Muhammadiyah-NU meeting: A closer look

Muhammadiyah-NU meeting: A closer look

Mohtar Mas'oed, Executive, Nahdlatul Ulama, Yogyakarta

He has done it again. Syafi'ie Maarif has repeated what he did
almost 10 years ago. In 1993, as one of the Muhammadiyah leaders,
together with young figures from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) mostly from
Yogyakarta, he tried to bridge the gap between the activists of
the two largest Muslim organizations.

"Reaching out" is Syafi'ie's prescription -- somebody's got to
do it. Once again, in last week's meeting between the country's
two largest Muslim organizations, he has reached out and was
welcomed in the same spirit by the leaders of NU, who are known
to be open-minded. Why do it again? What happened between 1993
and 2002? In what light should we understand this latest
political move?

We must take another look at the February 1993 meeting held at
the Muhammadiyah University in Yogyakarta. Though probably not
the first of its kind, it was a very special meeting. The meeting
was conducted not by theologians, but by activists with a
background in a variety of sciences. Most of them were from the
social sciences, such as politics, international relations,
economics, sociology, history and education apart from those
taking up Islamic studies. Most acquired their education in the
domestic as well as foreign "Western" academies. The attendants
were Muslim activists who were more confident of their
capabilities in comparison with previous leaders, hence they had
more similar viewpoints on the modern world.

The early 1990s was also an interesting period. Because during
that time many "liberal" initiatives emerged among the religious
activists in the city. A number of NU youths -- graduates of the
State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) -- developed a "neo-
modernist Islam" through an organization called the Institute of
Islamic and Social Studies (LKIS).

Their activities could be termed as "liberalizing" the Islamic
way of thinking and so making it a more open religion. This group
cooperated with Christian activists in forming the Interfaith
Dialog forum (Dian/Interfidei). This "reaching out" initiative
also covered other areas, including the empowerment of women.

In this context, the idea of gathering the activists of the
two large Muslim organizations cropped up. At the time,
discussions and implementation of pluralism were quite lively,
and were not limited to Muslims.

Unfortunately, at the national level, another movement drew
more attention: That of the Association of Indonesian Muslim
Intellectuals (ICMI). It basically utilized state authority in
the struggle of Islamic ideas. With the support of former
president Soeharto, and led by the flamboyant vice president B.J.
Habibie, the ICMI movement created more vibrations in the
national political arena.

During that period the leadership of Muhammadiyah and NU was
distinctly colored by a chemistry between Amien Rais and
Abdurrahman Wahid that was difficult to reconcile. The 1993
Muhammadiyah-NU meeting was rendered insipid when the two leaders
indicated an extremely "realistic" and pessimistic attitude on
creating the "Muhammad-NU project". Although one senior NU leader
was so high-spirited as to suggest the possibility of dual
membership, meaning one can become a member of both organizations
simultaneously, the atmosphere after the speeches by the two
foremost leaders turned pale.

The "realistic" attitude was indicated by the way Abdurrahman
described the factions in both organizations. He said that both
Muhammadiyah and NU had factions A and B, and that the
cooperation was limited to the A and B factions of each
organization. But just as the two leaders seemed to agree on this
perspective, the spirit of ecumenism soon disappeared.

A further catastrophe occurred. Not the economic crisis since
July 1997 or the fall of former president Soeharto in May 1998.
This was the fighting among the political elite, beyond the
comprehension of their respective followers. For the sake of
high-ranking political positions, many Muslim leaders initiated
activities which spurred religious conflicts that spread all over
the nation. The conflicts were not only between followers of
different religions, but, worse, it was between Muslims
themselves. Since 1998 we could even say the hardest hit victims
were those in the Muslim community (ummah) itself, given the
extraordinary rupture among Muslims.

Every party that relied on Islamic politics for electoral
support in the 1999 general elections suffered a major failure.
The highest percentage of nationwide votes that any one party
achieved was only 12. The result of the general elections clearly
indicated that the most tremendous split was among the Muslim
electorate.

In such a situation, the political arena was snatched away by
groups of Muslim extremists. Suddenly very different political
agendas appeared. Saying they were reacting towards the conflicts
with religious nuances in Ambon, Poso and other areas, radical
groups emerged, whose activities soon filled the mass media.
Suddenly each group seemed to have strong tendencies to hate the
other. The hatred was not only between the Muslims and followers
of other religions, but also between members of Muhammadiyah and
NU.

As a result, what happened was a far cry from the initial aim,
which was the development of Islam-based politics that were
compatible with modern democracy. What surfaced instead was "mob
politics", with "impunity" as its main feature. If one commits a
murder or sets a house on fire by himself, then he is a criminal.
But if one does as part of a crowd, then he is no longer a
criminal. The consequence was that Indonesia became a no man's
land.

If we desire a consolidated democracy in Indonesia, then the
people, interest groups and political parties should pursue their
political ambitions in peaceful ways, that is competing according
to the rules of the game, negotiating and cooperating in the
building of institutionalized politics.

There are two prerequisites to this end.

First, the majority of the people -- in spite of extreme
economic difficulties, and disappointment with leaders -- should
firmly believe in the democratic procedures and institutions as
the best choice to enable us to live together. Though there would
be those who are against the system, these groups should be
prevented from growing larger and disturbing the pro-democracy
movements.

Second, everyone, including the government, must abide by and
get accustomed to the method of resolving conflicts based on the
law, procedures and the institutions legalized by a fledgling
democratic process.

The most important step is a guarantee that ethnic, cultural
and religious rifts are not prolonged -- or we will see a setback
to authoritarianism (examples abound in Latin America). The more
domination in the political arena by the thoughts and agenda of
extremists, the more reasons there will be for the "status quo"
powers to reinforce an anti-democracy strength.

Who can be expected to snatch back the political agenda to
make democracy a success, and to make politics compatible with
Islamic ideas? The steps taken by the leaders of Muhammadiyah and
NU last week raised hopes that further concrete initiatives would
be taken. There are still many obstacles ahead. There are quite a
number of pessimists in both organizations who are indeed quite
realistic in showing that a major difference exists between the
two groups. Theologically, it is less problematic. But
sociologically and politically, both groups, especially of late,
still find it difficult to meet each other.