Mired at home, RI can't lead ASEAN

Takashi Shiraishi, The Daily Yomiuri, Asia News Network, Tokyo

Since the downfall in 1998 of the Soeharto regime, Indonesia has seen three presidents: B.J. Habibie (1998-1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) and Megawati Soekarnoputri, who took office in 2001.

Throughout the past five years, Indonesian politics had been marked by deep-seated instability, beset by such problems as the separatist Free Aceh movement in northern Sumatra and the terrorist activities of the Jamaah Islamiyah.

Moreover, the Indonesian economy has failed to continue on its once-vibrant high-growth path. The annual growth rate over the past four years has hovered at about 3 percent to 4 percent.

As a result, Indonesia has turned in on itself, and is unable to take the initiative in steering the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Given Indonesia's importance to Japan in economic and geopolitical terms, it is most worrying indeed for us to see the country drifting politically and mired in a socioeconomic crisis.

How are things in Indonesia likely to evolve in the foreseeable future?

Indonesia will hold parliamentary and provincial assembly elections in April. The first round of the presidential election will take place in July, followed by a second round in September.

Will these elections bring about major changes in Indonesian politics?

The results of a survey conducted in September by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) with the help of the Japan International Cooperation Agency may provide some answers. The survey was carried out in 30 provinces and covered 2,240 people from 224 areas. Aceh was not included in the survey.

First, how do the respondents assess Indonesia's political system?

Since Soeharto was ousted, the Indonesian political system has undergone a major transformation from a centralized authoritarian system to a decentralized democracy. Because of this change, political parties and the parliament have emerged as new power centers along with the presidency and the military.

In addition, provincial governments are now playing more important roles in society, comparable to that of the central government.

After five years of reformasi (reforms), how do people evaluate the current political framework?

When asked in the poll whether they think democracy is the best political systems, 65 percent of respondents answered yes, compared with 71 percent in the previous poll in 2001. But tellingly, in response to the question, "Do you think the Soeharto regime was bad?" only 26 percent said yes, compared with 60 percent in 2001.

Asked whether they think it undesirable for a member of the military to hold political office, only 40 percent agreed, while 53 percent said they were dissatisfied with the state of democracy in Indonesia, and 56 percent said they thought the Soeharto regime was better than the current democratic system.

These findings indicate that while the majority of Indonesians support the decentralized democratic system today, their number is declining, while those in favor of a centrally governed autocratic system such as that the one that existed under the Soeharto regime are increasing. This is mainly because the current government has failed to live up to public expectations.

What do people want from the government?

Responding to the question, "What do you think is the most important problem facing Indonesia?" 65.4 percent cited economic crisis, with public order, corruption and law and order trailing with 7.7 percent, 1.5 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively.

It is clear that most Indonesians want the government to deal with the economic crisis. But what does the term "economic crisis" indicate?

In the two years since Megawati became president, the government has been generally successful in stabilizing the macroeconomic situation. This can be seen in the stabilization of the rupiah's exchange rate and the decline in inflation and interest rates.

The economic growth rate, however, was less than 4 percent in both 2001 and 2002.

An annual growth rate of 6 percent is required for the creation of new jobs to secure employment for the 2.5 million or more people entering the Indonesian labor market every year. This means the current pace of growth is insufficient.

In short, what most Indonesians mean by overcoming the economic crisis is that the government has to realize a high economic growth rate of 7 percent to 9 percent a year, as was the case from the late 1980s to the first half of the 1990s under the Soeharto administration. A growth rate this high would lead to the creation of ample new jobs and give people a real sense that their livelihoods are improving.

The government is well aware of this, and has worked out an economic policy package designed to help Indonesia after it has graduated from the International Monetary Fund's financial rescue program at the end of 2003.

To improve the investment climate, however, the government needs to address a plethora of thorny problems, including labor issues, law and order, reforming the judicial system and the elimination of corruption. To do so, all the elements comprising government must unite and show their unshakable, strong resolve.

A question that must be asked is whether Indonesia, through the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, can give birth to a government that is able to meet the people's expectations.

Unfortunately, the chances of this happening are slim.

Without attempting an in-depth analysis of the survey results, I have come to two conclusions.

First, the elections will not help the Indonesian parliament break its three-cornered deadlock. Three parliamentary forces--the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle headed by Megawati; Golkar, the holdover party from the Soeharto days; and a number of Islamic parties with fundamental Muslims as their power base--are now locked in a power struggle, each unable to establish supremacy. The elections will not break this deadlock.

Second, although Megawati remains unquestionably the strongest presidential candidate, popular support for her is precariously low--less than 20 percent. This means that to win a second term, she will have no alternative but to form a coalition with either Golkar or the Islamic forces, offering vice presidential and ministerial posts as inducements. If this comes to pass, Megawati's new administration, while basically economic growth- oriented, will be composed of players with different backgrounds. The newly formed administration would not be able to act in unison to solve the weighty problems facing Indonesia, such as promoting investment, fostering economic growth and creating new jobs.

In other words, the three-cornered impasse will remain in place in and after 2004.

What implications does the current state of Indonesian politics have for the future of Indonesia and Southeast Asia?

First, should the new government be unable to achieve an annual economic growth rate of 6 percent or so, the public will become even more disenchanted with democracy.

There is no knowing whether Indonesia will revert back to a Soeharto-style authoritarian system of government.

If the new administration fails to create new jobs, the social crisis will deepen, which might lead to a political crisis if Indonesia is affected by external shocks as in 1997. Even if there are no crises, the people's expectations of strong leadership and strong government will continue to grow.

Second, there are clear signs that Indonesia will continue to turn even more inward, becoming fully preoccupied with domestic political affairs. It would then be highly unlikely that Indonesia would take an active leadership role or play a part in the war on terrorism.

In all likelihood, Indonesia will remain adrift for quite some time to come.