Myanmar test for ASEM future

Natee Vichitsorasatra, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

It is a just two months until the next Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit, this time in Hanoi. These two remaining months will stand as a test as to whether ASEM, a forum that has been variously described as "lacking in substance" and "forum- fatigued" to "ambitious" and "indispensable", is considered valuable enough to receive a lifeline from all parties involved.

Equally importantly, the results of this test will be an indicator of exactly how much interest the Asian and European Union (EU) sides of ASEM, especially the latter, have left in the ongoing process.

The ASEM process has never been so endangered since its initiation in 1996. The inaugural meeting in Bangkok was filled with high expectations and the promise of equal partnership and reciprocity, occurring within an informal dialogue. The optimism was watered down with the ensuing Asian economic crisis and few people took much notice of the Copenhagen ASEM IV Summit, a meeting that focused largely on the control of terrorism.

Instead of growing into a mature and structured framework for cooperation in its fifth upcoming summit, the Asian and European counterparts of ASEM are instead wrangling over the issue of Myanmar.

Indonesia and Thailand have already criticized the decision to cancel two ministerial meetings, which they said had been made without proper consultation with ASEAN.

This seems to point towards an increasing disinterest in ASEM from its European members. The focus of the ASEM process has been mainly on the economic side and trading figures show that the Asian side of ASEM has been the main beneficiaries of closer channels of access to their European counterparts.

Even today, the EU's trade deficit with their ASEM partners remains an issue on the table at ASEM Summits. Eurostat figures show EU's external trade with China, one of the main motivations for cooperation in the ASEM process, begin to see a widening trade deficit which quadrupled from US$11.6 billion in 1995 to $44.6 billion in 2000. Similar, though less drastic trends exist within the trade figures of EU trade with the rest of the Asian ASEM members.

If the EU's interest in ASEM had waned due to the Asian economic crisis and the continued trade deficit with Asia.

Since ASEM I, human rights have constantly been a European concern, whereas Asian participants have preferred an exclusive focus on trade.

At ASEM II, Europe informally raised the issues of human rights, labor practices, arms control and non-proliferation issues. It received little cooperation from countries such as Indonesia, China, and Myanmar, on the issues of East Timor and internal affairs, respectively. At ASEM III, the EU embarrassed itself by not being able to make a common response to the question of establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea, despite the "Declaration for Peace" announced in Seoul.

The Copenhagen Summit yielded little beyond issues of economic cooperation, as the Council of Minister was only able to express its dissatisfaction with the slow progress of democratic restoration in Myanmar, but little else. By then, the EU obviously realized that it was not benefiting from either the political or the economic pillars of ASEM.

The "New Partnership with Southeast Asia" communication from the Commission drafted in 2003 appears to be the EU's new means to fix what might have become a deadlocked ASEM. It is clear that while it offers an increased flexibility in the EU's relationship with ASEAN, issues of conditions have been placed as a further bargaining chip in the cooperation process between the two regions.

According to the European Commission, an "essential element" clause must be included in all future bilateral agreements with countries of Southeast Asia. At present only Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have signed this, while other present bilateral agreements lack this clause. This clause also offers a way out for the EU, which would be more reluctant in placing conditions into its relationship with potentially lucrative China than it would with ASEAN member states.

It appears that the EU may have already decided that the ASEM process is expendable and highlighting the issue of Myanmar with apparently little room for negotiation makes a mockery of ASEM's principles of "equal partnership" and "reciprocity".

Current EU sanctions against Myanmar are also widely perceived as ineffective and lacking in impact. In addition, the EU is clearly guilty of double standards because it is not demanding the exclusion of one-party communist states such as Laos, Vietnam or China.

A debate on whether Myanmar deserves to join international forums which would definitely benefit the military regime needs to continue, but if the EU's member governments do not soften their stance concerning Myanmar's inclusion in ASEM, the forum's principles of equal partnership, reciprocity and flexibility are thrown out of the window.

Meanwhile, ASEM's credibility as a promising and much-needed forum between Asia and Europe takes a large hit. If the ASEM V Summit in Hanoi does not contain more substance and full top- level cooperation from all member states, it will be difficult for anyone to take the already struggling process seriously.