Myanmar: Difficult road to reconciliation and democracy

Myanmar: Difficult road to reconciliation and democracy

Jusuf Wanandi, Member, Board of Trustees Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta

In Myanmar today there appears to be some movement
politically. This is certainly only an early beginning, but it is
in the region's interest to see that it leads to somewhere. On
Aug. 30, 2003, the Myanmar government, the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC), proposed a road map for Myanmar's
political development toward democracy. The road map, which
consists of seven steps, essentially has five elements:

o A National Convention to lay down the principles of state
and governance;

o A constitution that will be drafted in accordance with the
above principles;

o A National Referendum on the draft constitution;

o General elections for legislative bodies;

o Formation of the government and other central and regional
organs by the legislative bodies.

To some extent the National Convention is a continuation of
the ones between 1993 and 1996 and will involve all stakeholders:
political parties, minorities/nationalities, functional groups
(peasants, workers, intellectuals), state service personnel,
elected representatives and other invited groups. This could be
an important beginning if conducted in a credible and transparent
manner.

The road map has received mixed reactions from the
international community, because since 1993 the SPDC has promised
to take steps to draft a constitution but has failed to deliver.
The process became more complicated because the National League
for Democracy (NLD) under Aung San Suu Kyi walked out of the
process. Since then the relationship between her and the SPDC has
been stormy. The international community has reacted with
different degrees of severity against the Myanmar government.

This new road map may have been proposed mainly for two
reasons. First is increased international pressure and sanctions,
especially after the incident of May 30, 2003, during Aung San
Suu Kyi's trip to the north of the country.

In particular, the economic sanctions are hurting the economy
and the people. Second, perhaps more importantly, is the
realization by the SPDC that change is inevitable and could be
achieved in a gradual fashion.

They appear more confident now that a process in that
direction can begin, among other things, because talks with the
Karen National Union (KNU) have achieved positive results and
have led to a cease-fire with this rebellious minority group.

Since the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh in 2003,
ASEAN has exerted some new pressure on Yangon, but at the same
time is willing to support the SPDC's national reconciliation
efforts.

For ASEAN it is important that there is national
reconciliation and some political development in Myanmar, because
the status quo has tarnished ASEAN's image and has affected its
relations with her dialog partners, especially the EU and the
U.S. In 2006, Myanmar will assume the chairmanship of ASEAN.

It would be a big blow for Myanmar if ASEAN's dialog partners
boycotted the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference and the ASEAN
Regional Forum. This would also affect ASEAN's credibility and
prestige in the region and the world.

The Myanmar government realizes this and acknowledged it at a
recent conference organized by the Myanmar Institute of Strategic
and International Studies (MISIS) in Yangon on Jan. 27 and Jan.
28, 2004. The 52 foreign participants, consisting of think tank
members, business and NGO representatives, felt that the SPDC was
serious about the road map.

Even participants from Myanmar said in private that this time
it might be a real effort on the part of the SPDC. An encouraging
development is to see that participants from Myanmar were more
willing to talk, albeit mostly still in private, compared to the
past four bilateral and trilateral conferences I co-organized in
Yangon over the last seven years or so.

The representation on the Myanmar side has also broadened, to
include not only retired officials but also academics,
representatives from women's organizations and doctor
associations, and businesspeople.

Other Myanmar individuals that I met outside the conference
were somewhat more upbeat about the possibility that there would
be some political movement. They seem to be harboring some hope
again.

At another informal meeting in Bali, also in January 2004,
even among Burmese political activists in exile there seemed to
be a willingness as well to start a dialog with the SPDC on how
best to implement the road map. They understand that sanctions
alone cannot change the SPDC's policies.

However, they are cautious because past experience suggests
that they cannot fully trust the SPDC until agreements are really
implemented.

Indeed, the Myanmar government must adopt a few principles if
they want to make their proposal credible and acceptable to all
parties in the country, as well as among some of the exiled
activists and the international community.

First, all stakeholders, including the National League for
Democracy, have to be included in the process, and their safety
and the ability to express their views must be guaranteed.

Second, the road map should have a clear time frame. This need
not be ironclad because the situation on the ground warrants some
flexibility, but the plan of action must be viable and credible.

Third, the international community, particularly ASEAN, should
be welcomed to give advice and have some supportive involvement
throughout the several stages of the plan. Therefore, all ASEAN
member governments, as well as second-track processes such as the
ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, have to
pay more attention to and should be more engaged in the
implementation of the road map.

Such an effort is consistent with the idea of the ASEAN
Security Community as adopted at the ASEAN Summit in Bali in
October 2003. It will be very good for us all in the region if we
can show that this can work.