National consensus needed to avoid more serious chaos
National consensus needed to avoid more serious chaos
By Laksamana Sukardi
This is the first of two articles analyzing the current crisis
in Indonesia and predicting the outcome in the near future.
JAKARTA (JP): After Soeharto's fall from the presidency in May
1998, Indonesia was thrown from the frying pan into the fire.
Extrajudicial killings by so-called "black ninja" death squads,
hundreds of church burnings, revelations of mass murders
committed by the military, widespread looting and rioting, and a
dramatic upsurge in street crime have become routine everyday
occurrences.
Needless to say, the situation throughout the country has
become extremely frightening. The social and political turmoil is
compounded by the depressing state of the economy. Businessmen,
investors and diplomats have labeled Indonesia a dangerous place
and one to be avoided. The United States, Australia, and many
other foreign governments have issued travel advisories.
The riots and savagery have sent shock waves through the
country. Donor nations and international investors are alarmed.
Investors are obviously very apprehensive about these
developments because of the huge sums of capital they have
invested in the Indonesian economy. Indonesia has suddenly become
a pariah nation for investment.
The two key questions which everyone is asking are: Why is
Indonesia now plagued by these calamities; and what is likely to
happen in the near-, intermediate-, and longer-terms?
During the Soeharto era, investors viewed the country as an
open economy, dedicated to the precepts of free trade as defined
by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA), and other regional and international
trade organizations.
Indonesia was lauded repeatedly by the advanced nations and
multilateral finance institutions, which held it up as a model
of a successful emerging market economy. The World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) and other institutions urged other developing nations to
emulate Indonesia's example.
But the donor nations and international investors did not want
to admit publicly what they discussed among themselves in
private, namely that Soeharto was a brutal tyrant who kept the
country under control by the use of terror, and who ruled with an
iron fist what was arguably the world's most endemically corrupt
regime. So long as the profits were rolling in, investors played
the "house of cards" game according to Soeharto's rules by
cutting his family and cronies in on deals, and they kept their
mouths and eyes shut to the grim realities lurking in the
shadows.
Their lack of concern was manifested by the abundant flow of
offshore loans and investments in Indonesia and their praise of
Soeharto's authoritarian regime. Almost all the investors and
creditors ignored the risks to business and investment in the
event the authoritarian system of Soeharto collapsed.
After the student reform movement managed to bring down
Soeharto, Indonesia entered an erratic period of transition -- a
transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy. For thirty-
two years, under the Soeharto dictatorship, no state institutions
(government, parliament, courts) were autonomous or independent
in Indonesia. Soeharto held unlimited ultimate power, namely:
* Government: All appointments and high level placements of
state officials had to have Soeharto's blessing -- the state
ministers, regional governors, mayors, regents, the Central Bank
Governor and others.
* Politics: Soeharto appointed the majority of the members of
the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). The leaders of
political parties had to receive Soeharto's blessing. Party
policies had to be approved by the Soeharto regime. Moreover, any
leaders of mass organizations with strategic political power,
such as the Organization of Youth and the Indonesian Red Cross,
had to have the blessing of Soeharto.
* Law: The selection and appointment of high court judges and
the chief justice of the Supreme Court were not able to adopt
independent verdicts. The judges had to kowtow to political
interests and the business interests of Soeharto and his cronies.
In any strategic case, the judges had to "consult" with the
Soeharto regime.
* Business: Soeharto chose the directors of state-owned
enterprises and approved all company strategic policies. The
tender and procurement processes were indirectly determined by
Soeharto and his cronies.
Therefore, it was inevitable, when Soeharto was suddenly
forced from the throne, the people and nation of Indonesia were
thrown into total chaos. Most of the directors of state
institutions are unaccustomed to taking any initiative. More
dangerous still, these directors were unaccustomed to taking
responsibility, because they were appointed and then trained to
simply function as loyal servants and not become astute leaders
with a vision for the future.
The people of Indonesia have grown to despise the institutions
that supported the authoritarian rule of Soeharto and absolutely
squelched their aspirations. One very clear example is the
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). The MPR does not represent
the voice of the people in any way. In March 1998, the 1997
elected MPR grandly acclaimed Soeharto as President of the
Republic of Indonesia. But then, less than two months later,
Soeharto was forced from office by the people.
It is obvious, therefore, that the MPR was simply a "master-
piece" created by Soeharto from his own chosen cadre. The present
MPR does not voice the aspirations of the people, but is a
constitutional instrument to preserve the authoritarian regime
and power of Soeharto.
When Soeharto was brought down, the Indonesian people were
faced with a constitutional crisis as all the institutions of
state, including the MPR, were suddenly unable to function
effectively. De facto, the MPR lost its mandate and legitimacy
with the people. The situation was further compounded due to the
lack of available alternatives which forced the people to use the
expired system and state institutions left over from Soeharto.
The government of President Habibie emerged from a pre-emptive
move by Soeharto. On May 21, 1998, Habibie was installed as
President in the State Palace without convening a session of the
MPR. The justification for this move was that the MPR could not
convene because of security concerns stemming from the state of
emergency. Habibie has personally confessed that Soeharto was his
mentor and played a major role in Habibie's political career. It
is therefore very difficult to separate Habibie from Soeharto.
Every Indonesian knows that Soeharto is like the puppeteer who
positions his puppets on the screen, including the leaders of
state institutions, as well as Habibie.
The strong perception among the Indonesian people is that the
Habibie government is just a continuation of the Soeharto regime,
especially after Habibie chose to retain most of the old Soeharto
cabinet.
It is understandable that Habibie has desperately attempted to
erase the image that he is a puppet of Soeharto. But the facts
and the historical evidence are hard to rub out. The fact that
Habibie was one of the most beloved and spoiled of the Soeharto
regime puppets makes this task very difficult.
The perception that has grown among the public is that Habibie
is a perpetuation of Soeharto and that the Habibie government is
just as corrupt as the Soeharto regime. The people feel the fall
of the Habibie government is an important part of the reform
process and they see the Habibie government as a transitional
government that must be replaced.
Public figures who were born during the Soeharto era generally
do not have a feel for the grassroots. The political careers of
those during the Soeharto era relied heavily on their connection
with Soeharto. The same is true of Habibie. Because of Habibie's
connection with Soeharto, and Soeharto's strong patronage,
Habibie was able to compete with other high level Soeharto
servants and finally emerged as the third president of Indonesia.
Consequently, Habibie desperately needs the support of the
grassroots to maintain his position as president. The only
alternative for the Habibie camp is to take advantage of
religious sentiments and promote sectarian politics in Indonesia.
A number of examples confirm this stance. The use of religion
to attack and discredit his opposition and critics include:
* The Islamic People's Congress stated that women are not
permitted to become President or Vice President of Indonesia.
* The use of religious attributes with regard to the security of
the Special Session of the MPR.
It is easy to see that political developments in Indonesia are
moving toward a radicalization that has the potential to result
in problems involving SARA (exclusive political activities aimed
at causing ethnic, religious and racial upheaval).
The perception of the public toward Habibie has been
strengthened further by the promotion of this radicalization and
sectarian politics. For this reason, the Habibie government has
become ineffective and this therefore increases the degree of
instability of the reform process in Indonesia.
When examining the social, political and economic developments
in Indonesia, the role of and recent developments within ABRI can
not be ignored.
During the Soeharto reign, ABRI played a very important role
in securing and entrenching Soeharto's power. To achieve this
goal, Soeharto involved ABRI in Indonesian politics, so that ABRI
actually functioned as a political institution rather than a
military institution.
Therefore, ABRI has the same character as a political party,
where political competition among the ABRI leaders was prevalent.
Because ABRI functions as a political institution, it is logical
that extremely competitive factions and camps emerged among the
ABRI ranks. These alliances were the main factors affecting
promotions, where political considerations or one's closeness to
a certain camp could determine one's career. So promotions among
the ABRI ranks were not based on merit. Consequently, ABRI
operations and its image were undermined.
Several examples confirm this view:
* The careers of military officers were very erratic. One very
clear example is the case of Lt. Gen. Prabowo Soebianto who was
promoted each year and managed to become a general within a very
short time. However, immediately after Soeharto fell, Prabowo and
two other high-ranking officers were discharged from ABRI for
committing lethal acts.
* The use of live ammunition on students has been denied
constantly by ABRI, although the evidence from the field
indicates that many victims were shot with live ammunition. This
discrepancy is clear proof of the possibility that ABRI is not
under one command, especially when it comes to politically
motivated operations.
* The use of vigilante volunteers who used religious attributes
and symbols is further proof that ABRI has lost credibility given
such dubious policies. Moreover, this move gives way to
suspicions that ABRI does not have full control of security,
especially when besmirched by politics.
ABRI's deteriorating image due to the exposure of human rights
abuses is now a tremendous problem. Several cases have been
disclosed, including the mass murders in Aceh, human rights
abuses in East Timor, the shooting of Trisakti students on their
own campus, the slaughter of students at Semanggi near the MPR
building, the riots in May 1998 that resulted in mass looting,
burning, murder and the rape of ethnic Chinese women and the
abduction and torture of pro-democracy activists.
Having witnessed these atrocities, the youth of Indonesia,
particularly the students who entered universities during the
Soeharto era, have a terrible perception of ABRI. The youth of
Indonesia view ABRI as being wholly brutal and aggressively
against them.
Consequently, the general public and the young people in
particular feel that ABRI is the main obstacle to democracy in
Indonesia and calls for the elimination of ABRI's social and
political roles have grown louder and louder.
Considering ABRI's state, its role as the security apparatus
and stabilizing force in Indonesia has become ineffective. Due to
its monstrous image, ABRI is even seen as the major problem
rather than the solution.
The process of transition from an authoritarian regime to
democracy in Indonesia is highly risky and uncertain. The complex
constitutional crisis that has emerged will be difficult to
resolve quickly and peacefully. The weakness of the transitional
Habibie government only compounds the problem because of
Habibie's role as a trusted confidant of Soeharto. Indonesia's
transition needs a capable leader who has the full mandate of the
people to form a government that can uphold the laws and justice
in Indonesia.
The logical consequence of all this is that the Soeharto
puppets who have the means and finances (derived from corruption
and collusion) will not give up easily. This camp will fight to
sponsor and support any political group willing to protect their
interests. As a result, brutal and inhumane political power plays
are in progress. The worst fear is that the government and
upholders of the law will be unable to use the law and justice
system to process these violations.
Some examples:
* The mass murders by assassins of religious leaders in East
Java. The victims were accused without strong evidence of being
sorcerers. Over 200 have been murdered recently.
* The burning of churches and shops owned by people of Chinese
descent in Jakarta on Nov. 20, 1998. The court system in
Indonesia has proved incapable of prosecuting such crimes.
* Protests and looting of business throughout the regions of
Indonesia. Generally, the local communities feel neglected and
that they have suffered losses due to business and investments in
the regions. The people have also turned to looting because of
economic hardship that has caused hunger and hopelessness.
* The use of special organizations and criminals to instigate
chaos and provocation has angered the people, resulting in
massive unrest.
The writer is chief executive officer of ReFORM consulting
based in Jakarta.
Window A: The present MPR does not voice the aspirations of the
people, but is a constitutional instrument to preserve the
authoritarian regime and power of Soeharto.
Window B: Indonesia's transition needs a capable leader who has
the full mandate of the people to form a government that can
uphold the laws and justice in Indonesia.