Myanmar, a long-standing thorn in ASEAN's flesh
J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Jakarta
From the outset, even before its entry into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Myanmar has continued to be an issue of debate in various ASEAN fora, at the formal as well as informal (track-two) level. However, ASEAN heads of states and governments had made the commitment to admit Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia jointly into the association. It would have been unthinkable for them to reverse their decision. It would create the impression of kowtowing to Western pressure. This would be something ASEAN member states most probably could not afford.
Too much prestige was at stake. The stakes would be double for Malaysia, which was to host the occasion.
Indeed, Myanmar -- once named Burma - had been isolated or had isolated itself for decades, as though proving to the world that it was the only truly nonaligned nation. When asked to join ASEAN before its establishment in 1967, Burma turned down the offer because it would run contrary to its nonaligned foreign policy. Then, however, there was the risk that if it failed to join ASEAN soon for reasons not of its own making, Myanmar might never wish to join, again for considerations of prestige.
Moreover, if that had been the case, the dream of a united Southeast Asia would be shattered. Though not yet in the "ASEAN- 10" formula, the relevant provision in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 that the association was open for membership to other countries of the region would express that aspiration. Moreover, such an aspiration would justify the reference to Southeast Asia in the association.
To be sure, there were likely to be a certain price for ASEAN in admitting Myanmar in 1997. For one thing, it might be regarded as a boost to the legitimacy of the much-criticized military junta governing in Yangon. It might somehow adversely affect ASEAN's relations with its dialog partners, particularly the United States, which had imposed new economic sanctions on Myanmar.
In any event, it would be difficult to imagine a discussion between ASEAN and its dialog partners, particularly the United States, where representatives of Myanmar were present and sitting at the same table. It would be an awkward situation. It would be worse should Myanmar take the chair. Yet, if this could have been foreseen long before (Soedjati, Should ASEAN accept Myanmar this year, The Jakarta Post, May 19, 1997), how could anyone have regarded U.S. Foreign Secretary Rice failing to attend this year's meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers, and sending her deputy instead as a snub" or a decreasing interest in the problems of security of Southeast Asia by refraining from participating in the recent ARF meeting?
Unfortunately, other ASEAN member states have been too slow and too subtle in their efforts to persuade the ruling junta of Myanmar to consider skipping its turn as chair in the next ASEAN meeting with its dialog partners next year. They have been constrained by their reluctance somehow to help bring pressure to bear on Myanmar to seriously consider that option. ASEAN member countries, especially Indonesia, may hide such a reluctance behind the facade of the "cardinal principle" of not interfering in one another's domestic affairs.
For one thing, such a policy has been expressed in changing formulas such as "constructive engagement" and others, each of which does not really make much sense, and defies practical application. In addition, in the current system of globalization, nations are increasingly interdependent. Nations are also increasingly open to one another.
Thus it is not always easy in this era to make a distinction between the strictly "domestic affairs" of a country, and what is becoming the concern of humanity. These are problems related to such increasingly universal values as individual liberties, democracy marked by pluralism, equality and justice for everyone, and respect for basic human rights -- hence the concept of human security and of human intervention.
Indeed, to sustain such values, the promotion of good governance and the establishment of a civil society, which often relates to domestic stability or instability, are problems that are common to all ASEAN member states. Could it be, then, that some of us, particularly Indonesia, the largest member-state, but at the moment among the least successful in putting our own house in order, wonder to ourselves, "Who are we, then, after all, to pressure Myanmar toward democratic reform? " hat their military junta did in 1990 to Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD under her leadership, was worse that what one normally understands to be a coup d'etat. What was reported on Tuesday by this newspaper, that Myanmar may well skip its turn as chair, to be replaced by the Philippines, may hopefully be right.