Military's hands in the justice system

Military's hands in the justice system

Bayu Wicaksono, Contributor, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

In 1970 advocates set up the Jakarta Legal Institute, which
gained the support of then Jakarta governor Lt. Gen. Ali Sadikin,
despite its leading role in providing criticism of local and
central government. It was the embryo of the
Indonesian Foundation for Legal Aid (YLBHI), which now oversees
14 chapters. Thirty-two years later Munarman, former chairman of
the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence
(Kontras) has become the latest director of the foundation -- now
known not only for its role in being among the pioneers for a
civil society movement, and its legal services, mainly for the
poor, but also for its recent internal frictions.

The following is an excerpt of an interview with Munarman:

Question: Internal conflicts seem to have rendered YLBHI
"dormant" for a rather long period. How can you revive it to
respond to present-day challenges? There are quite a lot of legal
aid institutes today.
Answer: We have been carrying on as usual. However, as there are
a few internal things that need sorting out, it has looked as
though we were doing little.

We have settled all our conflicts in a very democratic manner.
The elections (for the YLBHI leadership) were carried out through
an open debate. This was by far a more democratic method compared
with previous elections.

Since November last year there had been a leadership vacuum
and elections were delayed because we hadn't agreed on open
elections yet. We'd never had an open debate before.

But how are you going to secure funds, given that a number of
donors reportedly pulled out following the controversial
appointment of founder Adnan Buyung Nasution (because of his
legal representation of military officers) to the board's
leadership?

There hasn't really been a pullout as such. If that does
happen we will open an account to collect public funds, as media
organizations do in the event of a disaster. We're also still
seeking funds from European countries, Canada and the
Netherlands.
What will you do with YLBHI in future?

We have both short- and long-term working programs. In the
short term we would like to see acceptance of the election bill
because the result of the last election was a failure, although
it met formal requirements in terms of procedure.

The present legislators are not doing their jobs properly and
rumors about corruption and collusion are always swirling around
them. There were strong indications to this effect recently.

Consequently, the elections did not result in credible
representatives. Elections must not be closed to the people, who
only become disenchanted afterwards. A closed system leads to
authoritarian leaders who do not care about the people.
What differentiates YLBHI from other legal aid institutes?

We do not only handle complaints at the district court level.
We carry out political education and provide advocacy to the
public regardless of ethnicity, religion and racial origin. This
is actually the "soul" of YLBHI.
What will be the future role of YLBHI? Will you be in the
vanguard of society's legal awareness?

We have established three main pillars in our struggle. First,
as an intermediary. We will still handle cases and also become an
intermediary in cases as part of our effort to empower civil
society. Then we will play the role of facilitator.

This means that YLBHI will carry out political education
because we realize that it is very difficult to provide good
political education to the public. That's why we will always make
an effort as a facilitator (in this role). And finally, we will
act as a mobilizer.

In this respect, YLBHI will always come up with ideas about
more democratic laws or bills, those that in principle respect
the civil rights of the community.
What cases are you prioritizing, of the many that are drawn to
your attention?

We delegate cases to our LBH offices in the provinces. YLBHI
is now handling the cases of migrant workers in Nunukan. We
prioritize cases that have a structural impact and those with
human rights violations, including environmental and labor cases.
In the beginning of the reform movement it was as if everyone
wanted violators of human rights to be brought to court. But now
there does not seem to be much resistance to a tendency that is
starting to allow impunity, or even a tendency to forget past
rights abuses. Your comment?

Violation of human rights involves three basic factors that
have been largely overlooked in investigations. The first is the
legal instrumental factor -- law no. 26/2000 on the human rights
tribunal only encompasses genocide and gross violation of human
rights.

Second is the institutional factor, the lack of proactiveness
on the part of prosecutors and the human rights court in
investigations. In the case of East Timor, there was no
cooperation with the Timor Leste government, which could
certainly have sent witnesses and provided them with protection.

The most important aspect of the institutional factor is the
lack of readiness on the part of prosecutors, hence the weak
prosecution.

The political factor is no less important. The human rights
tribunal for East Timor (which is in the international spotlight)
has started; but we have no idea when the Semanggi, Trisakti and
Tanjung Priok cases (involving the alleged shooting of
demonstrators) will be tried. In the first two a special
committee of the House of Representatives decided instead that
there was no violation of human rights.

The House switched to becoming an institution that made
decisions over human rights violation cases.
So what would be the main constraint regarding this apparent
tendency to maintain impunity?

The most difficult thing is facing the political power of the
military. It's true it won't be in the legislature anymore by
2004. It will formally be outside politics, but institutionally
its politics is based on its territorial structure, which is
still maintained, from the regional military commands upwards.

These will retain a significant role.

Another example is the military network in the legislature,
the military and police faction, which can annul recommendations
on severe violations of human rights, as in the cases of the
shootings (against protesters, mostly students) at Trisakti,
Semanggi I and Semanggi II; not to mention the time when it
succeeded in gathering influence to topple former president
(Abdurrahman Wahid) Gus Dur.

We want a political stage free of the military; as long as it
remains in politics we'll see a continuation of the impunity
principle.

There is also a decay in the political elite, characterized by
bitter internecine feuding and allegations of corruption being
traded by the political parties.