Murayama's visit to renew Japan's role
By Rizal Sukma
JAKARTA (JP): Since the end of Cold War, discussions on security matters in the Asia-Pacific have been preoccupied with two main issues: How China's modernization might affect the future of regional security environment, and how to find a suitable security arrangement in the region.
However, the recent visit by the Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama to four Southeast Asian countries (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore) reminds us not to overlook the changing Japan factor.
The visit brought about two significant signs of change in the post-war Japan-Asia relationship. Firstly, there has been a sign of readiness on the part of some Asian countries to leave the past behind. In Malaysia, Murayama was told by Malaysian Premier Mahathir Mohamad to stop apologizing for what the Japanese have done during World War II. Instead, Premier Mahathir asked Japan to strengthen its commitment to the improvement of relations between Japan and Asia through closer economic cooperations.
Secondly, Singapore has implicitly expressed its support to Japan for their bid to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council along with the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China. Malaysia has also given the same support, but in a more explicit way.
This would suggest that Singapore and Malaysia, despite the fact that they were victims of Japanese aggression in the past, no longer have objections to the idea of Japan playing a bigger role in international security affairs.
If the Malaysian and Singaporean attitude were accepted by all Asian countries which were the victims of Japanese military aggression during World War II, then the chance for Japan to be a "normal state" would be greater. In other words, Japan will no longer face two major constraints in assuming a full international role, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.
That role will, of course, include a larger security role. However, with the support from Malaysia and Singapore, it can be said that two major impediments to the expansion of Japan's security role have began to weaken.
There have also been some external developments that might force Japan to play a greater security role. Firstly, Japan must have learned that in the current era of uncertainty there are no guarantees that risks will not arise in the future. In such circumstances, it will become more necessary for a country to assure its own security without relying too much on allies and friends for help. The perceived North Korean threat to Japan's national security, for example, has already attracted serious attention from Japanese policy makers.
Secondly, the decline of American presence and influence in the Asia-Pacific would increase Japan's need for a more autonomous military capability to protect its vital global and regional interests. For example, some Japanese politicians (such as Ichiro Ozawa) have become more pessimistic about Washington's readiness and ability to provide answers to all Japan's security needs. Even though no one in Tokyo expects the breakdown of Japan-U.S. alliance, problems in U.S.-Japan relations remain.
Thirdly, the uncertainty in China's future role in the region adds another reason for Japan to go its own way in assuring its national security. China's claims in the South China Sea, for example, has alarmed the Japanese. Tokyo has not ruled out the possibility that the security of its sea lanes and access to Southeast Asian countries and Middle East would be endangered if China uses its force to settle territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Moreover, Japan has not made it a secret that it is concerned with the rapid modernization of China's military forces.
However, it is obvious that Japan realizes that transforming itself from an economic power into a political one, let alone a military one, is not an easy option. While it could possibly gain essential support from ASEAN countries, Japan should also consider China's reaction before it decides to move towards that direction.
The admission of Japan to the UN Security Council will definitely require Japan to become more actively engaged in international security affairs. This would include Japan's full participation in collective security actions under the UN, thus enhancing Japan's status as a global power. As these activities are developed, the argument for expanding SDF's role to include security functions under regional or UN Collective Security would be made easier. However, the rise of Japan as a global power would not make China comfortable.
Moreover, Japanese policy makers and strategists are still facing some difficulties in defining what kind of security role will be acceptable, not only to other Asian countries, but also to Japanese society at home. The changing political alignments among domestic political forces constitutes another problem in this matter. The lack of a precise conception and clear consensus about direction for Japan could give rise to regional misperceptions
It is likely that Murayama's cautious response to Malaysia and Singapore's support was based on the above consideration. As Murayama's spokesman Kishichiro Amae has said, the Japanese government is extremely cautious on this issue. Murayama himself maintained that it was difficult for Japan to play all international role, including a military role, in peace-keeping missions carried by permanent members of UN Security Council. This is because such a role would require Japan to go beyond its constitution. Therefore, for the meantime, we can probably expect to see Japan adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude.
The most important questions for ASEAN now is not when Japan should become a permanent member of UN Security Council, but what ASEAN should do to manage increasing Japanese security needs in the region. As ASEAN has began to take a leading role in shaping the future of post-Cold War regional security, it is time now to prepare for a new ground for a new and more comprehensive Japan's contribution to regional stability. In this regard, the result of Murayama's visit to Malaysia and Singapore provided new atmosphere and laid new foundation for a better Japan-ASEAN relationship in the future.
The writer is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, and a PhD candidate at the Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science.