Milosevic faces political crisis

LONDON: After more than two months of street demonstrations, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic shows little sign of conceding power to the opposition in 15 leading municipalities, including Belgrade. Indeed, he has purged the ranks of his ruling Socialist Party (the old League of Communists) of dissenters, and is unlikely to be deflected from retaining power, regardless of Constitutional niceties. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia's isolation has increased as a result of the regime's hardline stance, the economy is declining and Milosevic's determination to retain power increasingly risks ending in violence which may not be confined to Serbia.

Milosevic clearly miscalculated when he annulled opposition wins in local elections on Nov. 17, 1996. The scale of the resulting demonstrations took him, the West and even the opposition itself by surprise. But with the numbers of protesters dwindling and the opposition unsure of what to do next, Milosevic seems again to have gained the upper hand. Yet the myth of his invincibility is broken and the credibility of the regime, domestically and internationally, seriously eroded.

Ironically, Milosevic's ruling Socialist Party and its hardline communist coalition partner, the Yugoslav Unified Left (JUL) -- led by Milosevic's wife, Mirjana Markovic -- won the November elections, but lost in key municipalities. Relinquishing power in these towns, however, threatened to undermine the regime, particularly as much of the media in Yugoslavia is controlled by local governments. Milosevic's refusal to concede victory to the opposition heralds a period of considerable instability for Serbia, which coincides with political turbulence in the neighboring Balkan states of Albania and Bulgaria.

Annulling these opposition victories also sets a dangerous precedent for the crucial presidential and parliamentary elections to be held by the end of 1997. If Milosevic loses the presidential elections, he may refuse to give up power. Having already served two presidential terms, he is technically debarred from standing. But Milosevic has privately told Western officials that he is eligible to serve again because by calling early elections in 1992 he did not fully serve his first term.

Milosevic already controls the Serbian parliament, and the legal manipulation of the recent elections demonstrates his influence over the courts. There has been speculation that Milosevic would attempt to become President or Prime Minister of Yugoslavia (comprising Serbia and Montenegro) and this option cannot be ruled out. The Yugoslav Federation, however, now looks distinctly shaky. Montenegro has called for Serbia's November election results to be respected in a bid to win international support. Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic, while beholden to Milosevic, may well also balk at his proposed constitutional changes to increase the Yugoslav President's powers. By contrast, according to the Constitution, the position of Prime Minister has considerable authority. But it is difficult to envisage Milosevic, who rules Serbia virtually single-handedly, working with other ministers to run Yugoslavia.

The furor over the November elections has indefinitely delayed Yugoslavia's full reinstatement in the international community. It remains suspended from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The U.S. has yet to appoint an ambassador to Belgrade, and has proposed that other Western countries withdraw theirs, to the embarrassment of the UK and France. The U.S. administration will not only retain this 'outer wall' of sanctions, but has now concluded that the Milosevic regime is, in effect, in terminal decline.

Milosevic has used delaying tactics to defuse the opposition protests, dispatching thousands of police and prolonging legal decisions on the elections. While opposition leaders address protests in downtown Belgrade every day, Milosevic has returned to 'real' politics. Socialist officials, already planning how to win the forthcoming presidential and parliamentary polls, say they will not repeat the mistakes of November 1996.

Leaders of the opposition coalition, Zajedno ('Together') are now considering how to regain the initiative. As Milosevic is unlikely to concede Belgrade, they want to sustain the momentum of their protest. Yet they can no longer muster 100,000-strong crowds as demonstrators tire of assembling in freezing temperatures with no tangible results.

Zajedno's coalition leaders, however, are divided on personal rather than policy issues. If elections were held today, none of its three principal leaders could defeat Milosevic. Moreover, no obvious figure has emerged who could unite the opposition.

The President of the Democratic Party Zoran Djindjic, who appears the chief strategist behind the protests, is the most likely of the three to win votes across Serbia's political spectrum. His co-leader in Zajedno, Vuk Draskovic, head of the Serbian Renewal Movement, can still attract support, but remains an unacceptable candidate for Serbia's Left because of his ultra- nationalism. The nominal third leader of Zajedno, Vesna Pesic, who heads the tiny Civic Alliance, has very little popular backing.

By signing the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 1995, Milosevic was seen by the West as a linchpin of regional stability. The emergence of a strong opposition movement has now changed this view. Some Western governments remain wary of the opposition because of the extreme nationalist past of Djindjic and Draskovic. Only Vesna Pesic has a 'clean' war record. However, recently both Djindjic and Draskovic, who now calls for the return of the Serbian monarchy, have repeatedly emphasized their commitment to the Dayton peace agreement.

Another delicate issue, in addition to Bosnia, is the status of Serbia's southern province, Kosovo, whose population is mostly Albanian. Djindjic believes the province should be given autonomy -- in effect a return to the old formula inherited from the late Josip Tito's 1974 Constitution, abolished by Milosevic in 1987. In January 1997, state television -- under Milosevic's control -- accused the opposition of backing Albanian separatists. It called on Serbs to remain unified after a bomb attack wounded the Serb rector of Kosovo's university. Notwithstanding the years of war and economic decline, Kosovo retains an almost sacred significance for most Serbs.

State television has played a key role in reducing popular support for the opposition, particularly in rural areas. The evening news, which according to polls is the main information source for more than half Serbia's 10 million population, accuses the opposition of being 'foreign mercenaries' and of 'waging a terrorist war'.

The third mainstay of Milosevic's regime, after the media and the Socialist Party, is the highly armed police. By contrast, the Yugoslav Army, already resentful of Milosevic's favoritism towards the police, remained on the sidelines during the opposition protests, and a handful of officers even actively supported the demonstrators. Most officers are believed to be opposed to a 'Jaruzelski' solution and the imposition of martial law on their own people.

While opposition leaders have no plans to call off the protests, their strategy for the next few months is unclear. They have begun to form shadow local assemblies, meeting in the streets until the Socialists concede victory. But with living standards set to plunge lower, the arrival of spring could see widespread labor unrest. If the opposition capitalizes on the deteriorating economic situation, it could further broaden support.

Moderate Socialists within the establishment are dismayed by Milosevic's overtures towards the JUL, whose membership includes state company managers, retired army generals and war profiteers. Mirjana Markovic has made known her hardline views, calling for the state security to crush the demonstrations. If Milosevic continues to move closer to the JUL, key Socialists may defect and form their own party.

The key issue is whether Zajedno can remain unified and strength its network throughout the country in preparation for the forthcoming elections. Emboldened by the groundswell of popular and Western support, Zajedno now needs a concrete political strategy.

As Western governments, led by the U.S., revise their tacit backing of Milosevic, his luck may be changing. For the first time, he will face a serious challenge at the polls. But if he loses, how the opposition could secure their victory and how the West would respond is still unclear. With the stakes much higher in the next elections, the prospect of a prolonged political crisis in Serbia remains great.