Militias are by nature fracture prone

Militias are by nature fracture prone

By Siswo Pramono

CANBERRA (JP): What an irony. As the Indonesian military
formally withdraws from the political stage, the country also
witnesses a growing number of civilians in uniforms. Should the
hands of militias rock the cradle of our baby democracy?
'Militianism', one might argue -- not militarism -- is now
becoming a major concern of the country.

In Indonesia, militia groups are flourishing even if their
legality is questionable and their partisan politics increasingly
disturbing. The government must impose control.

Militia is a slippery term. A somewhat broader (and open
ended) U.S. legal definition characterizes militia as able-bodied
males or females of a particular age who are required by law to
join those units set up for purposes of protecting and defending
their community. The formulation of a militia is a consequence of
a self-help community: the collective right to armed self-
defense. Thus, the militia's task is not to fight for someone
else, but to protect their own families and communities.

Realpolitik has soiled the term and profile of these noble
societal forces. It has transformed militias into combat units
for the elite in the struggle for political power. In Peru,
rondas campesinas (civil defense patrol units) were employed by
the military in counter-insurgency operations, resulting in
various human rights abuses.

The Croat nationalist militia, the Croatian Defense Council
(HVO), was employed to attack Serb civilians and Bosnian Muslims.
In Rwanda, the Hutu elite formed militias, Interhamwe and
Impuzamigambi, who unleashed genocidal attacks against the Tutsi
population. In Somalia, the land of militias, even the U.S.
failed to control. In the heart of the U.S., following the
bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 by a
militia member, the fear of domestic militias is rampant.

Militia is in fact a term closely connected with the history
of the American colonies. The charter of every American colony
provides the authority to create militia units. Indeed, the
militia played a key role in the victory of the American
Revolution over the British. In U.S. history, militia units
appear as forces of a revolutionary war.

In Indonesia, too, the militia, even if the term itself is
hardly found in Indonesian law, was a key factor in the victory
of the 1945 revolutionary war against the Dutch.

Under the law, Indonesia's defense is the defense of all
people. Ordinary citizens who commit themselves to protect the
motherland and democracy make up the backbone of the national
defense and security system. The 1982 Law of National Defense
stipulates that Rakyat Terlatih, people given military training
for defense and security purposes, are to be the basic component
of national defense. For an Indonesian citizen, if conscripted,
one must join Rakyat Terlatih as a constitutional obligation.

Like the American militia, Indonesia's Rakyat Terlatih is
organized as mandated in the Constitution by the state, trained
by the military, and incorporated into the national education
system. The law regulates its deployment. Most importantly,
whatever the agent of recruitment, the sole loyalty of Rakyat
Terlatih remains to the Constitution.

Not all militia groups belong within the framework of Rakyat
Terlatih even if some might play the same patriotic roles in the
history of the country. These groups, including the task forces
of various political parties such as Banser, Satgas PDI-P, Satgas
Golkar, Brigade Hisbullah, and other militia such as Laskar Jihad
(Islamic Holly War), Laskar Islam (Islamic Forces), Satgas Merah
Putih and many others, are now on the increase both in terms of
personnel and number of organizations. Most are given basic
military training, wear military uniforms and act militarily.
Mass media has reported increasing activities, political and
otherwise, of these militia groups.

As mentioned before, militia is a slippery term. With the
absence of adequate definition, qualifying some of these groups
as militia might be debatable. Thus, this qualification is more
labeling than substantial.

This new phenomena of 'militianism' poses a challenge to both
the state and the community. There are positive and negative
aspects.

Among the positive aspects of the militia are that these
groups are locally grown societal forces, who are voluntary in
nature, and who are ready to take up the task of social workers.
They help people in the countryside with various self-help
community projects.

Within their own region, these groups are deployed for many
humanitarian operations. Most of the parties' task forces (the
satgas) are formed to maintain the orderly function of the
parties' political activities. In many occasions, these militia
groups also help the police in maintaining law and public order.

There are also problems with these militias. Many of the
groups are ready vehicles of partisan politics of the elite.
These groups have the spirit of a militaristic cult, the main
characteristic of which is blind loyalty to a central charismatic
figure: the leader.

For example, if some political opponents conceivably challenge
their leaders' position, the Banser is as ready to fight for
Abdurrahman Wahid as the Satgas PDI-P for Megawati. Fighting
among task forces of different political parties is a common
phenomenon. Blind loyalty overrides reason and is thus counter-
productive to the promotion of democracy. Democracy is built on
dialogue and deliberation, not violence.

These militia groups can be disruptive to an orderly society.
The "sweeping" against U.S. citizens in Solo by members of the
so-called Laskar Islam (Islamic Forces) is a case in point.

Most of the militia groups are beset with a typical
characteristic of the militia scene: lack of professional
organization that renders militias disparate and unstructured.

A similar problem exists in the case with the American
militia. A recent study by FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation)
on the so-called Project Megiddo notes: "Even well-structured
militia, which tend to organize along military lines with central
control, are characterized by factionalism and disunity".

Loyalty is not necessarily the key issue but management is.
Either way, leadership suffers. Thus, even a leader will find it
difficult to control his or her own group.

Finally, such militia groups can be counter-productive to the
maintenance of national defense and security. Indonesia has
experienced difficulties in controlling militias operating in
such conflict torn regions as East Timor, Irian Jaya and Maluku.

In situations such as war, every armed group -- the regular
army and the militia -- must abide by the laws of armed conflict
(e.g. the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1949 Geneva Convention).
These laws regulate relations among adversaries and the relations
between combatants and civilians. Destruction of Dili and the
atrocities in Maluku are evidence of the armed militia's tendency
to disregard the rules whether out of ignorance or otherwise.

The government must act to seize control. Disbanding parties'
task forces and other militia groups might be politically
difficult but the government must impose a stringent control upon
them. Indonesia's commitment to the promotion of democracy and
civil society assumes upholding the rule of law. The 1982 Law of
National Defense offers a starting point in attempts to place the
militia under the control of civilian authority.

Here are some of the implications. First, all militia groups
must retain their organizations while satisfying the standard
requirements of Rakyat Terlatih (as governed by the 1982 Law of
National Defense). This standard would improve discipline and the
organization of the militia, and ultimately ease their
supervision by civilian authority. Groups that failed to meet the
standard would be dismissed.

Second, while they can continue to fulfill their respective
function as self-help societal forces, no militia groups is
allowed to support partisan politics. Democracy must be protected
from the use of violent forces.

Last but not least, while militia groups may embrace their
respective ideology and political affiliation of their choice,
loyalty to the Constitution remains paramount. From this it
follows that no militia leader may ask members to participate in
any unconstitutional and unlawful activities.

The Indonesian government must place militia groups under
control. A militia per se is not an evil. Militias are societal
forces that deserve a good system of management and control so
that they are able to channel their contributions to benefit the
community and the process of democracy.

The writer is a postgraduate student at the Department of
political science, the Australian National University, Canberra