Money politics burdens democratization

Money Politics -- Pengaruh Uang Dalam Pemilu (Money Politics -- The Effects of Money in Elections); By Indra Ismawan; Media Pressindo, Yogyakarta, April 1999; iv and 82 pages

YOGYAKARTA (JP): Money used as a means to gain political power is not a new practice. Nicolo Machiavelli once stated that any way can be used to get power. "The buck stops here", said former U.S. president Harry Truman. Even the president seat in U.S. can cost US$70 million to $80 million.

In Indonesia, the Lippogate/Riadygate incident was a turning point for money politics discussions. Other cases which come to mind are the abasement of Jamsostek (workers insurance) funds in the discussion of the Manpower Law; Golkar's congress; the massacre of dukun santet (suspected shamans) in East Java; and the mobilization of a militia.

These are what Indra Ismawan mentions as the prologue to this book. The phenomena of money politics is like an iceberg. Why? From the spreading discourse, money politics has not been perfectly profiled. The demarcation line between money politics and political financing is still very vague.

Even Law No. 2/1999 on political parties does not talk about money politics. If there are rules about the source of a political party's funds, what is discussed is the stream of the funds from the donor. Ismawan states that such rules are only effective for the new parties, which are still mobilizing funds. What about the established parties that are already rich? This condition gives the parties the opportunity to hand over funds to the voters in order to get the political benefit.

There are different ideas about the meaning of money politics, which makes it difficult for the public to judge the maneuver of the groups. On the other hand, it becomes easy for the political actors to make justification. Ironically, the justification made by a player of money politics is hard to verify, or at least to clarify, to reveal the real substance of the problem.

For a time, this problem will keep growing in a value system which justifies the hidden practice of money politics. Hidden or not, money politics is a dangerous virus for democratization.

Ismawan defines money politics as every effort or action plan that uses money with a political motive (every action that uses money convertibility), in order to influence the receiver to do or not to do some action for the sake of the giver.

This transaction has the potential to raise a distortion to the pureness of political process and to blur the essence of democracy.

Money politics on a national scale is a reproduction of events in a smaller and more limited scope. At the grass roots of democratization, like the election of a village chief, money politics largely expands. As it happens all the time, it is considered normal and people are no longer aware of its danger.

Money politics which is committed institutionally rather than individually, is as dangerous as violent intimidation. It is even more systematic and well camouflaged.

A floating-mass politics which eliminates individual loyalty to a political party is a precondition of money politics. Corruption as a social-cultural structure which has been well- tended since the colonial era is also a significant precondition of money politics. Thus, money politics is, indeed, inherent to the corruptive-culture.

An increase in the "absolute poverty number" opens possibilities to commit money politics. A rich party will play Santa Claus to the poor and get community sympathy. The handover of social safety net funds is presumed as a camouflage of money politics.

According to the process, money politics in elections is divided into two fund streams. First, funds flow from donor to party. What often happens is that the donor, in return, demands privileges, consensus or any other economic benefit from the party.

Second, funds flow from party to voters. The motive behind this is trading of voters' right.

Loyalty and volatility of the party mass are also important factors to know whether money politics is increasing or decreasing. It is assumed that money politics cannot flourish in a loyal mass. In reverse, money politics will flourish in a volatile mass.

What has been happening in Indonesia since 1998 is a turn from loyalty to volatility of the mass. There is disequilibrium as a result of a growth of new parties. The effect which is instantly seen is a decrease of traditional voters' loyalty. In such conditions, a single majority no longer exists.

When the money politics discussion is taken as a destructive potency, there is an early warning. It comes from the fact that there is always a certain party that uses its power, including money, to win the political competition.

The danger of money politics can be eliminated through a voters' education program. This program can also create a group of election monitors at the grass roots.

Any action to eliminate money politics, in the long-term, should have a built-in corruption sweeping program. This is related to the fact that money politics is always part of corruption, collusion and nepotism, which are inherited from the New Order.

This book is five-chapter compilation of articles and columns. Despite its unsystematic plot, the book could become a discourse of education process related to the 1999 general election.

-- Ag. Prih Adiartanto