Thu, 10 Jan 2002

Muhammadiyah-NU meeting: A closer look

Mohtar Mas'oed, Executive, Nahdlatul Ulama, Yogyakarta

He has done it again. Syafi'ie Maarif has repeated what he did almost 10 years ago. In 1993, as one of the Muhammadiyah leaders, together with young figures from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) mostly from Yogyakarta, he tried to bridge the gap between the activists of the two largest Muslim organizations.

"Reaching out" is Syafi'ie's prescription -- somebody's got to do it. Once again, in last week's meeting between the country's two largest Muslim organizations, he has reached out and was welcomed in the same spirit by the leaders of NU, who are known to be open-minded. Why do it again? What happened between 1993 and 2002? In what light should we understand this latest political move?

We must take another look at the February 1993 meeting held at the Muhammadiyah University in Yogyakarta. Though probably not the first of its kind, it was a very special meeting. The meeting was conducted not by theologians, but by activists with a background in a variety of sciences. Most of them were from the social sciences, such as politics, international relations, economics, sociology, history and education apart from those taking up Islamic studies. Most acquired their education in the domestic as well as foreign "Western" academies. The attendants were Muslim activists who were more confident of their capabilities in comparison with previous leaders, hence they had more similar viewpoints on the modern world.

The early 1990s was also an interesting period. Because during that time many "liberal" initiatives emerged among the religious activists in the city. A number of NU youths -- graduates of the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) -- developed a "neo- modernist Islam" through an organization called the Institute of Islamic and Social Studies (LKIS).

Their activities could be termed as "liberalizing" the Islamic way of thinking and so making it a more open religion. This group cooperated with Christian activists in forming the Interfaith Dialog forum (Dian/Interfidei). This "reaching out" initiative also covered other areas, including the empowerment of women.

In this context, the idea of gathering the activists of the two large Muslim organizations cropped up. At the time, discussions and implementation of pluralism were quite lively, and were not limited to Muslims.

Unfortunately, at the national level, another movement drew more attention: That of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). It basically utilized state authority in the struggle of Islamic ideas. With the support of former president Soeharto, and led by the flamboyant vice president B.J. Habibie, the ICMI movement created more vibrations in the national political arena.

During that period the leadership of Muhammadiyah and NU was distinctly colored by a chemistry between Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid that was difficult to reconcile. The 1993 Muhammadiyah-NU meeting was rendered insipid when the two leaders indicated an extremely "realistic" and pessimistic attitude on creating the "Muhammad-NU project". Although one senior NU leader was so high-spirited as to suggest the possibility of dual membership, meaning one can become a member of both organizations simultaneously, the atmosphere after the speeches by the two foremost leaders turned pale.

The "realistic" attitude was indicated by the way Abdurrahman described the factions in both organizations. He said that both Muhammadiyah and NU had factions A and B, and that the cooperation was limited to the A and B factions of each organization. But just as the two leaders seemed to agree on this perspective, the spirit of ecumenism soon disappeared.

A further catastrophe occurred. Not the economic crisis since July 1997 or the fall of former president Soeharto in May 1998. This was the fighting among the political elite, beyond the comprehension of their respective followers. For the sake of high-ranking political positions, many Muslim leaders initiated activities which spurred religious conflicts that spread all over the nation. The conflicts were not only between followers of different religions, but, worse, it was between Muslims themselves. Since 1998 we could even say the hardest hit victims were those in the Muslim community (ummah) itself, given the extraordinary rupture among Muslims.

Every party that relied on Islamic politics for electoral support in the 1999 general elections suffered a major failure. The highest percentage of nationwide votes that any one party achieved was only 12. The result of the general elections clearly indicated that the most tremendous split was among the Muslim electorate.

In such a situation, the political arena was snatched away by groups of Muslim extremists. Suddenly very different political agendas appeared. Saying they were reacting towards the conflicts with religious nuances in Ambon, Poso and other areas, radical groups emerged, whose activities soon filled the mass media. Suddenly each group seemed to have strong tendencies to hate the other. The hatred was not only between the Muslims and followers of other religions, but also between members of Muhammadiyah and NU.

As a result, what happened was a far cry from the initial aim, which was the development of Islam-based politics that were compatible with modern democracy. What surfaced instead was "mob politics", with "impunity" as its main feature. If one commits a murder or sets a house on fire by himself, then he is a criminal. But if one does as part of a crowd, then he is no longer a criminal. The consequence was that Indonesia became a no man's land.

If we desire a consolidated democracy in Indonesia, then the people, interest groups and political parties should pursue their political ambitions in peaceful ways, that is competing according to the rules of the game, negotiating and cooperating in the building of institutionalized politics.

There are two prerequisites to this end.

First, the majority of the people -- in spite of extreme economic difficulties, and disappointment with leaders -- should firmly believe in the democratic procedures and institutions as the best choice to enable us to live together. Though there would be those who are against the system, these groups should be prevented from growing larger and disturbing the pro-democracy movements.

Second, everyone, including the government, must abide by and get accustomed to the method of resolving conflicts based on the law, procedures and the institutions legalized by a fledgling democratic process.

The most important step is a guarantee that ethnic, cultural and religious rifts are not prolonged -- or we will see a setback to authoritarianism (examples abound in Latin America). The more domination in the political arena by the thoughts and agenda of extremists, the more reasons there will be for the "status quo" powers to reinforce an anti-democracy strength.

Who can be expected to snatch back the political agenda to make democracy a success, and to make politics compatible with Islamic ideas? The steps taken by the leaders of Muhammadiyah and NU last week raised hopes that further concrete initiatives would be taken. There are still many obstacles ahead. There are quite a number of pessimists in both organizations who are indeed quite realistic in showing that a major difference exists between the two groups. Theologically, it is less problematic. But sociologically and politically, both groups, especially of late, still find it difficult to meet each other.