`National Police are not mere dishwashers'
Sr. Comr. Anton Tabah, Expert Staff of the National Police Chief, Jakarta
The National Police (Polri) may be blamed for the conflicts raging in Maluku, Aceh and Papua. They may be blamed for the failure to unravel the mysteries of the murdered labor activist Marsinah, the journalist Fuad Muhammad Sjafruddin (Udin), the shooting of students at Trisakti University and Semanggi in Jakarta and many other incidents, including a number of bombings.
In recent years, relief and optimism set in as the National Police continued to improve itself. Prior to Polri's 57th anniversary, which falls on July 1, the police have had some success, particularly in combating terrorism. They have received praise from the international community, although the public at home continues to express dissatisfaction with Polri's performance, mocking and cursing them. The police have even been accused of not being reform-minded.
Despite efforts at becoming more professional there are obstacles to this desire, such as the interests of the ruling elite. Maybe this explains why only a few of the police's top brass have stood up against tyranny -- such as those of the caliber of Gen. Soekanto, the first minister of police affairs, and Gen. Hugeng Iman Santoso.
When president Sukarno planned to make the National Police part of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), like the Army, Navy and Air Force, Soekanto firmly opposed the idea. For him, this would only harm police professionalism and would even dash all hopes that the police would ever become an authoritative force.
Soekanto's worry became a reality, while Gen. Hugeng gave up his position because he was not allowed to expose a corruption case.
In the New Order era, the police organization was virtually ruined and law enforcement was no longer independent. In the case of Marsinah, who was killed in 1993, the police quickly managed to expose the murderer and location of the crime. Unfortunately, to save the face of the powers-that-be, the results of the investigation were simply shelved.
Now there is more hope for police professionalism -- also meaning the police become independent and authoritative -- with the decrees on the police issued in 2000 by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). How this hope is translated into reality depends on the state's political treatment of the police. The police should never again be tempted into "political experiments".
At least part of the Polri's wish for reform has now been realized. Structurally, the police are now no longer part of the Indonesian Military (TNI). Instrumentally, Law No. 2/2002 on the Polri has been issued. Yet cultural changes need more time.
The state now no longer interferes with police affairs as regards professional quality and independence. Still, reform within Polri will be conducted in stages. This is not because of a lack of regulations or a lack of improvisation in the police apparatus -- the police must catch up with growing public demand regarding their role.
The reason is that, first, the police are still in the process of structural adjustment, which relates to the factor of power. Relations with other state institutions, which entail bargaining, may lead to an unfavorable direction for the police. Political divisions took place in the period leading to Gus Dur's executive order and in its aftermath. Some officers reportedly disobeyed superiors. New values are yet to take shape while old ones remain.
Second, Polri still seems to be treated as a dishwasher. Dirty plates from the parties of the past are all over the place. The dirt is from, for instance, the looting of natural resources, economic banditry and mafia-like groups, gambling, corruption, pornography, and from press freedom. While the police must handle white-collar crimes, the public demands that the police continue to investigate robbery, other petty crimes and even people living together outside of marriage.
Third, the police seem to be in a long-distance race without a finish line. The public demands that this regime must be "totally reformed". When social tension intensifies, a clash is inevitable. Against this backdrop the police must anticipate changes; and they can only do so if they can make cultural adjustments.
So we face two crucial developments: First, the kick-off of the reform movement was marked with the wide popular demand to reverse the existing situation; the desire to severe the strong grip of state control and replace it with "people's control".
Yet this was not coupled with the presence of a compatible capacity, particularly the role of Polri. Many members of the current political elite were perceived to side with the people, but have become a disappointment -- leading to widespread frustration.
Second, while past modernization showed amazing growth, Indonesians have been "overwhelmed" by their own environment.
The police now find that they must anticipate such a condition and prepare required measures, including guidelines at the operational level. Meanwhile, software and hardware must be modernized. The fact that foreign vessels are involved in illegal fishing in our territorial waters makes it absolutely necessary for us to have an adequate number of patrol vessels for the Sea Police and Air Police. Personnel development must be geared toward the establishment of a police force with specialized skills. Until now the police have played their role like superhumans, dealing with everything from traffic violations and petty thievery to cross-border crimes, while their personnel and skills are limited.
One may indeed expect that a police officer should be hospitable, nimble and agile. But it would be hard to find the ideal policeman given his empty stomach and a host of domestic problems. Worse, he might take off his uniform and rush out as a motorcycle taxi driver to supplement his income.
At the level of leadership, one finds officers quick to stigmatize "certain groups" or "masterminds" of major crimes. The response of a professional policeman would instead be measured and empirical, toward seeking a solution.
Perhaps the police curricula could be enriched with social understanding geared toward such responses. Nowadays, maybe we still hear the rumor that police cadets fall asleep once class begins, exhausted after the morning physical exercise.
Police cadets need simulation of social problems and a basic understanding of, among others, geography, demography, politics, anthropology, psychology and public relations.
Graduates would then better understand that social unrest is not merely another crime. Such incidents are linked with historical, sociological, anthropological and political aspects. To understand a particular social environment, policemen need education and training in what one writer dubs "the learning community". The existing police educational system, comprising among others the State Police School (SPN), the Police Academy, the Police College (PTIK), the Training School for Commissioned Officers (Secapa) and the Police Leadership College (Sespimpol), is certainly not sufficient.
The learning community for the police means expanding their learning environment beyond the above formal education institutions. This would help their cultural reform, something that until now has been considered very difficult to introduce.