Militias are by nature fracture prone

By Siswo Pramono

CANBERRA (JP): What an irony. As the Indonesian military formally withdraws from the political stage, the country also witnesses a growing number of civilians in uniforms. Should the hands of militias rock the cradle of our baby democracy? 'Militianism', one might argue -- not militarism -- is now becoming a major concern of the country.

In Indonesia, militia groups are flourishing even if their legality is questionable and their partisan politics increasingly disturbing. The government must impose control.

Militia is a slippery term. A somewhat broader (and open ended) U.S. legal definition characterizes militia as able-bodied males or females of a particular age who are required by law to join those units set up for purposes of protecting and defending their community. The formulation of a militia is a consequence of a self-help community: the collective right to armed self- defense. Thus, the militia's task is not to fight for someone else, but to protect their own families and communities.

Realpolitik has soiled the term and profile of these noble societal forces. It has transformed militias into combat units for the elite in the struggle for political power. In Peru, rondas campesinas (civil defense patrol units) were employed by the military in counter-insurgency operations, resulting in various human rights abuses.

The Croat nationalist militia, the Croatian Defense Council (HVO), was employed to attack Serb civilians and Bosnian Muslims. In Rwanda, the Hutu elite formed militias, Interhamwe and Impuzamigambi, who unleashed genocidal attacks against the Tutsi population. In Somalia, the land of militias, even the U.S. failed to control. In the heart of the U.S., following the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 by a militia member, the fear of domestic militias is rampant.

Militia is in fact a term closely connected with the history of the American colonies. The charter of every American colony provides the authority to create militia units. Indeed, the militia played a key role in the victory of the American Revolution over the British. In U.S. history, militia units appear as forces of a revolutionary war.

In Indonesia, too, the militia, even if the term itself is hardly found in Indonesian law, was a key factor in the victory of the 1945 revolutionary war against the Dutch.

Under the law, Indonesia's defense is the defense of all people. Ordinary citizens who commit themselves to protect the motherland and democracy make up the backbone of the national defense and security system. The 1982 Law of National Defense stipulates that Rakyat Terlatih, people given military training for defense and security purposes, are to be the basic component of national defense. For an Indonesian citizen, if conscripted, one must join Rakyat Terlatih as a constitutional obligation.

Like the American militia, Indonesia's Rakyat Terlatih is organized as mandated in the Constitution by the state, trained by the military, and incorporated into the national education system. The law regulates its deployment. Most importantly, whatever the agent of recruitment, the sole loyalty of Rakyat Terlatih remains to the Constitution.

Not all militia groups belong within the framework of Rakyat Terlatih even if some might play the same patriotic roles in the history of the country. These groups, including the task forces of various political parties such as Banser, Satgas PDI-P, Satgas Golkar, Brigade Hisbullah, and other militia such as Laskar Jihad (Islamic Holly War), Laskar Islam (Islamic Forces), Satgas Merah Putih and many others, are now on the increase both in terms of personnel and number of organizations. Most are given basic military training, wear military uniforms and act militarily. Mass media has reported increasing activities, political and otherwise, of these militia groups.

As mentioned before, militia is a slippery term. With the absence of adequate definition, qualifying some of these groups as militia might be debatable. Thus, this qualification is more labeling than substantial.

This new phenomena of 'militianism' poses a challenge to both the state and the community. There are positive and negative aspects.

Among the positive aspects of the militia are that these groups are locally grown societal forces, who are voluntary in nature, and who are ready to take up the task of social workers. They help people in the countryside with various self-help community projects.

Within their own region, these groups are deployed for many humanitarian operations. Most of the parties' task forces (the satgas) are formed to maintain the orderly function of the parties' political activities. In many occasions, these militia groups also help the police in maintaining law and public order.

There are also problems with these militias. Many of the groups are ready vehicles of partisan politics of the elite. These groups have the spirit of a militaristic cult, the main characteristic of which is blind loyalty to a central charismatic figure: the leader.

For example, if some political opponents conceivably challenge their leaders' position, the Banser is as ready to fight for Abdurrahman Wahid as the Satgas PDI-P for Megawati. Fighting among task forces of different political parties is a common phenomenon. Blind loyalty overrides reason and is thus counter- productive to the promotion of democracy. Democracy is built on dialogue and deliberation, not violence.

These militia groups can be disruptive to an orderly society. The "sweeping" against U.S. citizens in Solo by members of the so-called Laskar Islam (Islamic Forces) is a case in point.

Most of the militia groups are beset with a typical characteristic of the militia scene: lack of professional organization that renders militias disparate and unstructured.

A similar problem exists in the case with the American militia. A recent study by FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) on the so-called Project Megiddo notes: "Even well-structured militia, which tend to organize along military lines with central control, are characterized by factionalism and disunity".

Loyalty is not necessarily the key issue but management is. Either way, leadership suffers. Thus, even a leader will find it difficult to control his or her own group.

Finally, such militia groups can be counter-productive to the maintenance of national defense and security. Indonesia has experienced difficulties in controlling militias operating in such conflict torn regions as East Timor, Irian Jaya and Maluku.

In situations such as war, every armed group -- the regular army and the militia -- must abide by the laws of armed conflict (e.g. the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1949 Geneva Convention). These laws regulate relations among adversaries and the relations between combatants and civilians. Destruction of Dili and the atrocities in Maluku are evidence of the armed militia's tendency to disregard the rules whether out of ignorance or otherwise.

The government must act to seize control. Disbanding parties' task forces and other militia groups might be politically difficult but the government must impose a stringent control upon them. Indonesia's commitment to the promotion of democracy and civil society assumes upholding the rule of law. The 1982 Law of National Defense offers a starting point in attempts to place the militia under the control of civilian authority.

Here are some of the implications. First, all militia groups must retain their organizations while satisfying the standard requirements of Rakyat Terlatih (as governed by the 1982 Law of National Defense). This standard would improve discipline and the organization of the militia, and ultimately ease their supervision by civilian authority. Groups that failed to meet the standard would be dismissed.

Second, while they can continue to fulfill their respective function as self-help societal forces, no militia groups is allowed to support partisan politics. Democracy must be protected from the use of violent forces.

Last but not least, while militia groups may embrace their respective ideology and political affiliation of their choice, loyalty to the Constitution remains paramount. From this it follows that no militia leader may ask members to participate in any unconstitutional and unlawful activities.

The Indonesian government must place militia groups under control. A militia per se is not an evil. Militias are societal forces that deserve a good system of management and control so that they are able to channel their contributions to benefit the community and the process of democracy.

The writer is a postgraduate student at the Department of political science, the Australian National University, Canberra