Myanmar's political dialogue stalled yet

Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

The war in Iraq has had a great dampening effect on the future prospects of the reconciliation process in Burma. The Burmese junta leaders know full well that world attention is no longer focused on their ongoing suppression of the Burmese people.

The much-heralded release of opposition party leader Aung San Suu Kyi last May has remained only a gesture. The regime is still reluctant to genuinely start the much-awaited political dialogue to proceed towards power-sharing and building democratic institutions.

Burma is also facing an economic malaise of its own making. The fallout of its banking crisis in recent weeks will have far- reaching ramifications on its poorly managed financial markets and the economy in general.

In such a dire situation, the dialogue process has now become the regime's most efficient diplomatic instrument to increase international support and recognition. Apart from delaying further sanctions and weakening support of the opposition, the junta aims to sideline democracy and strengthen its grip on the lives of the Burmese people.

The latest incident encountered by the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Paulo Sergio Pinheiro pointed to Burma's ulterior motives in international engagement. Pinheiro cut short his visit to Rangoon last week after finding a hidden microphone inside the room he used to interview political prisoners. Later he told reporters in Bangkok he was frustrated by the slow progress of both the reconciliation dialogue and the release of political prisoners.

The UN has been pressuring the Burmese regime to set free more prisoners to show its seriousness in the dialogue process. So far, the regime has released around 600 political prisoners. Nobody knows the exact numbers, but Bangkok-based diplomats said that at least 500-600 were still in prison. Given the circumstances now, the reconciliation process will run according to the regime's timetable and at its own choosing.

This tactic has served the junta leaders well in engaging the world over the past three years. On the surface, they have displayed a willingness to talk with the opposition in order to confuse international opinion about their goodwill and to soften demands for tough measures against the Burmese regime. That explains why the international community cannot agree on measures to isolate and punish the regime.

Within Burma, the junta leaders have choreographed their moves so precisely that the reconciliation process has been used as an alibi to weaken the opposition party. While Suu Kyi is free to travel, the junta has instigated incidents to mar her visits.

Now, returning diplomats -- who have access to both regime and opposition leaders -- talk more about the regime's need for more humanitarian assistance to alleviate the HIV/Aids epidemic, ignoring the opposition's eagerness to begin dialogue. Suu Kyi has clearly stated she is ready to enter the dialogue without any conditions. But the junta leaders continue to dodge the talks and ignore her appeals. Indeed, the regime has continued to enjoy this win-win situation. As long the status quo persists, nobody will pay much attention anyway.

Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra said last week that he wished he could seize Muang Yuon, the town inside Burma across the Thai border controlled by the Wa army. Muang Yuon has been used as a base for manufacturing and transporting amphetamine pills, or ya ba.

Obviously, like Pinheiro, Thaksin has been hamstrung by slow progress on the anti-drug effort pledged by the Burmese leaders.

Despite much hullabaloo over the past two years, Thaksin has not succeeded in his Burmese policy. His willingness to comply with the regime's requests has become routine, while issues affecting Thai-Burmese security have remained unchanged, not to mention unresolved. The removal of Thai generals responsible for firm and tough Burmese policies and the amputation of Task Force 399 have weakened the Thai defense capacity along the border as never before.

One disturbing trend, according to a Thai military intelligence source, is the dramatic improvement of Burmese military capability over the past two years. Despite financial woes, money from the cross-border trade and the Yadana gas pipeline has increased the Burmese regime's purchasing power for new weapons and new technology. Security concerns remain as always at the top of Burma's list of priorities, while the Thaksin government naively believes the economic incentives it offers will subsequently alter the regime's perceptions.

As long as Thailand continues its current Burmese policy, the reconciliation process in Burma will suffer. The Thaksin government has single-handedly transformed this endeavor, once fully backed by the international community, into a bilateral burden. No wonder the junta leaders keep demanding that Thaksin do more, especially security measures at the Thai-Burmese border through the removal of ethnic groups. Recently Thaksin has even made an overture to be a mediator between the regime and the ethnic groups.

Burma's increased intransigence is the result of the junta leaders' illusion that they can get away scot-free with thwarting the free will of the Burmese people. As a willing accomplice, the Thaksin government is being used to bear the responsibility for the lack of progress in the dialogue process. A case in point is that the regime repeatedly uses border insecurity and ethnic problems as a pretext to delay political dialogue with the opposition.

Unless Thailand changes its present course, the country will be further sucked into the regime's sleight-of-hand games.