particular purposes. The result is an Alliance with an aura not of purposeful change, but of piecemeal adaptation. This image is powerfully reinforced by the history of NATO's experience in Bosnia.
The proposed summit will address a broad range of issues. Most obviously, decisions on NATO enlargement will be made, thus ending the uncertainty about NATO's commitment to accepting new members while Russia remains so openly hostile to the idea. But NATO is also undergoing significant reform in other areas, such as changes to its command structure and Europeanization.
Who will be invited to join NATO is only one of the relevant issues. The U.S. Congress and public opinion are already focussing on Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Apart from France possibly championing Rumania, no one is keen to extend the list. The summit will not actually admit new members immediately. Candidates will be invited to enter into negotiations on their membership, and wait until details of participation - such as budgetary contributions, places in the military structure and so on - have been agreed. Membership would then be ratified in the legislatures of the 16 existing Allies. The process will thus remain gradual and could still be delayed further. Turkey, for example, resentful at seeing former Warsaw Pact countries about to join the Alliance and likely to overtake its entry into the European Union (EU), has already hinted that it may be forced to use its veto unless its 'second-class' position as an associate- member of the Western European Union (WEU) is amended to full membership status.
A far more difficult question is what to do with those countries not invited to join, but that wish to do so - and particularly those, such as the Baltic states, whose failure to enter the Alliance might expose them to a Russia eager to reassert itself. The answer to such countries is an 'enhanced' Partnership for Peace (PFP), which would include greater political and security substance than at present. A 'Senior Level Group' of experts now meets regularly in Brussels to decide the content of this enhanced PFP which could involve more political consultations and the involvement of Partners in the Alliance's non-Article 5 missions (for example, in Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) planning). The fact that these experts come from capitals rather than the permanent national delegations in Brussels indicates the importance the Allies attach to having a policy in place to deal with the 'B'-list countries.
Signs that Russia is now more relaxed about an enlarging Alliance are more apparent than real. The tone of Russian statements has softened and the pace of high-level contact has increased. The Russian contingent serving in Bosnia as part of the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) has blended in well, and Russia has already indicated its willingness to contribute to an IFOR follow-on force. A Russian General, Leonty Shevtsov, is based at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons.
However, unlike other PFP countries, Russia has not sent liaison officers to NATO, and it has yet to start implementing the program of activities agreed in 1995. Its place in IFOR reflects more its strategic interest in the Balkans than a partnership with an enlarged NATO. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov has repeatedly stated that moving NATO's 'infrastructure' eastward on enlargement is unacceptable - an impossible condition to satisfy because, at the very least, NATO would have to integrate new members' forces into an effective collective defense. While NATO has said that it has no need or plans to station foreign or nuclear forces on new members' territory, the fact that new participants will join the integrated structure will be difficult for Russia to accept.
Moscow insists on settling the substance of the NATO-Russia relationship before it acts on the detail of PFP. However, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's proposed 'charter' has not been discussed systematically within NATO or with Moscow, with which no systematic dialogue exists. Such a charter could acknowledge the status of Russia, make commitments on consultations in crisis management and establish the framework for permanent cooperation, including Russian representation at NATO and in the military structure. It is unlikely to offer the hard guarantees that Moscow wants: ending enlargement after the first wave, permanently banning nuclear weapons and the deployment of troops to Central Europe, and limiting NATO infrastructure. Nevertheless, NATO is likely to move forward with enlargement, irrespective of Russian opposition. After the commitments made to Central European states, halting the enlargement process to placate Russia is now almost inconceivable.
At Berlin in June 1996, NATO foreign ministers decided that the Alliance's structures should be further adapted so as to reflect a European and Security Defense Identity (ESDI) within it. By developing a ESDI inside NATO, the Europeans have effectively accepted that the WEU's ability to act will be defined, and therefore limited, by NATO. At the same time, the WEU's capacity to respond also remains circumscribed by its own meager capabilities.
The Berlin agreement also marked a shift in U.S. policy. Before the meeting, Washington's preference was to depend on NATO's inherent flexibility to support the WEU: the new command structure would plan for European-led operations, but would not be specifically organized to facilitate them. After Berlin, due to heavy European pressure, NATO is contemplating a European command 'arrangement' within the structure.
U.S. fears had effectively prevented NATO from acting on previous commitments to support the WEU. The U.S. has been reassured to some degree by WEU work on potential missions which the European defense body could lead: they are at the lower end of the crisis spectrum. The U.S. military, nevertheless, remains suspicious of any development which could undermine NATO's military effectiveness by artificially inserting European elements into it; or which could detract from the main priority to develop NATO's ability to work with partners, as opposed to a smaller configuration of Allies.
Another complex issue facing the Alliance is the reorganization of its command-structure, which - apart from minor modifications agreed in 1991- remains largely as it was during much of the Cold War. As NATO's mission in Bosnia showed, in operations of limited scope and purpose, much of the Alliance's extensive system of command is redundant. In IFOR, three distinct levels of military bureaucracy separated the troops on the ground from the North Atlantic Council. Moreover, important Allied contributors to IFOR, such as France and Spain, which had previously kept outside the command structure for political reasons, had to negotiate themselves into a system with which they were largely unfamiliar. For those two countries, joining NATO's military structure has now become a firm objective - on condition that it is sufficiently reformed to demonstrate a European capacity within it.
A review of NATO's military structure has been progressing since 1994, under the direction of NATO's Military Committee. The new structure, like the old, will have two strategic commands, both U.S.-led. Most Allies want two regional commands (north and south), although the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) favors retaining three to accommodate the new members. The number of levels will be reduced from four to three, with many of the lower-level commands being eliminated. The new structure will, at first, incorporate three 'nucleus' CJTF headquarters, giving the Alliance for the first time an in-place capability to deploy and command forces beyond Allied territory.
Europeanizing the structure remains contentious. The debate at present is on the 'visibility' of the European arrangement within NATO. A Deputy SACEUR would have the responsibility for developing and exercising a European capability; he would also be ready to lead an operation on behalf of the WEU. The debate is at its most contentious below Deputy SACEUR level. France, concerned about European visibility, would like both European regional commands to be European-led, otherwise the structure would be relatively even more U.S. top-heavy than it is now. The U.S., with an eye on substance, insists that the vital southern European command must remain in U.S. hands - how otherwise could the U.S. 6th Fleet be adequately commanded? A European commander in the south would also do little to relieve Greek-Turkish tension, which has prevented the establishment of NATO headquarters in both countries since 1992.
NATO's variable missions require a variable structure. In theory, enlargement, enhanced PFP and a new relationship with Russia will allow for coalition building for more demanding contingencies. Arguably, the Europeanization of the structure is likely in the longer term to have the most profound effect of all on the character of NATO. The Alliance, once structured to facilitate U.S. leadership, is now being restructured for variable leadership. The 1997 summit will be a unique opportunity to complete NATO's still unfinished transformation.