Myanmar is ASEAN's test case

Myanmar is ASEAN's test case

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): Before the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) decided to accept Myanmar as a member, there had
been concerns raised that the country's membership in the
Association would pose a number of challenges, if not problems,
for ASEAN.

There were differences in opinion, especially between ASEAN
and Western countries, on the question whether Myanmar was
"suitable" or not to become a member of ASEAN. The West
(especially, the U.S. and the European Union) views Myanmar as a
pariah state which violates almost all fundamental norms and
rules held by international society.

ASEAN, on the other hand, holds a different idea on this
issue. For ASEAN, a state's domestic political condition should
not be a criteria for membership. Moreover, ASEAN holds the view
that the domestic political condition in Myanmar can be improved
by involving the country in the dynamics of regional cooperation.

As I have argued elsewhere, "the inclusion of Myanmar into
ASEAN will also affect the dialogue between ASEAN and the West,
especially in terms of the latter's objection to deal with the
SLORC regime..." (The Jakarta Post May 31, 1997).

Indeed, signs toward that direction are already emerging. The
first shot was fired by British Foreign Minister Robin Cook when
he commented in Singapore on the possibility of Myanmar attending
the second Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) scheduled to convene in
London in April 1998. He maintained that a recent decision by
Europe to deny visas to senior Myanmar officials will make it
impossible to include the country at the ASEM process (Jakarta
Post, Sept. 2, 1998).

Minister Cook's remarks have already provoked strong reactions
from Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. He retorted that
ASEAN may boycott the Second ASEM if the EU barred Myanmar from
attending it.

Mahathir displayed a degree of confidence when he said that
"if there is discrimination against Myanmar, it is a
discrimination against ASEAN. You may find other countries in
ASEAN also deciding not to attend" (Jakarta Post, Sept. 3, 1997).
In other words, Mahathir clearly sees the question of Myanmar's
membership in ASEM in terms of extending ASEAN solidarity to that
country.

In this regard, the question of Myanmar may bring up at least
two problems for ASEAN to deal with. Firstly, it could highlight
the existing differences among ASEAN members themselves regarding
the issue. Signs toward that direction have already been
discernible. For example, Philippine Foreign Affairs Under-
Secretary Rodolfo Severino, who will take over as ASEAN
secretary-general in January 1998, maintained that ASEAN has yet
to adopt a formal position on the issue.

Reactions from other ASEAN countries has also been relatively
cautious. A Singapore foreign ministry spokesman, for example, is
reported to have stated that the question of Myanmar's attendance
does not arise because "there has been no decision taken on new
membership of ASEM" (Straits Times, Sept. 3, 1997).

Secondly, the ongoing dialogue process between ASEAN and the
EU would be seriously hampered. While at the same time, the need
for closer cooperation in the future, especially on trade and
business relations, is greater than it has been before.

The growing mood of cooperation which predominates post-Cold
War international relations should not be missed by any parties.
The 30th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Joint Communique, for example,
expressed the hope that the second ASEM in London would "further
develop a stronger Asia-Europe partnership for greater growth
mutually benefiting both regions". For Europe, the increasing
significance of East Asian countries in the world economy can no
longer be easily dismissed.

How, then, should ASEAN react to this issue? In this regard,
it would not be appropriate for ASEAN to adopt a confrontational
attitude. As mentioned earlier, the question of new membership in
ASEM has not yet been decided.

More over, Myanmar's membership in ASEAN does not necessarily
mean that the country automatically becomes a member of ASEM.
Membership in ASEM is not determined by criteria of regional
grouping. ASEM, it should be made clear, consists of individual
countries which are trying to forge closer cooperation among
states across Asia and Europe.

Indeed, this issue may become a "sensitive topic" for ASEAN in
months to come. Therefore, it is important for ASEAN not to be
dictated by any kind of fait accompli in formulating its common
policy concerning Myanmar's membership in ASEM.

There is no need for ASEAN, for example, to insist that
Myanmar has to be admitted as a member of ASEM just because the
EU does not want it to be so. There is nothing to be gained from
such an attitude.

ASEAN should not send the wrong signal to the SLORC regime in
Yangon, that the Association is willing to sacrifice its wider
interests in defense of Myanmar. More importantly, Myanmar's
problems with the West regarding human rights issues should be
solved by these two parties alone.

Of course, it is likely that such an attitude could bring the
question of "ASEAN solidarity" to the fore. It is possible that
there would be questions regarding the purpose of ASEAN if it
does not come to the defense its members when under attack by
outside forces. Such a concern is, of course, legitimate.

However, one should also not forget that ASEAN expects some
changes, or at least a degree of flexibility, in the SLORC's
attitude towards political reform in the country, after Myanmar
is admitted as a member.

In other words, ASEAN itself has admitted, albeit in an
indirect way, that there is a problem in Myanmar that needs to be
resolved. ASEAN and the West only differ with regard to the most
appropriate way to deal with such a problem. Unlike the West,
ASEAN believes that changes in Myanmar should be brought about
through engagement not confrontation.

The writer is a researcher at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Jakarta.