Military's hands in the justice system

Bayu Wicaksono, Contributor, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

In 1970 advocates set up the Jakarta Legal Institute, which gained the support of then Jakarta governor Lt. Gen. Ali Sadikin, despite its leading role in providing criticism of local and central government. It was the embryo of the Indonesian Foundation for Legal Aid (YLBHI), which now oversees 14 chapters. Thirty-two years later Munarman, former chairman of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) has become the latest director of the foundation -- now known not only for its role in being among the pioneers for a civil society movement, and its legal services, mainly for the poor, but also for its recent internal frictions.

The following is an excerpt of an interview with Munarman:

Question: Internal conflicts seem to have rendered YLBHI "dormant" for a rather long period. How can you revive it to respond to present-day challenges? There are quite a lot of legal aid institutes today. Answer: We have been carrying on as usual. However, as there are a few internal things that need sorting out, it has looked as though we were doing little.

We have settled all our conflicts in a very democratic manner. The elections (for the YLBHI leadership) were carried out through an open debate. This was by far a more democratic method compared with previous elections.

Since November last year there had been a leadership vacuum and elections were delayed because we hadn't agreed on open elections yet. We'd never had an open debate before.

But how are you going to secure funds, given that a number of donors reportedly pulled out following the controversial appointment of founder Adnan Buyung Nasution (because of his legal representation of military officers) to the board's leadership?

There hasn't really been a pullout as such. If that does happen we will open an account to collect public funds, as media organizations do in the event of a disaster. We're also still seeking funds from European countries, Canada and the Netherlands. What will you do with YLBHI in future?

We have both short- and long-term working programs. In the short term we would like to see acceptance of the election bill because the result of the last election was a failure, although it met formal requirements in terms of procedure.

The present legislators are not doing their jobs properly and rumors about corruption and collusion are always swirling around them. There were strong indications to this effect recently.

Consequently, the elections did not result in credible representatives. Elections must not be closed to the people, who only become disenchanted afterwards. A closed system leads to authoritarian leaders who do not care about the people. What differentiates YLBHI from other legal aid institutes?

We do not only handle complaints at the district court level. We carry out political education and provide advocacy to the public regardless of ethnicity, religion and racial origin. This is actually the "soul" of YLBHI. What will be the future role of YLBHI? Will you be in the vanguard of society's legal awareness?

We have established three main pillars in our struggle. First, as an intermediary. We will still handle cases and also become an intermediary in cases as part of our effort to empower civil society. Then we will play the role of facilitator.

This means that YLBHI will carry out political education because we realize that it is very difficult to provide good political education to the public. That's why we will always make an effort as a facilitator (in this role). And finally, we will act as a mobilizer.

In this respect, YLBHI will always come up with ideas about more democratic laws or bills, those that in principle respect the civil rights of the community. What cases are you prioritizing, of the many that are drawn to your attention?

We delegate cases to our LBH offices in the provinces. YLBHI is now handling the cases of migrant workers in Nunukan. We prioritize cases that have a structural impact and those with human rights violations, including environmental and labor cases. In the beginning of the reform movement it was as if everyone wanted violators of human rights to be brought to court. But now there does not seem to be much resistance to a tendency that is starting to allow impunity, or even a tendency to forget past rights abuses. Your comment?

Violation of human rights involves three basic factors that have been largely overlooked in investigations. The first is the legal instrumental factor -- law no. 26/2000 on the human rights tribunal only encompasses genocide and gross violation of human rights.

Second is the institutional factor, the lack of proactiveness on the part of prosecutors and the human rights court in investigations. In the case of East Timor, there was no cooperation with the Timor Leste government, which could certainly have sent witnesses and provided them with protection.

The most important aspect of the institutional factor is the lack of readiness on the part of prosecutors, hence the weak prosecution.

The political factor is no less important. The human rights tribunal for East Timor (which is in the international spotlight) has started; but we have no idea when the Semanggi, Trisakti and Tanjung Priok cases (involving the alleged shooting of demonstrators) will be tried. In the first two a special committee of the House of Representatives decided instead that there was no violation of human rights.

The House switched to becoming an institution that made decisions over human rights violation cases. So what would be the main constraint regarding this apparent tendency to maintain impunity?

The most difficult thing is facing the political power of the military. It's true it won't be in the legislature anymore by 2004. It will formally be outside politics, but institutionally its politics is based on its territorial structure, which is still maintained, from the regional military commands upwards.

These will retain a significant role.

Another example is the military network in the legislature, the military and police faction, which can annul recommendations on severe violations of human rights, as in the cases of the shootings (against protesters, mostly students) at Trisakti, Semanggi I and Semanggi II; not to mention the time when it succeeded in gathering influence to topple former president (Abdurrahman Wahid) Gus Dur.

We want a political stage free of the military; as long as it remains in politics we'll see a continuation of the impunity principle.

There is also a decay in the political elite, characterized by bitter internecine feuding and allegations of corruption being traded by the political parties.