`National Police are not mere dishwashers'

`National Police are not mere dishwashers'

Sr. Comr. Anton Tabah, Expert Staff of the National Police Chief,
Jakarta

The National Police may be blamed for the conflicts raging in
Maluku, Aceh and Papua. They may be blamed for the failure to
unravel the mysteries of the murdered labor activist Marsinah,
the journalist Fuad Muhammad Sjafruddin (Udin), the shooting of
students at Trisakti University and Semanggi in Jakarta and many
other incidents, including a number of bombings.

In recent years, relief and optimism set in as the National
Police (Polri) continued to improve itself. Prior to Polri's 57th
anniversary, which falls on July 1, the police have had some
success, particularly in combating terrorism. They have received
praise from the international community, although the public at
home continues to express dissatisfaction with Polri's
performance, mocking and cursing them. The police have even been
accused of not being reform-minded.

Despite efforts at becoming more professional there are
obstacles to this desire, such as the interests of the ruling
elite. Maybe this explains why only a few of the police's top
brass have stood up against tyranny -- such as those of the
caliber of Gen. Soekanto, the first minister of police affairs,
and Gen. Hugeng and Gen. Bimantoro, both former National Police
chiefs.

When president Sukarno planned to make the National Police
part of the Indonesian Armed Forces, like the Army, Navy and Air
Force, Soekanto firmly opposed the idea. For him, this would only
harm police professionalism and would even dash all hopes that
the police would ever become an authoritative force.

Soekanto's worry became a reality. Gen. Hugeng gave up his
position because he was not allowed to expose a corruption case,
while Gen. Bimantoro rejected a presidential executive order and
an unconstitutional decree to remove him from his post (he was
perceived to be siding with legislators who wanted to replace
then president Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur -- Ed.), a move
which contributed to the toppling of Gus Dur.

In the New Order era, the police organization was virtually
ruined and law enforcement was no longer independent. In the case
of Marsinah, who was killed in 1993, the police quickly managed
to expose the murderer and location of the crime. Unfortunately,
to save the face of the powers-that-be, the results of the
investigation were simply shelved.

Now there is more hope for police professionalism -- also
meaning the police become independent and authoritative -- with
the decrees on the police issued in 2000 by the People's
Consultative Assembly. How this hope is translated into reality
depends on the state's political treatment of the police. The
police should never again be tempted into "political
experiments".

At least part of the National Police's wish for reform has now
been realized. Structurally, the police are now no longer part of
the Indonesian Military (TNI). Instrumentally, Law No. 2/2002 on
the National Police has been issued. Yet cultural changes need
more time.

The state now no longer interferes with police affairs as
regards professional quality and independence. Still, reform
within Polri will be conducted in stages. This is not because of
a lack of regulations or a lack of improvisation in the police
apparatus -- the police must catch up with growing public demand
regarding their role.

The reason is that, first, the police are still in the process
of structural adjustment, which relates to the factor of power.
Relations with other state institutions, which entail bargaining,
may lead to an unfavorable direction for the police. Political
divisions took place in the period leading to Gus Dur's executive
order and in its aftermath. Some officers reportedly disobeyed
superiors. New values are yet to take shape while old ones
remain.

Second, the National Police still seems to be treated as a
dishwasher. Dirty plates from the parties of the past are all
over the place. The dirt is from, for instance, the looting of
natural resources, economic banditry and mafia-like groups,
gambling, corruption, pornography, and from press freedom. While
the police must handle white-collar crimes, the public demands
that the police continue to investigate robbery, other petty
crimes and even people living together outside of marriage.

Third, the police seem to be in a long-distance race without a
finish line. The public demands that this regime must be "totally
reformed". When social tension intensifies, a clash is
inevitable. Against this backdrop the police must anticipate
changes; and they can only do so if they can make cultural
adjustments.

So we face two crucial developments: First, the kick-off of
the reform movement was marked with the wide popular demand to
reverse the existing situation; the desire to severe the strong
grip of state control and replace it with "people's control".

Yet this was not coupled with the presence of a compatible
capacity, particularly the role of the National Police. Many
members of the current political elite were perceived to side
with the people, but have become a disappointment -- leading to
widespread frustration.

Second, while past modernization showed amazing growth,
Indonesians have been "overwhelmed" by their own environment.

The police now find that they must anticipate such a condition
and prepare required measures, including guidelines at the
operational level. Meanwhile, software and hardware must be
modernized. The fact that foreign vessels are involved in illegal
fishing in our territorial waters makes it absolutely necessary
for us to have an adequate number of patrol vessels for the Sea
and Air Police. Personnel development must be geared toward the
establishment of a police force with specialized skills. Until
now the police have played their role like superhumans, dealing
with everything from traffic violations and petty thievery to
cross-border crimes, while their personnel and skills are
limited.

One may indeed expect that a police officer should be
hospitable, nimble and agile. But it would be hard to find the
ideal policeman given his empty stomach and a host of domestic
problems. Worse, he might take off his uniform and rush out as a
motorcycle taxi driver to supplement his income.

At the level of leadership, one finds officers quick to
stigmatize "certain groups" or "masterminds" of major crimes. The
response of a professional policeman would instead be measured
and empirical, toward seeking a solution.

Perhaps the police curricula could be enriched with social
understanding geared toward such responses. Nowadays, maybe we
still hear the rumor that police cadets fall asleep once class
begins, exhausted after the morning physical exercise.

Police cadets need simulation of social problems and a basic
understanding of, among others, geography, demography, politics,
anthropology, psychology and public relations.

Graduates would then better understand that social unrest is
not merely another crime. Such incidents are linked with
historical, sociological, anthropological and political aspects.
To understand a particular social environment, policemen need
education and training in what one writer dubs "the learning
community". The existing police educational system, comprising
among others the State Police School (SPN), the Police Academy,
the Police College (PTIK), the Training School for Commissioned
Officers (Secapa) and the Police Leadership College (Sespimpol),
is certainly not sufficient.

The learning community for the police means expanding their
learning environment beyond the above formal education
institutions. This would help their cultural reform, something
that until now has been considered very difficult to introduce.