Military territorial structures are natural to many

Military territorial structures are natural to many

YOGYAKARTA (JP): One manifestation of the military's dwi
fungsi or dual function are its territorial institutions which
span from provincial to village level: Military regional commands
(Kodam), military resort commands and district commands at the
regional level (Kodim), district level commands (Koramil) and
village guidance bodies (Babinsa), comprising noncommissioned
officers in the villages make up these territorial institutions.

In the midst of demands to scrap the social and political
function of soldiers, the Indonesian Military (TNI) is striving
to redefine its dual function doctrine, saying it is still vital
for, among other things, maintaining the unity of the nation.

The Jakarta Post recently talked to lecturer Cornelis Lay of
Gadjah Mada University (UGM) on this issue. Following is an
excerpt of the interview:

Question: The military's institutions are justified by the dual
function doctrine. People do not seem to be bothered by them
despite calls to scrap the doctrine.

Answer: These territorial institutions, from Kodam to
Babinsa level, are indeed expressions of the military's social
and political role. Public opinion polls shows very strongly that
people accept such institutions. People consider the Kodam and
its lower structures to be natural places for soldiers. They do
not think the existence of those institutions, which are
manifestations of its dual function should be questioned. Only a
few people among the educated class strongly resist those
institutions.

I base my statement on the preliminary results of research by
UGM's inter-university center (PAU) on social issues in which I
am involved. The results of the survey and interviews clearly
reveal that 78 percent of 5,000 respondents accept the military's
territorial institutions.

Only there are different degrees of acceptances -- the further
the territorial institution from people, the higher the
acceptance. So acceptance of the Kodam at the provincial level
rated highest, while the presence of the Babinsa in villages was
the least accepted, by 54 percent of respondents.

The most common reason given was that territorial institutions
were where soldiers belonged and nothing needed to be questioned
about that. Respondents questioned soldiers or officers becoming
regents, governors, village heads and taking other positions, but
they could accept the territorial institutions.

What is the real effect of these institutions on civilian
political life?

Politically it's easy to see in various areas that the
presence of the territorial structure has become a powerful and
decisive force in determining the local political scene. The
power of a Kodam is obviously greater than that of the governor.

At the lower level, a regional military commander is more
powerful than the regent. And if the regent is a military man too
they will combine into a very powerful conspirational force.

The influence of military territorial officers is reflected in
the political decision making and in determining which people
hold local political posts. It is very easy for officers to
determine who will become regent, who will become regional
secretary, the provincial head of a ministry and so forth. The
capability of these military officers in such things far
surpasses other local politicians.

This has produced an extraordinary imbalance among local
political institutions.

Another political implication is the creation of what is
called "local military structures" parallel to the civilian
bureaucracy.

Everywhere in Indonesia, all levels of local bureaucracies are
accompanied or politically overshadowed by the bureaucracy of the
military's territorial institutions. The Babinsa is parallel to
the village head; the Koramil to the district head and so on.
Those military officers mainly have the function of control.

Such institutional parallelism has had serious implications to
civilian political life, which is systematically controlled 24
hours-a-day by a very tight military structure through local
soldiers in the midst of civilian life.

Actually such an implication does not only affect civilians;
it also affects local political institutions and the civilian
bureaucracy.

What about the implications on the local economy?

In military and political affairs the hierarchy is evident;
the Kodim has very tight and strong control of the Koramil. But
this hierarchy does not operate in economy and business.

The result is that all territorial institutions from top to
bottom, even their battle units, become very independent
"business empires." So it is quite likely that they will target
their income from the same source.

For instance one Kodam (could gain income) through its
cooperative, its generals or its business group -- whether a
normal business, a security business, a black-market operation, a
gambling operation or others. So one privately-owned firm could
be practically besieged by soldiers from different levels in the
hierarchy; one company would have to pay such amount of money to
the Kodim, another amount to the Koramil for back up etc.

This results in extraordinary economic distortion because
production costs become very high, which is then a burden on all
consumers. Furthermore there are very strong indications in a
number of areas of the deep involvement of the military in
illegal businesses.

In gambling, for instance, from sophisticated forms to those
like cock fighting, you are likely to find soldiers supporting
the business. The same goes for drugs. The flourishing black-
market is indirectly because of the presence of soldiers and
their territorial institutions. In Kupang, for instance, soldiers
are allegedly behind the illicit trafficking of goods, likewise
in East Nusa Tenggara; in Kalimantan soldiers have reportedly
been found to be involved in timber thefts and more.

Would you say the dual function doctrine has only been a mask
for soldiers' economic interests?

There are indeed strong indications that the degree of will on
the part of the military to intervene in local politics is
determined by local economic potential. Where an area has a high
economic potential, soldiers will control the local political
structure. All across Java the governor cannot be separated from
the military, or at the least he is someone they can control.
Riau, North Sumatra and other areas with economic potential have
always been dominated by the military.

Bali is an interesting example. In the early 1970s when Kuta
beach began showing big economic potential the military suddenly
became involved. This was evident from the election of the regent
who was from the military, whereas previously the military did
not care a bit about Kuta. This continues today and (military
involvement) has become hard to let go, while soldiers are eying
different positions in Kuta.

The main conclusion here is a suspicion that military
involvement in politics may be more determined by economic
interests rather than political and ideological considerations
which they claim, like communist threats, national stability and
others.

What is the influence of the institutions on local social and
cultural life?

Maybe only 60 percent of soldiers in the institutions stay in
military camps, the rest stay in civilian settlements. This has
posed difficulties for people, because the military members are
not supervised 24 hours-a-day, they're free to go out after their
work hours. The most problematic thing for locals is when a
dispute occurs among villagers.

For instance, if a village where a military member stays is
caught up in a dispute with another village, the military will be
used to frighten the other side. Military members are often
brought into land disputes which can lead to unfair decisions in
court.

All this results in an escalation of conflict from time to
time. Furthermore, it has turned out that escalations like this
can spread to other units within the TNI and the National Police,
if, for instance, one side is supported by the Army and the other
is supported by the Police Mobile Brigade or the Air Force. This
frequently happens in local areas.

Have the territorial institutions been found to be involved in
the settlement of crime, something which is actually under the
police's authority?

Yes, this is very important. In many areas we find that
territorial institutions are involved in handling public order
cases, like those involving young delinquents. However, their
involvement has complicated things even more. For example, if a
gang of youngsters are caught committing crimes or engaged in an
intergang fight. Those caught by soldiers from the Kodim may well
be treated harshly during their detention. But the ridiculous
thing is that they will feel proud and compare themselves with
the rival gang whose members were only arrested by the police,
which is considered lower in prestige. Then those who were only
arrested by the police will be encouraged to commit more serious
crimes so they can be caught by soldiers.

This leads to an escalation of social problems in the younger
generation and at the same time causes the police, who should
uphold the law and maintain law and order, to lose their
authority entirely. So once again, the high level of violence in
society is a logical consequence of the presence of territorial
institutions which intervene in civilian's daily life.

The presence of territorial institutions also poses a problem
when used by government offices which feel they cannot complete a
program without the help of the military and its ability to use
force. The most clear example here is the National Family
Planning Board (BKKBN); because (officials) could not make people
come to listen to lectures and take part in the family planning
program they asked for the military's help.

Their method was to use the health section of the Armed Forces
in Villages program (AMD). This practice may not have been too
prevalent in Java, but outside Java this was normal.

There was no persuasion in the family planning program (in
such areas). Outside Java such practices caused extraordinary
panic. It distanced the government from the people.

Similar things happened in the implementation of programs from
the ministry of agriculture. Soldiers were used to force farmers
to use new types of fertilizers, new technology and to force
people to leave their homes because a dike or another project was
planned on their land.

The presence of the military in areas through territorial
institutions has led to many social complications. And it has
greatly burdened civilians. Meanwhile people have begun to
believe -- at least they have become used to -- the use of
violence to settle disputes, and people have become used to
soldiers and they don't trust any other party. This alone results
in a negative culture.

What makes people accept military territorial institutions?

I don't know for sure, maybe they have been around so long we
have become used to their presence, and also to their negative
implications. But clearly the continuing, systematic ideological
process regarding the military's social and political role has
been profoundly powerful, to the extent that society does not
realize what should have been, or what should be the case. People
do not consider the presence of a Korem strange; it has been
there for ages. People accept it as it is. They can complain of
its negative influences but they do not know that the source is
the territorial institution. People complain about soldiers
supporting cock fighting but they do not think that if the
Babinsa or Koramil weren't there, the support for such activities
would not be there either.

Do TNI senior officials realize that the military, through
territorial institutions, make things worse in the regions?

Many soldiers still think the appearance of social and
political problems in various regions is a sign of disintegration
and an absence of military territorial institutions in those
areas. This is visible from their response when Aceh heated up;
they proposed the establishment of a military command in Aceh.

In Maluku the Kodam was activated, in West Kalimantan a Kodam
was planned and in East Nusa Tenggara even the district police
station was to be made into a Korem.

So they think that a military territorial institution is the
solution to all regional problems. This is a serious problem
regarding our military.

Instead, it is their presence which is the source of the
social and political problems. More so because their presence has
failed to catch up with political developments. For instance,
many areas do not have a regional commander while officers in the
same area have become the speaker of the local legislature or the
regent. So the military is greatly lacking in officers. But they
have a surplus of officers to fill in political positions, that
is what is absurd.

The military's jargon has it that the TNI is the nation's
dinamisator (dynamist), stabilisator (stabilizer), integrator and
a host of other things. But their territorial institutions have
become a source of disasters in many areas because of the use of
violence in settling problems.

Would you say the institutions have contributed to
disintegration movements in a number of areas?

Not directly, but indirectly yes. Disintegration movements are
accumulative responses to military actions, reflected in such
resistance. Excessive and irresponsible use of violence by
security forces at the lower level would not have happened if
there were no powerful institutions protecting them, and in most
cases such institutions are the military's territorial ones.

Has too deep a military involvement in civilian life led to
people's hatred toward the government in general?

We cannot possibly build respect for state institutions by
upholding the law with violence. I think Aceh's experience is a
concrete example which shows there are limits to the use of
force, particularly in imposing public obedience or loyalty to
the state.

If we learned a good lesson from the experience, we should
have discarded our former belief that we need strong battle units
across the archipelago. This is why the eradication of these
territorial military institutions from the Kodam downwards is
terribly important. Or to avoid a shake up in the military which
could spread to national politics, at least we could start with
the eradication of the Babinsa at the village and the Koramil at
the district level.

What should be prepared for when military territorial
institutions are done away with?

We must strengthen our police. Police personnel must be added
and they should be placed right down to the village level. But
what is also important is that the police are trained to become
real police officers. If it's only police substituting for
soldiers this would be worse, because all this time their
authority has been trampled on and their behavior has become like
the soldiers.

The TNI has often promised to discipline its members
implicated in crime and other undisciplined acts ...

I do not believe in disciplining individual members because it
must be done institutionally. If we say "arrest corporal A" who
is involved in an illegal business, this would not resolve
anything, because "A's" behavior is as a result of interests
based on the entire military institution. A sergeant would not
dare to back up an illegal business if he did not represent a
powerful institution like the Kodim for instance.

So the eradication of territorial institutions is a must if we
want a better political life in the future. In fact, there should
be an all-out purge of military institutions including the so-
called Directorate General of Social and Political Affairs in the
Ministry of Home Affairs as well as their subordinate offices.
They are wasting their energy and funds, their only job is to
screen people and watch over civil servants.

A further (target) is the "conspiring oligarchy organization"
in civilian bureaucracies which manifests itself in the Muspida
(regional consultative councils) where the military always
dominate decision making. (The Muspida should) deliver public
policy in the provinces or regions to governors and regents who
have been elected democratically at the local level.

Do you agree to the gradual removal of territorial
institutions?

I do think (the eradication) should go through a stage by
stage process ... if only to reduce its psychological impact and
potential sociopolitical costs.

We can predict that a drastic eradication of the institutions
would lead to demoralization on a large scale within TNI. This
could lead to resistance, indiscipline, collective chaos, ethnic
or religious disputes generated by disappointed soldiers.

While a phasing out is done, the government must also prepare
the necessary infrastructure. We do not know what the project of
"returning the military to the barracks" will be like. What if we
return them to their dormitories, while the buildings are not in
decent condition? Respectable dormitories, decent wages, a decent
budget and other things must be prepared. At the same time, their
curricula must be changed. They must be prepared to become
military professionals. So there will be an outgoing generation
and a new generation growing up and educated in another way.

What would be an ideal budget for the military?

We cannot fix a (figure) to say what is ideal. What is clear
is that all this time they have controlled unlimited economic
resources. If all these resources were converted into tax for the
government, part of which would then be allocated to the
military, the money would be enough for military needs.

And what senior TNI officials have forgotten is that we don't
want to produce rich officers. The difference is as follows: If
we can implant a new way of thinking within the military, success
would not be measured in the number or luxuriousness of the
generals' houses, but if military units have sophisticated
equipment.

Show me a poor general, while military units have limited
means and poor equipment. Outdated weaponry and old equipment
mean our military is among the most backward in the world. (Asip
Agus Hasani)