Wed, 04 Jul 2001

Milosevic -- other tyrants too?

By Aboeprijadi Santoso

THE HAGUE, the Netherlands (JP): Given the impatient wait for hours of the world press and the public for the arrival of the former Yugoslav dictator in The Hague, the late hours of June 28, 2001 may be remembered as "the night of Slobodan Milosevic."

In Beograd the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Jinjic's unilateral action, described here as the "wild West method," had made Milosevic's transfer possible, and in turn, led to a new crisis that could spell the end of the remaining Yugoslavia. The flight carrying Milosevic was diverted and security in The Hague was intensified.

So the historic hand over of one of the world most wanted former president-cum-political crooks on June 28, was hailed by the international community but marked by tensions, security concerns and a new Balkan crisis.

Ironically June 28 is a very emotional date for the Serbs. In 1914 the Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand was assassinated on that date, creating a casus belli for World War I. Most profoundly, the date is St. Vitus Day of June 28, 1389, marking the defeat of Prince Lazar's troops by the Muslim Ottoman army in Kosovo.

But the 600 year-old myth surrounding St. Vitus Day could be as fresh as yesterday. On the same date in 1989, then President Milosevic, acting as a reborn Prince Lazar, came to Kosovo to awaken Serbian nationalism among the Kosovo-Serb minority, which incited a new Balkan civil war and resulted in the disintegration of Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslavia.

Today, few Serbs are reportedly sad about Milosevic being brought to The Hague, but the fact that it took place on that same historic date -- hence a symbolic moment -- could leave a bad taste, even seeds of revenge, for the future of Serbian nationalism.

Meanwhile the Milosevic transfer -- i.e. Jinjic's "coup" and the diplomatic blackmail by the World Bank-led donor conference for Yugoslavia held in Brussels the next day -- inevitably led to new debates. Milosevic becomes "Billion Dollar Man" since only his transfer will pave the way for US$1.5 million in aid for Yugoslavia.

Could Milosevic be tried by the international tribunal without violating Yugoslavia's own constitution or without threats by a donor conference, as a Dutch expert in international law who worries about these precedents has argued?

Yes, it is possible, said Vojislav Kostunica. The Yugoslav President, who only learned about Milosevic's transfer from the media, had shown his readiness to cooperate with the International Court of Justice's Yugoslavia Tribunal. But he wished to settle the problem constitutionally and opposed Jinjic's decision.

But in reply to that question, a former European Union diplomat who had frequently dealt with Milosevic in the past said no.

H. van den Broek argued that Kostunica's method of resolving the Milosevic problem would end up in impunity for the former dictator. Moreover, he admitted that without the forced transfer of Milosevic, the donor conference would risk a debacle and a greater danger of a split between the United States government and the European Union.

Kostunica is a constitutionalist who respects the national sovereignty of his country, whereas van den Broek believes in real politik. In the end, the latter wins as the aim justified the means.

Whatever the controversy over the Milosevic transfer, it is irrelevant for the trial. Once he is brought under the authority of the International Court of Justice, according to international law, the tribunal may lawfully start the process. But the political methods have shaped a precedent.

Slobodan Milosevic had risen to power, acquired popularity and taken actions that were to become his crimes against humanity -- thanks to his style of politics largely based on ethnic identity. Unlike most former communist rulers in Eastern Europe, Milosevic responded to the fall of the Berlin Wall by igniting Serbian nationalism. Indeed, the international sanctions against his regime are, in a sense, a verdict against his aggressive ideology.

But it was also shortcut politics that was apparently aimed at creating a Serb dominated Balkan regional security order by means of violent ethnic cleansing of other peoples.

In doing so, Milosevic and his associates were certainly guilty of one of the worst forms of gross human rights violations, but at the same time he challenged a new era -- one which then U.S. President George Bush (Sr.) in 1991 proudly proclaimed as "the New World Order" to mark the end of the Cold War.

Yet, in less than a decade, there has been three Allied-led wars (in the Gulf and the Balkans) compared to controlled tensions throughout the decades of the Cold War. In the end, it was not Bush (Sr.) alone, but he, with Milosevic (and Saddam Hussein), who made up the architecture of that new order.

In a world dominated by a single superpower and a multi-polar pattern of regional major powers, it means that the new structures of world security cannot be challenged without greater risks than before. National sovereignty, as President Kostunica now learns, can no longer be taken for granted.

Earlier, Gulf countries led by rulers like Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini's successors were considered isolated "rogue states". They too, must have concluded that the established regional order was imposed more firmly because they were threatening the (oil) interests of the big powers.

The "sins" of Milosevic, therefore, are not simply the war crimes his regime committed in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo (four wars, some 250,000 dead and a ruined country), but the fact that these "sins" were committed on the doorstep of the Atlantic Pact NATO area, "threatening" the established stability of the West European countries. Significantly the media here saw him as "the greatest European mischief maker." Similarly, the Gulf leaders had made their "sins" in their geo-politically sensitive regions.

Contrary to the assumptions of scholar Samuel Huntington, all these were clashes of states, rather than of civilizations.

So what should happen to other (former) rulers who were responsible for atrocities committed far away from NATO boundaries or with less direct and strategic interests for the West, yet, arguably, much worse than Milosevic -- like Chile's Augusto Pinochet and the Rwandan leaders of 1994? With the 1965 massacres, East Timor and Aceh human rights abuses in Indonesia, former president Soeharto may be even worse than all of them.

A new momentum should be developed if the international community is to avoid double standards for those responsible for human rights atrocities. Likewise multilateral structures, like UN agencies, tribunals and donor platforms, should be more accessible to alternative views of non-state institutions, human rights organizations, NGOs, the press and experts, in weighing such cases.

The Belgian court, for one, has implemented its unique laws, which have universal jurisdiction, by trying a former Rwandan PM for the genocide of Tutsis and has started to investigate Israeli PM Ariel Sharon for the Sabra and Shatilla massacres.

In any case, the hand over of Milosevic has sent a powerful message. Unlimited atrocities with impunity can no longer be accepted. Some crooks might already have had bad dreams like the late Zaire's President Mobutu, who used to be haunted by the faces of his victims at the bottom of his glass of wine.

More may follow.

The writer is a journalist based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.