Mindanao rebels -- fighters or terrorists?

Mindanao rebels -- fighters or terrorists?

Under The Crescent Moon: Rebellion In Mindanao
By Marites Danguilan Vitug & Glenda M. Gloria
Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs & Institute
for Popular Democracy, Quezon City, the Philippines 2000
344 pages
300 Philippine pesos

YOGYAKARTA (JP): The release of Under The Crescent Moon:
Rebellion In Mindanao just as the Abu Sayyaf was escorting its
latest group of foreign hostages into its lair may have seemed to
be fantastic timing.

But as the book itself clearly shows, the Muslim Filipino
disquiet has long been in existence. What has been sorely lacking
was a close scrutiny of why it has been so and the issues
involved, as well as a sober discussion on what could be done.

The book, written by Philippines Center for Investigative
Journalism (PCIJ) cofounder Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda M.
Gloria, tries to do all three and in general the effort is
successful. Indeed, the work is probably one of the best attempts
at documenting the rebellion (and terrorism) in Mindanao, and
even unearths historical details that few Filipinos know about.

It traces the rebellion from the infamous Jabiddah Massacre of
March 18, 1968, an event that gave birth to the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF), from which a faction that was to become
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) later broke away. The
book also devotes much space to the tiny group that is now
attracting the most attention: the terrorist Abu Sayyaf, which
had its beginnings in the early 1990s. Its young founder, the
late Abdurajak Janjalani, openly questioned Misuari's leadership
while studying in Libya. He did not stop here, and would turn
extremely anti-Christian as well.

Among the more interesting discussions in the book is the
authors' argument that in searching for a revolutionary model
suitable for the Muslim Filipino experience would-be MNLF founder
Nur Misuari came across the Palestinian experience. Like Muslim
Filipinos, Palestinians were also in search of a "lost identity"
and fighting for territory based on historic rights. To Vitug and
Gloria, this partly explains why Muslim Filipinos have stronger
ties with Arab Muslims than with Muslims in neighboring Asian
countries.

The book also shows that while MNLF based its struggle on the
Palestinian model, the war being waged by the MILF against the
government is inspired by the U.S. -backed Afghan mujahideen
experience -- and to a certain point, even the current Chechen
war against Russia.

The "MILF story" could have stood more detail and perhaps
additional input from observers and experts, especially once the
MILF begin telling of its supposed clandestine role in the Afghan
conflict.

As for the Abu Sayyaf, the information obtained by the authors
about the group could probably help Manila's fight against
terrorism. That is if Malacanang opted to see the problem
independently from that of U.S. war strategies and their
Filipinos disciples who insist on using the lens of "internal
terrorism". Military tacticians, for example, insist the Abu
Sayyaf is a product of Islamic extremism from Iranian Shiite
school of thought.

Both the MILF and Abu Sayyaf consider Khalid Bin Walid, a 7th
century hero among the majority Sunni Muslims but considered a
villain by the Shiites, as their model of Islamic leadership. In
the Malaysian International Islamic University, references to Bin
Walid are banned, apparently to discourage the creation of a
following.

For those who are wondering if Mindanao will always be at war,
Under The Crescent Moon's documentation of the peace process
initiated by the administration of former president Fidel Ramos
with the MNLF offers a peace packaging model that could be useful
in efforts for a peace settlement with even non-Muslim insurgent
groups. Indeed, Vitug and Gloria say that instead of
concentrating on a military strategy, those serious about peace
can well explore how poverty can be alleviated if not eradicated.
After all, more often than not, it is economic hardship rather
than ideology that drives common folk to take up arms.

Investing more in education than in military hardware in
Mindanao could be made part of the solution to the conflict.
Officials can look at the example set by Malaysia, where premier
Mahathir Mohammad responded to surging Islamic revivalism by
"bureaucratizing religious authority".

But part of the problem in the Philippines is that even those
who go to Islamic schools abroad often come home without
specialization in a particular field, including religion and
history, says Cotabato City-based Muslim scholar Mohammad
Sulaiman. As a result, the Dharul Ifta (House of Opinion) in
Cotabato City is headed by someone who took up astronomy. In all
probability, this crisis in Arabic education contributes to the
thinking that options for Muslim Filipinos are limited, thereby
paving the way for the rise of local religious advocates of jihad
al kital (armed struggle).

-- Joko Subanarto

The reviewer is a researcher at Lembaga Studi SOVRANITA
Indonesia in Yogyakarta.