Military to play vital role in possible political deadlock

By Klomjit Chandrapanya

Military historian Dr. Salim Said talks to The Jakarta Post about the Indonesian Military (TNI) at a time when calls for changing the military's dual function is reverberating at the same time as its commander, Gen. Wiranto, has been tipped as a strong vice presidential candidate.

Question: Have military actions signified a true recognition that change is needed or are such actions merely a response to public pressure?

Salim: What is happening with the military now is that it is moving away from being "the" power to become "a" power in Indonesian politics. It has been a power among many powers in Indonesian politics from the very first days of independence in 1945, but after Sukarno it became the power dominating Indonesian politics.

Following the debacle of Soeharto, it has returned to being just a power. As a power it doesn't need a doctrine like dual function or whatever. It has become a de facto political power rather than a de jure power. During Soeharto's rule it became a de jure and de facto political power, now it is only de facto. So, it's useless talking about ending dwifungsi by decree. Even without a decree the military has abandoned the dual function doctrine.

But does that mean it doesn't play politics? No! You will see in the upcoming People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) session that the military will play a very decisive role in deciding who becomes president of this country. How long the military will play a political role depends very much on whether civil society develops and what kind, how strong and how credible a civilian government emerges from the general election and the many elections to come.

I'm confident that for many years to come the military will still be a political power in this country. How big (a role) depends very much on the power, the cohesiveness and the credibility of the civilian governments which come into power through independent and fair elections.

Q: To make a difference in the MPR wouldn't it need to have one voice? What if it is divided?

S: Don't believe those phony stories about factions, about divisions in the military. Since 1966, Soeharto dominated the military. But with the military under Wiranto, we've found the strongest general. Under Soeharto, all the generals were controlled by Soeharto. Wiranto is not controlled by Habibie the way the commanders of the armed forces in the past were controlled by Soeharto, so he's a very powerful general. As a powerful general I don't think he'll tolerate any dissent. Don't believe the division nonsense. Even those who consider themselves an alternative to Wiranto, he or they, if they are a group, do not control the military. It is Wiranto who calls the shots in the military now.

Q: What do you think about how the military is dealing with cases like Aceh?

S: You have to see Aceh in a historical perspective. Aceh is the result of a mishandling of the central government under Soeharto and so the military is just taking care of the result of a bad policy. I think if the government persists in relying on the military to solve Aceh's problems there will never be a solution for Aceh, even though a lot of people have been killed. So Aceh is a political problem. It should be solve politically, not militarily. That is why we need this coming government to say something about Aceh because Habibie's Aceh policy is just a continuance of Soeharto's.

Q: Do you think Habibie's policy and the military's policy are the same?

S: I think, basically, yes. That also shows you that Habibie probably does not have a policy on Aceh. I'm afraid of that.

Q: So, basically, the policy on cases like Aceh is the military's call?

S: It isn't that straightforward. This new government took over after 32 years of an authoritarian government manipulating the military, using the military. So it will take time to change this kind of policy. The military is bogged down there. You cannot expect it to suddenly change, moving from there.

Q: So you think a new government can come in and say it wants to change the policy on Aceh and the military will go along with it?

S: If it is credible. If its not credible it can do nothing.

Q: The military won't listen?

S: It's not that simple. This is not two times two is four. We are talking politics in a country where you have a long tradition. We came into being as a national in 1945, and since then most of our time has been spent under an authoritarian regime. So we are learning. Have you ever read the book A Nation in Waiting (Adam Schwarz, Allen & Unwin, 1994)? I told Adam Schwarz to write another book, "A Nation in Learning". We are learning. We are learning to play by the rules. We are learning to read our Constitution. We are learning to enjoy freedom of the press. We are learning everything. We didn't learn how to enjoy our independence because from 1945 to 1950 we were fighting the Dutch.

After Sukarno declared a return to the 1945 Constitution, we were troubled by many problems; rebellions outside and inside Java. And for a long time after that we were under the authoritarian regime. Since we gained independence we haven't learned to act like Indonesians among Indonesians. We were used to being Indonesians against the Dutch, never Indonesians among Indonesians. That's the way to understand this country.

Q: What about the military's role in business?

S: Well, it still has a role because it doesn't have enough money. That will be a problem addressed by the next government, not only business but also the military doctrine, the Indonesian defense doctrine. That should also be reviewed by the next government because our defense doctrine is to have a territorial apparatus.

Other countries don't have that. This territorial apparatus can easily be used by the military to play politics. If you want to get rid of that then you have to change the doctrine from total people defense to regular conventional warfare like Thailand, Malaysia. That means the military only takes care of defense, but for that we'll need a lot of arms. Do we have money for that? Soldiers need good salaries. Do we have money for that? So, there are problems that have not been addressed for 32 years so the coming government has to face all of this.

Q: Anti-Soeharto feelings are very strong. What can Gen. Wiranto, as a potential presidential candidate, do to distance himself from his association with Soeharto?

S: You say the people feel strongly against Soeharto, but those in the legislature are politicians. Politicians should be realistic, not base their actions on emotions. As a result of that there will be compromise. And as a result of that compromise there will be many people outside the MPR who will feel frustrated. Expect demonstrations. Why? Because politicians know that campaigning is one thing, governing another.

The Indonesian public is not like the American public, Thai public or Malaysian public, who have had many regular elections. We've had no political education so we think that whatever the politicians say, they are going to do it, so there will be frustrations. I hope it will not be violent. You will see discontent, dissatisfaction among activists witnessing the result of compromise in the legislature. I can see no other vice president besides Wiranto.

Why? Because the military is a power, especially if there is a deadlock between Megawati and Habibie. The military will play an important role... Gen. Wiranto is 52 years old. He is not a rock. He is sending the message that "I am myself". The public should recognize that... What I'm saying is don't look at Soeharto-Wiranto relations as static. He's slowly becoming himself. In politics the word "loyalty" does not exist. Sincerity does not exist. Politics is business, no emotions involved.