Sat, 05 Oct 2002

Myriad problems mar TNI relations with the police

Lela E. Madjiah, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

Army Chief Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu must be feeling miserable of late. On Wednesday, he publicly discharged 20 members of the Medan-based Airborne 100th Battalion for attacking a Brimob police station in Binjai on Sunday evening, sparking off a gunbattle that lasted for nine hours and left at least 8 dead and dozens wounded.

Only last year Ryamizard, then chief of the Army's Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), discharged 20 members of Kostrad's Infantry Battalion 501 for involvement in a gunfight with police officers in Madiun, East Java. Two civilians were shot dead and 15 others were injured during last year's fierce clash that occurred on Sept. 16, 2001.

The incidents in Binjai and Madiun are a repeat of similar clashes across the country, triggered by rivalries between the military and police. In fact, the rivalry between the two services has increased since their official separation on July 1, 2000 and has already led to violent incidents across the country. There were 79 reported military-police clashes throughout 2000, during which six were killed, 70 seriously wounded and another 76 slightly wounded. The number of clashes decreased to 52 in 2001, during which left three dead, 39 seriously injured and 31 slightly wounded.

The number of incidents further declined during the period of January to August this year, with 23 cases reported, or a decrease by around 35 percent compared to the previous year. The Binjai incident, however, is the bloodiest single clash so far.

More incidents are bound to occur if the TNI fails to address the root problems. There are at least three main issues to deal with to prevent recurring incidents.

* Salaries. Members of the military are engaged in various illegal business activities due to low salaries. Troops get Rp 798,000 a month. The amount includes Rp 7,500 in daily meal allowance and that means the basic salary of a soldier is Rp 573,000 (US$63) a month, slightly lower than workers' minimum wage of around Rp 600,000 for Greater Jakarta. By law, servicemen are prohibited from conducting business activities. However, the TNI, as an institution, seems less than willing to put a stop to such businesses because of its inability to adequately provide for its members. Worse, many are engaged in operating illegal business or providing protection for them which often includes gambling operations, illegal logging, smuggling, drug dealing and even weapons sales.

The police, too, face similar problems and it is in big cities like Medan that clashes over income sources between members of the two forces are imminent. As long as salaries remain poor, soldiers and policemen here will resort to side businesses to enrich themselves and to "keep up with the Joneses". The battle over business operations will therefore continue.

* Legal and organizational problems. Law No. 2/2002 on the National Police was another blow to the TNI after the painful separation of the two forces. The law, dubbed a "super power" law, has further sidelined the military, which had been stripped of its powerful socio-political role.

The police's new-found power has resulted in what many in the military described as a euphoria and has led to questionable decisions, such as the training of the police mobile brigade as counterinsurgency troops and the purchase of M-16 firearms. This seems to run against the spirit of the separation of the two forces, which was triggered by, among other things, concerns that the police were too militarized.

Unfortunately, the new-found power has not been matched with adequate personnel and capabilities. Prof. Satjipto Rahardjo, founder of the Police Study Center at Diponegoro University in Semarang, said it would take at least three generations before Indonesia could have an ideal police force.

The law also overlaps with Law No. 3/2002 on the Indonesian Military. According to Law No. 2, the police have the right to ask for military assistance in dealing with conflicts, while Law No. 3 stipulates that the military has the authority to declare a state of emergency or a state of war to deal with a conflict.

The government has yet to issue a regulation that serves as a clear guideline for both forces to avoid clashes, particularly on the operational level.

Gen. Endriartono Sutarto raised the issue when he was still Army chief of staff. He said the lack of clear guidelines in regard to the roles of the police and the military in conflict handling had resulted in prolonged conflicts in various parts of the country due to the inability of both forces to solve them.

It is imperative that the government issue a regulation that will provide a clear guideline on the role of the military and police in internal security.

* Cultural problem. The separation of the police from the military was a blow to the latter, for a number of reasons. For decades, the police had been treated as the "younger brother" and were treated as an inferior force by their military colleagues.

The separation was also considered by many in the military as an effort to create division between the two forces. History has shown that the police and the military were united in their defense of the republic and their separation was seen as a move to weaken the country's unity.

Members of the military, as well as the police, are finding it difficult to adjust to the police's new role. As of July 1, 2001, the police are under direct presidential authority. This places the police on par with the military. The "big brother" is now legally, at least, on the same level as their younger brothers. This change has resulted in a culture shock of sorts. Soldiers, who used to feel superior, now find it offensive for a policeman to ticket them for violating a traffic regulation.

"They (the soldiers) are wrong for committing the traffic regulations, but they cannot accept being reprimanded by a policeman, which is also wrong of them," said former Army deputy chief Lt. Gen. (ret.) Kiki Syahnakri,

The above three factors need serious attention if the TNI is determined to improve its conduct. Good conduct yields good publicity and good public relations.