Mystery over Iraq's weapons

LONDON: After five-and-a-half years of inspections, monitoring and analysis, the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are still not able to declare that they know all the facts about Iraq's proscribed nuclear, biological, chemical and missile programs. Moreover, the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, has stated that Iraq could still be hiding a number of Al-Hussein (modified Scud-B) missiles and warheads, and materials to produce chemical and biological weapons. This reality raises two major concerns:

UNSCOM's ability to guarantee that Iraq will not restart its weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) programs will be effective only if the political support for rigorous inspection and monitoring is maintained in the UN Security Council (UNSC). Such surveillance will become more challenging if, in response to mounting pressure, sanctions against Iraq are lifted fully; and

It illustrates the technical limits, against a governing regime determined to hide illegal weapons programs, of a wide variety of verification and monitoring techniques which form part of current and future treaty compliance systems.

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 passed at the end of the 1991 Gulf War required Iraq to make a 'full, final and complete disclosure' of its WMD programs, as well as its programs to develop ballistic missiles with a range of 150 km or more, including all associated research-and-development facilities. All these elements had to be destroyed or dismantled. In its initial declarations, Iraq stated that it had: * no nuclear or biological weapons programs, although there is now ample evidence of both; and * substantially fewer chemical weapons, fewer missiles and a more limited development program than was later discovered to be the case.

UNSCOM investigations since 1991 have revealed a nuclear- weapons program which, over a ten-year period, has been estimated to have cost between US$8 and $10 billion at over 20 sites involving some 15,000 people. Iraq did not admit formally that its nuclear activities were aimed at producing a nuclear explosive device until Aug. 17, 1995. The program included multiple routes to enrich uranium for weapons purposes. This clandestine activity was made possible by extensive foreign assistance through an elaborate supplier network which is yet to be fully uncovered.

It is essential to understand the full extent of the program in order to ensure continuing compliance with UNSCR 687. At times, to gain the access needed, extraordinary measures have been required. For instance, in January 1993, when Iraq blocked air access by UN inspectors, air-strikes had to be launched against sites on targets in southern Iraq. The political climate which made such measures possible has changed as, for example, in November 1996 when Iraq denied inspectors access to Republican Guard facilities. On this occasion, UNSCOM could not count on UNSC support for vigorous action and was forced to negotiate for limited access despite its unfettered rights granted by UNSCR 687.

Since no offensive biological-weapons program was declared for the first four years of inspections, UNSCOM representatives had to visit every facility which had the capability to contribute at least to part of such a program. This meant inspecting not only the more obvious types of bio-technological facility, such as pharmaceutical production plants and breweries, but also dairy factories and even vegetable-oil processing plants (for filter presses) and detergent production sites (for particle spray dryers). Other types of facilities visited included agricultural research centers (for anti-crop agents and spraying devices), medical research institutions (genetic engineering) and university laboratories.

Altogether, over 80 sites had to be inspected, personnel interviewed, and important dual-use equipment tagged and assessed for its possible participation in the weapons program and the requirements for long-term monitoring. Only through painstaking and detailed investigations, both in Iraq and outside, was real evidence found of an offensive biological-weapons program. While UNSCOM inspectors discovered proof that a program existed, even after four years of investigations they did not know its scope or the state of its development. However, this was sufficient to force the Iraqis to confess to an offensive program in July 1995.

Although Iraq admitted to producing biological agents, it claimed that it had not filled any warheads. In August 1995, the scope of the program became better known when Gen. Hussein Kamal Hassan defected; the Iraqis then confessed to a program which included lethal, incapacitating crop agents in a variety of warheads in Al-Hussein missiles as well as tactical field artillery.

Development work on the delivery of agents from combat aircraft and aerial spray tanks was well advanced by the time Kuwait was recaptured by the coalition forces at the end of the Gulf War. While one of the major production facilities at Al Hakem was destroyed under UN supervision in May and June 1996, Ekeus reported to the UN Security Council on Dec. 18, 1996 that he remained unconvinced that the full extent of the program had been revealed and that all biological munitions had been destroyed.

Iraq's development, production and use of chemical weapons during its conflict with Iran was well known. Consequently, UNSCOM began its work with the knowledge of a declared program.

Until Gen. Kamal defected, however, the full extent of the production of VX, a more advanced nerve agent than sarin and tabun, was hidden by Iraq. In his Dec. 18, 1996 report, Ekeus also stated that Iraq had not fully declared its VX program, including the quantities and whereabouts of key precursor chemicals.

Knowledge of what can fairly be regarded as the most visible part of the proscribed programs, that on ballistic missiles, remains incomplete. UNSCOM believes that a number of missiles and their warheads are still hidden. Some unofficial reports put the number at over 20. There is good reason to be skeptical of Iraqi denials, given that they hid vital research on more advanced missile engines for four years and attempted to acquire components for proscribed missiles after UNSCR 687 came into force in 1991.

In his report to the UNSC, Ekeus said that Iraq had all the necessary components to recreate a missile force. For example, during a three-week excavation mission at Dawra, near Baghdad, which ended on Jan. 26, 1997, inspectors discovered four undeclared missile engines for Al-Hussein missiles -- and more are still to be accounted for.

The important milestones that lie ahead for the UN Special Commission on Iraq include:

Ekeus' next six-monthly report is due in April 1997. This document will be a key factor for policy-makers to take into account as pressure mounts for lifting the sanctions on Iraq.

At the same time, there will be an assessment of the implementation of UNSCR 986, which allows Iraq to sell up to $1 billion-worth of oil every quarter to fund the import of food and medical supplies under United Nations supervision, pay war reparations and fund UNSCOM, the IAEA and other UN operations in Iraq. Baghdad agreed to the implementation of the Resolution on Nov. 23, 1996 and the oil started flowing on Dec. 10. Permission to sell oil has to be renewed by the UN Security Council after 180 days of operation.

And the partial lifting of sanctions, let alone a full lifting, would make UNSCOM's verification task even greater. The record of deception outlined above, throughout the more than five years of UNSCOM's operations, is discouraging. Those making judgments about the wisdom of lifting sanctions will have to weigh very carefully the dogged determination of the Iraqi regime to retain, and be in a position to recreate, proscribed weapons programs.

Although the political circumstances are substantially different, the experience in Iraq demonstrates the technical limitations of intrusive inspections which need to be taken into account in the context of arms-control and non-proliferation regimes. In addition to very intrusive on-site inspections, UNSCOM has been able to deploy a panoply of monitoring and surveillance means, ranging from a U2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters with ground-penetrating radar and over 100 optical cameras deployed at many facilities throughout Iraq.

In present circumstances, with all its rights and innovative use of verification equipment, UNSCOM can just about contain Iraq's determination to circumvent its obligations under UNSCR 687. This experience must give pause for thought about the cost- effectiveness of far less intrusive arms-control regimes.