Myanmar test for ASEM future

Myanmar test for ASEM future

Natee Vichitsorasatra, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

It is a just two months until the next Asia Europe Meeting
(ASEM) summit, this time in Hanoi. These two remaining months
will stand as a test as to whether ASEM, a forum that has been
variously described as "lacking in substance" and "forum-
fatigued" to "ambitious" and "indispensable", is considered
valuable enough to receive a lifeline from all parties involved.

Equally importantly, the results of this test will be an
indicator of exactly how much interest the Asian and European
Union (EU) sides of ASEM, especially the latter, have left in the
ongoing process.

The ASEM process has never been so endangered since its
initiation in 1996. The inaugural meeting in Bangkok was filled
with high expectations and the promise of equal partnership and
reciprocity, occurring within an informal dialogue. The optimism
was watered down with the ensuing Asian economic crisis and few
people took much notice of the Copenhagen ASEM IV Summit, a
meeting that focused largely on the control of terrorism.

Instead of growing into a mature and structured framework for
cooperation in its fifth upcoming summit, the Asian and European
counterparts of ASEM are instead wrangling over the issue of
Myanmar.

Indonesia and Thailand have already criticized the decision to
cancel two ministerial meetings, which they said had been made
without proper consultation with ASEAN.

This seems to point towards an increasing disinterest in ASEM
from its European members. The focus of the ASEM process has been
mainly on the economic side and trading figures show that the
Asian side of ASEM has been the main beneficiaries of closer
channels of access to their European counterparts.

Even today, the EU's trade deficit with their ASEM partners
remains an issue on the table at ASEM Summits. Eurostat figures
show EU's external trade with China, one of the main motivations
for cooperation in the ASEM process, begin to see a widening
trade deficit which quadrupled from US$11.6 billion in 1995 to
$44.6 billion in 2000. Similar, though less drastic trends exist
within the trade figures of EU trade with the rest of the Asian
ASEM members.

If the EU's interest in ASEM had waned due to the Asian
economic crisis and the continued trade deficit with Asia.

Since ASEM I, human rights have constantly been a European
concern, whereas Asian participants have preferred an exclusive
focus on trade.

At ASEM II, Europe informally raised the issues of human
rights, labor practices, arms control and non-proliferation
issues. It received little cooperation from countries such as
Indonesia, China, and Myanmar, on the issues of East Timor and
internal affairs, respectively. At ASEM III, the EU embarrassed
itself by not being able to make a common response to the
question of establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea,
despite the "Declaration for Peace" announced in Seoul.

The Copenhagen Summit yielded little beyond issues of economic
cooperation, as the Council of Minister was only able to express
its dissatisfaction with the slow progress of democratic
restoration in Myanmar, but little else. By then, the EU
obviously realized that it was not benefiting from either the
political or the economic pillars of ASEM.

The "New Partnership with Southeast Asia" communication from
the Commission drafted in 2003 appears to be the EU's new means
to fix what might have become a deadlocked ASEM. It is clear that
while it offers an increased flexibility in the EU's relationship
with ASEAN, issues of conditions have been placed as a further
bargaining chip in the cooperation process between the two
regions.

According to the European Commission, an "essential element"
clause must be included in all future bilateral agreements with
countries of Southeast Asia. At present only Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia have signed this, while other present bilateral
agreements lack this clause. This clause also offers a way out
for the EU, which would be more reluctant in placing conditions
into its relationship with potentially lucrative China than it
would with ASEAN member states.

It appears that the EU may have already decided that the ASEM
process is expendable and highlighting the issue of Myanmar with
apparently little room for negotiation makes a mockery of ASEM's
principles of "equal partnership" and "reciprocity".

Current EU sanctions against Myanmar are also widely perceived
as ineffective and lacking in impact. In addition, the EU is
clearly guilty of double standards because it is not demanding
the exclusion of one-party communist states such as Laos, Vietnam
or China.

A debate on whether Myanmar deserves to join international
forums which would definitely benefit the military regime needs
to continue, but if the EU's member governments do not soften
their stance concerning Myanmar's inclusion in ASEM, the forum's
principles of equal partnership, reciprocity and flexibility are
thrown out of the window.

Meanwhile, ASEM's credibility as a promising and much-needed
forum between Asia and Europe takes a large hit. If the ASEM V
Summit in Hanoi does not contain more substance and full top-
level cooperation from all member states, it will be difficult
for anyone to take the already struggling process seriously.