Military to play vital role in possible political deadlock
Military to play vital role in possible political deadlock
By Klomjit Chandrapanya
Military historian Dr. Salim Said talks to The Jakarta Post
about the Indonesian Military (TNI) at a time when calls for
changing the military's dual function is reverberating at the
same time as its commander, Gen. Wiranto, has been tipped as a
strong vice presidential candidate.
Question: Have military actions signified a true recognition
that change is needed or are such actions merely a response to
public pressure?
Salim: What is happening with the military now is that it is
moving away from being "the" power to become "a" power in
Indonesian politics. It has been a power among many powers in
Indonesian politics from the very first days of independence in
1945, but after Sukarno it became the power dominating Indonesian
politics.
Following the debacle of Soeharto, it has returned to being
just a power. As a power it doesn't need a doctrine like dual
function or whatever. It has become a de facto political power
rather than a de jure power. During Soeharto's rule it became a
de jure and de facto political power, now it is only de facto.
So, it's useless talking about ending dwifungsi by decree. Even
without a decree the military has abandoned the dual function
doctrine.
But does that mean it doesn't play politics? No! You will see
in the upcoming People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) session that
the military will play a very decisive role in deciding who
becomes president of this country. How long the military will
play a political role depends very much on whether civil society
develops and what kind, how strong and how credible a civilian
government emerges from the general election and the many
elections to come.
I'm confident that for many years to come the military will
still be a political power in this country. How big (a role)
depends very much on the power, the cohesiveness and the
credibility of the civilian governments which come into power
through independent and fair elections.
Q: To make a difference in the MPR wouldn't it need to have one
voice? What if it is divided?
S: Don't believe those phony stories about factions, about
divisions in the military. Since 1966, Soeharto dominated the
military. But with the military under Wiranto, we've found the
strongest general. Under Soeharto, all the generals were
controlled by Soeharto. Wiranto is not controlled by Habibie the
way the commanders of the armed forces in the past were
controlled by Soeharto, so he's a very powerful general. As a
powerful general I don't think he'll tolerate any dissent. Don't
believe the division nonsense. Even those who consider themselves
an alternative to Wiranto, he or they, if they are a group, do
not control the military. It is Wiranto who calls the shots in
the military now.
Q: What do you think about how the military is dealing with cases
like Aceh?
S: You have to see Aceh in a historical perspective. Aceh is the
result of a mishandling of the central government under Soeharto
and so the military is just taking care of the result of a bad
policy. I think if the government persists in relying on the
military to solve Aceh's problems there will never be a solution
for Aceh, even though a lot of people have been killed. So Aceh
is a political problem. It should be solve politically, not
militarily. That is why we need this coming government to say
something about Aceh because Habibie's Aceh policy is just a
continuance of Soeharto's.
Q: Do you think Habibie's policy and the military's policy are
the same?
S: I think, basically, yes. That also shows you that Habibie
probably does not have a policy on Aceh. I'm afraid of that.
Q: So, basically, the policy on cases like Aceh is the military's
call?
S: It isn't that straightforward. This new government took over
after 32 years of an authoritarian government manipulating the
military, using the military. So it will take time to change this
kind of policy. The military is bogged down there. You cannot
expect it to suddenly change, moving from there.
Q: So you think a new government can come in and say it wants to
change the policy on Aceh and the military will go along with it?
S: If it is credible. If its not credible it can do nothing.
Q: The military won't listen?
S: It's not that simple. This is not two times two is four. We
are talking politics in a country where you have a long
tradition. We came into being as a national in 1945, and since
then most of our time has been spent under an authoritarian
regime. So we are learning. Have you ever read the book A Nation
in Waiting (Adam Schwarz, Allen & Unwin, 1994)? I told Adam
Schwarz to write another book, "A Nation in Learning". We are
learning. We are learning to play by the rules. We are learning
to read our Constitution. We are learning to enjoy freedom of the
press. We are learning everything. We didn't learn how to enjoy
our independence because from 1945 to 1950 we were fighting the
Dutch.
After Sukarno declared a return to the 1945 Constitution, we
were troubled by many problems; rebellions outside and inside
Java. And for a long time after that we were under the
authoritarian regime. Since we gained independence we haven't
learned to act like Indonesians among Indonesians. We were used
to being Indonesians against the Dutch, never Indonesians among
Indonesians. That's the way to understand this country.
Q: What about the military's role in business?
S: Well, it still has a role because it doesn't have enough
money. That will be a problem addressed by the next government,
not only business but also the military doctrine, the Indonesian
defense doctrine. That should also be reviewed by the next
government because our defense doctrine is to have a territorial
apparatus.
Other countries don't have that. This territorial apparatus
can easily be used by the military to play politics. If you want
to get rid of that then you have to change the doctrine from
total people defense to regular conventional warfare like
Thailand, Malaysia. That means the military only takes care of
defense, but for that we'll need a lot of arms. Do we have money
for that? Soldiers need good salaries. Do we have money for that?
So, there are problems that have not been addressed for 32 years
so the coming government has to face all of this.
Q: Anti-Soeharto feelings are very strong. What can Gen. Wiranto,
as a potential presidential candidate, do to distance himself
from his association with Soeharto?
S: You say the people feel strongly against Soeharto, but those
in the legislature are politicians. Politicians should be
realistic, not base their actions on emotions. As a result of
that there will be compromise. And as a result of that compromise
there will be many people outside the MPR who will feel
frustrated. Expect demonstrations. Why? Because politicians know
that campaigning is one thing, governing another.
The Indonesian public is not like the American public, Thai
public or Malaysian public, who have had many regular elections.
We've had no political education so we think that whatever the
politicians say, they are going to do it, so there will be
frustrations. I hope it will not be violent. You will see
discontent, dissatisfaction among activists witnessing the result
of compromise in the legislature. I can see no other vice
president besides Wiranto.
Why? Because the military is a power, especially if there is a
deadlock between Megawati and Habibie. The military will play an
important role... Gen. Wiranto is 52 years old. He is not a
rock. He is sending the message that "I am myself". The public
should recognize that... What I'm saying is don't look at
Soeharto-Wiranto relations as static. He's slowly becoming
himself. In politics the word "loyalty" does not exist. Sincerity
does not exist. Politics is business, no emotions involved.