Myanmar's political dialogue stalled yet

Myanmar's political dialogue stalled yet

Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

The war in Iraq has had a great dampening effect on the future
prospects of the reconciliation process in Burma. The Burmese
junta leaders know full well that world attention is no longer
focused on their ongoing suppression of the Burmese people.

The much-heralded release of opposition party leader Aung San
Suu Kyi last May has remained only a gesture. The regime is still
reluctant to genuinely start the much-awaited political dialogue
to proceed towards power-sharing and building democratic
institutions.

Burma is also facing an economic malaise of its own making.
The fallout of its banking crisis in recent weeks will have far-
reaching ramifications on its poorly managed financial markets
and the economy in general.

In such a dire situation, the dialogue process has now become
the regime's most efficient diplomatic instrument to increase
international support and recognition. Apart from delaying
further sanctions and weakening support of the opposition, the
junta aims to sideline democracy and strengthen its grip on the
lives of the Burmese people.

The latest incident encountered by the UN Special Rapporteur
for Human Rights Paulo Sergio Pinheiro pointed to Burma's
ulterior motives in international engagement. Pinheiro cut short
his visit to Rangoon last week after finding a hidden microphone
inside the room he used to interview political prisoners. Later
he told reporters in Bangkok he was frustrated by the slow
progress of both the reconciliation dialogue and the release of
political prisoners.

The UN has been pressuring the Burmese regime to set free more
prisoners to show its seriousness in the dialogue process. So
far, the regime has released around 600 political prisoners.
Nobody knows the exact numbers, but Bangkok-based diplomats said
that at least 500-600 were still in prison. Given the
circumstances now, the reconciliation process will run according
to the regime's timetable and at its own choosing.

This tactic has served the junta leaders well in engaging the
world over the past three years. On the surface, they have
displayed a willingness to talk with the opposition in order to
confuse international opinion about their goodwill and to soften
demands for tough measures against the Burmese regime. That
explains why the international community cannot agree on measures
to isolate and punish the regime.

Within Burma, the junta leaders have choreographed their moves
so precisely that the reconciliation process has been used as an
alibi to weaken the opposition party. While Suu Kyi is free to
travel, the junta has instigated incidents to mar her visits.

Now, returning diplomats -- who have access to both regime and
opposition leaders -- talk more about the regime's need for more
humanitarian assistance to alleviate the HIV/Aids epidemic,
ignoring the opposition's eagerness to begin dialogue. Suu Kyi
has clearly stated she is ready to enter the dialogue without any
conditions. But the junta leaders continue to dodge the talks and
ignore her appeals. Indeed, the regime has continued to enjoy
this win-win situation. As long the status quo persists, nobody
will pay much attention anyway.

Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra said last week that he
wished he could seize Muang Yuon, the town inside Burma across
the Thai border controlled by the Wa army. Muang Yuon has been
used as a base for manufacturing and transporting amphetamine
pills, or ya ba.

Obviously, like Pinheiro, Thaksin has been hamstrung by slow
progress on the anti-drug effort pledged by the Burmese leaders.

Despite much hullabaloo over the past two years, Thaksin has
not succeeded in his Burmese policy. His willingness to comply
with the regime's requests has become routine, while issues
affecting Thai-Burmese security have remained unchanged, not to
mention unresolved. The removal of Thai generals responsible for
firm and tough Burmese policies and the amputation of Task Force
399 have weakened the Thai defense capacity along the border as
never before.

One disturbing trend, according to a Thai military
intelligence source, is the dramatic improvement of Burmese
military capability over the past two years. Despite financial
woes, money from the cross-border trade and the Yadana gas
pipeline has increased the Burmese regime's purchasing power for
new weapons and new technology. Security concerns remain as
always at the top of Burma's list of priorities, while the
Thaksin government naively believes the economic incentives it
offers will subsequently alter the regime's perceptions.

As long as Thailand continues its current Burmese policy, the
reconciliation process in Burma will suffer. The Thaksin
government has single-handedly transformed this endeavor, once
fully backed by the international community, into a bilateral
burden. No wonder the junta leaders keep demanding that Thaksin
do more, especially security measures at the Thai-Burmese border
through the removal of ethnic groups. Recently Thaksin has even
made an overture to be a mediator between the regime and the
ethnic groups.

Burma's increased intransigence is the result of the junta
leaders' illusion that they can get away scot-free with thwarting
the free will of the Burmese people. As a willing accomplice, the
Thaksin government is being used to bear the responsibility for
the lack of progress in the dialogue process. A case in point is
that the regime repeatedly uses border insecurity and ethnic
problems as a pretext to delay political dialogue with the
opposition.

Unless Thailand changes its present course, the country will
be further sucked into the regime's sleight-of-hand games.