Tue, 15 Apr 1997

Multinational protection force doomed to fail in Albania

By Omar Halim

JAKARTA (JP): The United Nations Security Council, early this month, authorized a "multinational protection force" to deliver humanitarian assistance to Albanians and to help the country recover from near-anarchy.

The force, which is to be led by Italy and under the aegis of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), is authorized to undertake enforcement action in fulfilling its mandate.

Every member of the Council voted for the resolution, except China which said that it could not support it because it was an intrastate conflict and, furthermore, it could not approve the use of force. The mandate is for three months and is renewable. The force will be financed by troop-contributing countries.

Albania is located on the southeastern corner of Europe, bounded by Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Greece. Italy is situated across from it on the Adriatic Sea. Albanians -- comprising the Geg and the Tosk ethnic groups, inhabiting roughly north and south of the Shkumbin River, respectively -- had suffered extreme totalitarian rule for decades by Enver Hoxha, who effectively used the Sigurimi, the secret police, to control the population.

Before communist rule, Albania suffered from an annexation by Mussolini's Italy. The differences between the Geg and the Tosk, both seeing themselves as Albanian, have been sources of problems in their relationship. For example, the dialect of the Tosk, Enver Hoxha's group, was declared the national language of the country. Ethnically, they have been at odds with each other.

In addition, there are people of Greek, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Monengrin, Serbian and Vlach descent, making up about 10 percent of the total population. Outside the borders, there are people of Albanian-origin who live in Kosovo in Serbia and in Macedonia.

Decades of isolation during Enver Hoxha's rule, exacerbated by the drought of 1983-1988, had made the Albanian economy stagnate and even decline. Albanian income, per capita, is one of the lowest in Europe. Reform efforts were made, only from 1991 to 1992, but discontent was already widespread.

The change in government brought Sali Berisha into the presidency in 1992. President Berisha is from the north. At the time, the slogan in the Balkans was said to be "stability first, democracy later". Seen from the point of view of the West, President Berisha became one of the cornerstones of regional stability and peace. He was an indispensable player in dampening the possible unrest in Kosovo and, to a lesser extent, in Macedonia, where people of Albanian origin are either dominant or are a significant minority.

In the context of the war in former Yugoslavia, he was also an indispensable asset in containing a spillover from the war into other parts of the Balkans. President Berisha allowed U.S. and NATO naval and air bases. Furthermore, after being elected, Berisha promised reform and a free market, reversing the economic policy of the communist regimes of the past. Seemingly, the economy was responding and growth started to take place. The pyramid schemes also started at about the same time, which were reportedly sustained for five years by the income obtained from selling weapons to the Serbs for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the same time, as reported by Tracy Wilkinson of the Los Angeles Times, President Berisha's government had been plagued by "increasingly visible and pervasive corruption". Also, the secret police expanded, journalists were harassed, and the judiciary was being increasingly controlled by the executive branch of government by the filling of judiciary posts with political appointees.

Parliamentary elections held last May were reportedly fraudulent and full of intimidation, an event that the Clinton Administration wanted to question President Berisha about. The people, however, did not seem to care about this, because of their illusion of economic prosperity brought about by the pyramid schemes.

Presumably, the end of the war in Bosnia resulted in the end, or at least diminution, in the purchase of arms. The pyramid schemes fell apart about two months ago. Starting in the south, stability unraveled and violence erupted from the northern town of Shloder to the southern Adriatic port of Vlore.

Anarchy has apparently descended into Albania. A "national unity" government was formed. But the rebellion has not been resolved. The rebels demand that President Berisha leave office before they surrender weapons they took from military depots; while the president insists that he will only leave office if he is ousted in the coming elections, scheduled for June. This is the situation now. One could question whether elections could be held in June, since government institutions seem to have collapsed in many parts of the country and widespread violence continues to reign. Some have even asked whether Albania is "irreparably split into city-states and regional fiefdoms that no central government can govern".

Can the instability of Albania spread to neighboring Serbia and Macedonia, and beyond?

Violence has reportedly escalated in Kosovo in the last few months, perhaps mainly because of the policy of President Milosevic in dramatically increasing the presence of the Serb military in border towns. With a long-standing problem with Greece, could the spread of violence in southern Albania, affecting people of Greek origin in the south of the country, drag Greece into the picture? If so, would this not trigger the involvement of Turkey, a Moslem country? The powder keg in the Balkans might not be the former Yugoslavia, but Albania.

Neighboring Italy and Greece have also been worried that the anarchy, and hunger, in Albania will trigger larger waves of "illegal immigrants". Italy flew in emergency medical supplies on March 24, and the European Union has decided to provide humanitarian assistance on a systematic basis.

But security has to be provided for the delivery of this assistance. This means that a military force has to be deployed to protect the supplies and the aid workers. This is where the UN resolution comes in. But President Berisha understandably has asked that the European military force "contribute to restoring order" also.

Prime Minister Bashkim Fino has stated that his government gives priority to the restoration of order over the delivery of aid. Among European countries, Italy, Greece, Austria and Spain reportedly have agreed to send troops but, perhaps learning from the experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden will not. The U.S. and NATO have apparently ruled out, at least for the time being, sending troops to Albania. In Italy, the opposition is reportedly against sending Italian troops to Albania.

Learning from experiences of UN's peacekeeping missions, European countries planning to send troops to Albania have to first ascertain the nature of the intrastate conflict in the country. With the apparent division between north and south, rural and urban, and the apparent absence of a person or groups that could "re-unite" the country, it will be very likely that a foreign intervention force will be deployed to protect President Barisha.

The traditional conception of a foreign force deployed to keep the peace while providing an opportunity for the contending parties to reach a long-term solution to their conflict does not apply to intrastate conflict cases, such as Albania. Keeping peace among fighters of different groups, especially if they are "roaming armed gangs", would be an impossibility for a foreign force.

Peace and security have to be agreed upon, guaranteed and attained by the Albanians themselves. If this is not possible, the European countries can only do the following things without jeopardizing its impartiality and, in this context, it is questionable whether Italy and Greece should even participate in the multinational force.

First, in order to prevent a possible spillover into Kosovo, Macedonia and Greece, preventive deployments in neighboring countries should be made to stave off any conflicts near borders.

With the possible exception of Macedonia, which needs international assistance, Serbia and Greece are probably doing this already. OSCE could send military observers to monitor the situation. Preventive diplomacy has to be undertaken to persuade President Milosevic of Serbia to alter his policy towards Kosovar Albanians. Otherwise, preventive deployment might not work.

The spillover of refugees is inevitable and the neighboring countries will have to try to limit the influx or make provisions for a flow of refugees. The next action is for the "multinational protection force" to be deployed solely for the purpose of delivering humanitarian supplies, for a limited and definite period of time, and this is to be made known to all parties in Albania ahead of time.

This is where enforcement capability could be used, if necessary, such was the case of the American-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia from 1992 to 1993. If by the end of a determined period, Albanian leaders are not able to agree to a long-term solution -- and here the European Union or OSCE could assist in the mediation -- the foreign force should leave, whatever the consequence.

Somalia is a good example, where no major humanitarian disaster has taken place in the past two years, since the UN ended its mission there.

If a long-term solution can be reached by the Albanians, then the EU and OSCE should be prepared to field a major peace- building mission to eliminate the root causes of the Albanian conflict. This will be an opportunity for the EU and OSCE to show what regional organization and arrangement can do to resolve conflicts.

The writer is an Indonesian observer who was Deputy Director, Europe Division of the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations. He has also participated in United Nation's peacekeeping missions in Namibia, Lebanon, Somalia and Liberia.