National consensus needed to avoid more serious chaos

By Laksamana Sukardi

This is the first of two articles analyzing the current crisis in Indonesia and predicting the outcome in the near future.

JAKARTA (JP): After Soeharto's fall from the presidency in May 1998, Indonesia was thrown from the frying pan into the fire. Extrajudicial killings by so-called "black ninja" death squads, hundreds of church burnings, revelations of mass murders committed by the military, widespread looting and rioting, and a dramatic upsurge in street crime have become routine everyday occurrences.

Needless to say, the situation throughout the country has become extremely frightening. The social and political turmoil is compounded by the depressing state of the economy. Businessmen, investors and diplomats have labeled Indonesia a dangerous place and one to be avoided. The United States, Australia, and many other foreign governments have issued travel advisories.

The riots and savagery have sent shock waves through the country. Donor nations and international investors are alarmed. Investors are obviously very apprehensive about these developments because of the huge sums of capital they have invested in the Indonesian economy. Indonesia has suddenly become a pariah nation for investment.

The two key questions which everyone is asking are: Why is Indonesia now plagued by these calamities; and what is likely to happen in the near-, intermediate-, and longer-terms?

During the Soeharto era, investors viewed the country as an open economy, dedicated to the precepts of free trade as defined by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and other regional and international trade organizations.

Indonesia was lauded repeatedly by the advanced nations and multilateral finance institutions, which held it up as a model of a successful emerging market economy. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other institutions urged other developing nations to emulate Indonesia's example.

But the donor nations and international investors did not want to admit publicly what they discussed among themselves in private, namely that Soeharto was a brutal tyrant who kept the country under control by the use of terror, and who ruled with an iron fist what was arguably the world's most endemically corrupt regime. So long as the profits were rolling in, investors played the "house of cards" game according to Soeharto's rules by cutting his family and cronies in on deals, and they kept their mouths and eyes shut to the grim realities lurking in the shadows.

Their lack of concern was manifested by the abundant flow of offshore loans and investments in Indonesia and their praise of Soeharto's authoritarian regime. Almost all the investors and creditors ignored the risks to business and investment in the event the authoritarian system of Soeharto collapsed.

After the student reform movement managed to bring down Soeharto, Indonesia entered an erratic period of transition -- a transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy. For thirty- two years, under the Soeharto dictatorship, no state institutions (government, parliament, courts) were autonomous or independent in Indonesia. Soeharto held unlimited ultimate power, namely:

* Government: All appointments and high level placements of state officials had to have Soeharto's blessing -- the state ministers, regional governors, mayors, regents, the Central Bank Governor and others.

* Politics: Soeharto appointed the majority of the members of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). The leaders of political parties had to receive Soeharto's blessing. Party policies had to be approved by the Soeharto regime. Moreover, any leaders of mass organizations with strategic political power, such as the Organization of Youth and the Indonesian Red Cross, had to have the blessing of Soeharto.

* Law: The selection and appointment of high court judges and the chief justice of the Supreme Court were not able to adopt independent verdicts. The judges had to kowtow to political interests and the business interests of Soeharto and his cronies. In any strategic case, the judges had to "consult" with the Soeharto regime.

* Business: Soeharto chose the directors of state-owned enterprises and approved all company strategic policies. The tender and procurement processes were indirectly determined by Soeharto and his cronies.

Therefore, it was inevitable, when Soeharto was suddenly forced from the throne, the people and nation of Indonesia were thrown into total chaos. Most of the directors of state institutions are unaccustomed to taking any initiative. More dangerous still, these directors were unaccustomed to taking responsibility, because they were appointed and then trained to simply function as loyal servants and not become astute leaders with a vision for the future.

The people of Indonesia have grown to despise the institutions that supported the authoritarian rule of Soeharto and absolutely squelched their aspirations. One very clear example is the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). The MPR does not represent the voice of the people in any way. In March 1998, the 1997 elected MPR grandly acclaimed Soeharto as President of the Republic of Indonesia. But then, less than two months later, Soeharto was forced from office by the people.

It is obvious, therefore, that the MPR was simply a "master- piece" created by Soeharto from his own chosen cadre. The present MPR does not voice the aspirations of the people, but is a constitutional instrument to preserve the authoritarian regime and power of Soeharto.

When Soeharto was brought down, the Indonesian people were faced with a constitutional crisis as all the institutions of state, including the MPR, were suddenly unable to function effectively. De facto, the MPR lost its mandate and legitimacy with the people. The situation was further compounded due to the lack of available alternatives which forced the people to use the expired system and state institutions left over from Soeharto.

The government of President Habibie emerged from a pre-emptive move by Soeharto. On May 21, 1998, Habibie was installed as President in the State Palace without convening a session of the MPR. The justification for this move was that the MPR could not convene because of security concerns stemming from the state of emergency. Habibie has personally confessed that Soeharto was his mentor and played a major role in Habibie's political career. It is therefore very difficult to separate Habibie from Soeharto. Every Indonesian knows that Soeharto is like the puppeteer who positions his puppets on the screen, including the leaders of state institutions, as well as Habibie.

The strong perception among the Indonesian people is that the Habibie government is just a continuation of the Soeharto regime, especially after Habibie chose to retain most of the old Soeharto cabinet.

It is understandable that Habibie has desperately attempted to erase the image that he is a puppet of Soeharto. But the facts and the historical evidence are hard to rub out. The fact that Habibie was one of the most beloved and spoiled of the Soeharto regime puppets makes this task very difficult.

The perception that has grown among the public is that Habibie is a perpetuation of Soeharto and that the Habibie government is just as corrupt as the Soeharto regime. The people feel the fall of the Habibie government is an important part of the reform process and they see the Habibie government as a transitional government that must be replaced.

Public figures who were born during the Soeharto era generally do not have a feel for the grassroots. The political careers of those during the Soeharto era relied heavily on their connection with Soeharto. The same is true of Habibie. Because of Habibie's connection with Soeharto, and Soeharto's strong patronage, Habibie was able to compete with other high level Soeharto servants and finally emerged as the third president of Indonesia.

Consequently, Habibie desperately needs the support of the grassroots to maintain his position as president. The only alternative for the Habibie camp is to take advantage of religious sentiments and promote sectarian politics in Indonesia.

A number of examples confirm this stance. The use of religion to attack and discredit his opposition and critics include:

* The Islamic People's Congress stated that women are not permitted to become President or Vice President of Indonesia.

* The use of religious attributes with regard to the security of the Special Session of the MPR.

It is easy to see that political developments in Indonesia are moving toward a radicalization that has the potential to result in problems involving SARA (exclusive political activities aimed at causing ethnic, religious and racial upheaval).

The perception of the public toward Habibie has been strengthened further by the promotion of this radicalization and sectarian politics. For this reason, the Habibie government has become ineffective and this therefore increases the degree of instability of the reform process in Indonesia.

When examining the social, political and economic developments in Indonesia, the role of and recent developments within ABRI can not be ignored.

During the Soeharto reign, ABRI played a very important role in securing and entrenching Soeharto's power. To achieve this goal, Soeharto involved ABRI in Indonesian politics, so that ABRI actually functioned as a political institution rather than a military institution.

Therefore, ABRI has the same character as a political party, where political competition among the ABRI leaders was prevalent. Because ABRI functions as a political institution, it is logical that extremely competitive factions and camps emerged among the ABRI ranks. These alliances were the main factors affecting promotions, where political considerations or one's closeness to a certain camp could determine one's career. So promotions among the ABRI ranks were not based on merit. Consequently, ABRI operations and its image were undermined. Several examples confirm this view:

* The careers of military officers were very erratic. One very clear example is the case of Lt. Gen. Prabowo Soebianto who was promoted each year and managed to become a general within a very short time. However, immediately after Soeharto fell, Prabowo and two other high-ranking officers were discharged from ABRI for committing lethal acts.

* The use of live ammunition on students has been denied constantly by ABRI, although the evidence from the field indicates that many victims were shot with live ammunition. This discrepancy is clear proof of the possibility that ABRI is not under one command, especially when it comes to politically motivated operations.

* The use of vigilante volunteers who used religious attributes and symbols is further proof that ABRI has lost credibility given such dubious policies. Moreover, this move gives way to suspicions that ABRI does not have full control of security, especially when besmirched by politics.

ABRI's deteriorating image due to the exposure of human rights abuses is now a tremendous problem. Several cases have been disclosed, including the mass murders in Aceh, human rights abuses in East Timor, the shooting of Trisakti students on their own campus, the slaughter of students at Semanggi near the MPR building, the riots in May 1998 that resulted in mass looting, burning, murder and the rape of ethnic Chinese women and the abduction and torture of pro-democracy activists.

Having witnessed these atrocities, the youth of Indonesia, particularly the students who entered universities during the Soeharto era, have a terrible perception of ABRI. The youth of Indonesia view ABRI as being wholly brutal and aggressively against them.

Consequently, the general public and the young people in particular feel that ABRI is the main obstacle to democracy in Indonesia and calls for the elimination of ABRI's social and political roles have grown louder and louder.

Considering ABRI's state, its role as the security apparatus and stabilizing force in Indonesia has become ineffective. Due to its monstrous image, ABRI is even seen as the major problem rather than the solution.

The process of transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy in Indonesia is highly risky and uncertain. The complex constitutional crisis that has emerged will be difficult to resolve quickly and peacefully. The weakness of the transitional Habibie government only compounds the problem because of Habibie's role as a trusted confidant of Soeharto. Indonesia's transition needs a capable leader who has the full mandate of the people to form a government that can uphold the laws and justice in Indonesia.

The logical consequence of all this is that the Soeharto puppets who have the means and finances (derived from corruption and collusion) will not give up easily. This camp will fight to sponsor and support any political group willing to protect their interests. As a result, brutal and inhumane political power plays are in progress. The worst fear is that the government and upholders of the law will be unable to use the law and justice system to process these violations.

Some examples:

* The mass murders by assassins of religious leaders in East Java. The victims were accused without strong evidence of being sorcerers. Over 200 have been murdered recently.

* The burning of churches and shops owned by people of Chinese descent in Jakarta on Nov. 20, 1998. The court system in Indonesia has proved incapable of prosecuting such crimes.

* Protests and looting of business throughout the regions of Indonesia. Generally, the local communities feel neglected and that they have suffered losses due to business and investments in the regions. The people have also turned to looting because of economic hardship that has caused hunger and hopelessness.

* The use of special organizations and criminals to instigate chaos and provocation has angered the people, resulting in massive unrest.

The writer is chief executive officer of ReFORM consulting based in Jakarta.

Window A: The present MPR does not voice the aspirations of the people, but is a constitutional instrument to preserve the authoritarian regime and power of Soeharto.

Window B: Indonesia's transition needs a capable leader who has the full mandate of the people to form a government that can uphold the laws and justice in Indonesia.