Murayama's visit to renew Japan's role

Murayama's visit to renew Japan's role

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): Since the end of Cold War, discussions on
security matters in the Asia-Pacific have been preoccupied with
two main issues: How China's modernization might affect the
future of regional security environment, and how to find a
suitable security arrangement in the region.

However, the recent visit by the Japanese Prime Minister
Tomiichi Murayama to four Southeast Asian countries (Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore) reminds us not to overlook
the changing Japan factor.

The visit brought about two significant signs of change in the
post-war Japan-Asia relationship. Firstly, there has been a sign
of readiness on the part of some Asian countries to leave the
past behind. In Malaysia, Murayama was told by Malaysian Premier
Mahathir Mohamad to stop apologizing for what the Japanese have
done during World War II. Instead, Premier Mahathir asked Japan
to strengthen its commitment to the improvement of relations
between Japan and Asia through closer economic cooperations.

Secondly, Singapore has implicitly expressed its support to
Japan for their bid to become a permanent member of the United
Nations Security Council along with the United States, Russia,
Britain, France, and China. Malaysia has also given the same
support, but in a more explicit way.

This would suggest that Singapore and Malaysia, despite the
fact that they were victims of Japanese aggression in the past,
no longer have objections to the idea of Japan playing a bigger
role in international security affairs.

If the Malaysian and Singaporean attitude were accepted by all
Asian countries which were the victims of Japanese military
aggression during World War II, then the chance for Japan to be a
"normal state" would be greater. In other words, Japan will no
longer face two major constraints in assuming a full
international role, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.

That role will, of course, include a larger security role.
However, with the support from Malaysia and Singapore, it can be
said that two major impediments to the expansion of Japan's
security role have began to weaken.

There have also been some external developments that might
force Japan to play a greater security role. Firstly, Japan must
have learned that in the current era of uncertainty there are no
guarantees that risks will not arise in the future. In such
circumstances, it will become more necessary for a country to
assure its own security without relying too much on allies and
friends for help. The perceived North Korean threat to Japan's
national security, for example, has already attracted serious
attention from Japanese policy makers.

Secondly, the decline of American presence and influence in
the Asia-Pacific would increase Japan's need for a more
autonomous military capability to protect its vital global and
regional interests. For example, some Japanese politicians (such
as Ichiro Ozawa) have become more pessimistic about Washington's
readiness and ability to provide answers to all Japan's security
needs. Even though no one in Tokyo expects the breakdown of
Japan-U.S. alliance, problems in U.S.-Japan relations remain.

Thirdly, the uncertainty in China's future role in the region
adds another reason for Japan to go its own way in assuring its
national security. China's claims in the South China Sea, for
example, has alarmed the Japanese. Tokyo has not ruled out the
possibility that the security of its sea lanes and access to
Southeast Asian countries and Middle East would be endangered if
China uses its force to settle territorial dispute in the South
China Sea. Moreover, Japan has not made it a secret that it is
concerned with the rapid modernization of China's military
forces.

However, it is obvious that Japan realizes that transforming
itself from an economic power into a political one, let alone a
military one, is not an easy option. While it could possibly gain
essential support from ASEAN countries, Japan should also
consider China's reaction before it decides to move towards that
direction.

The admission of Japan to the UN Security Council will
definitely require Japan to become more actively engaged in
international security affairs. This would include Japan's full
participation in collective security actions under the UN, thus
enhancing Japan's status as a global power. As these activities
are developed, the argument for expanding SDF's role to include
security functions under regional or UN Collective Security would
be made easier. However, the rise of Japan as a global power
would not make China comfortable.

Moreover, Japanese policy makers and strategists are still
facing some difficulties in defining what kind of security role
will be acceptable, not only to other Asian countries, but also
to Japanese society at home. The changing political alignments
among domestic political forces constitutes another problem in
this matter. The lack of a precise conception and clear consensus
about direction for Japan could give rise to regional
misperceptions

It is likely that Murayama's cautious response to Malaysia and
Singapore's support was based on the above consideration. As
Murayama's spokesman Kishichiro Amae has said, the Japanese
government is extremely cautious on this issue. Murayama himself
maintained that it was difficult for Japan to play all
international role, including a military role, in peace-keeping
missions carried by permanent members of UN Security Council.
This is because such a role would require Japan to go beyond its
constitution. Therefore, for the meantime, we can probably expect
to see Japan adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude.

The most important questions for ASEAN now is not when Japan
should become a permanent member of UN Security Council, but what
ASEAN should do to manage increasing Japanese security needs in
the region. As ASEAN has began to take a leading role in shaping
the future of post-Cold War regional security, it is time now to
prepare for a new ground for a new and more comprehensive Japan's
contribution to regional stability. In this regard, the result of
Murayama's visit to Malaysia and Singapore provided new
atmosphere and laid new foundation for a better Japan-ASEAN
relationship in the future.

The writer is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, and a PhD candidate at
the Department of International Relations, London School of
Economics and Political Science.