Military territorial structures are natural to many

YOGYAKARTA (JP): One manifestation of the military's dwi fungsi or dual function are its territorial institutions which span from provincial to village level: Military regional commands (Kodam), military resort commands and district commands at the regional level (Kodim), district level commands (Koramil) and village guidance bodies (Babinsa), comprising noncommissioned officers in the villages make up these territorial institutions.

In the midst of demands to scrap the social and political function of soldiers, the Indonesian Military (TNI) is striving to redefine its dual function doctrine, saying it is still vital for, among other things, maintaining the unity of the nation.

The Jakarta Post recently talked to lecturer Cornelis Lay of Gadjah Mada University (UGM) on this issue. Following is an excerpt of the interview:

Question: The military's institutions are justified by the dual function doctrine. People do not seem to be bothered by them despite calls to scrap the doctrine.

Answer: These territorial institutions, from Kodam to Babinsa level, are indeed expressions of the military's social and political role. Public opinion polls shows very strongly that people accept such institutions. People consider the Kodam and its lower structures to be natural places for soldiers. They do not think the existence of those institutions, which are manifestations of its dual function should be questioned. Only a few people among the educated class strongly resist those institutions.

I base my statement on the preliminary results of research by UGM's inter-university center (PAU) on social issues in which I am involved. The results of the survey and interviews clearly reveal that 78 percent of 5,000 respondents accept the military's territorial institutions.

Only there are different degrees of acceptances -- the further the territorial institution from people, the higher the acceptance. So acceptance of the Kodam at the provincial level rated highest, while the presence of the Babinsa in villages was the least accepted, by 54 percent of respondents.

The most common reason given was that territorial institutions were where soldiers belonged and nothing needed to be questioned about that. Respondents questioned soldiers or officers becoming regents, governors, village heads and taking other positions, but they could accept the territorial institutions.

What is the real effect of these institutions on civilian political life?

Politically it's easy to see in various areas that the presence of the territorial structure has become a powerful and decisive force in determining the local political scene. The power of a Kodam is obviously greater than that of the governor.

At the lower level, a regional military commander is more powerful than the regent. And if the regent is a military man too they will combine into a very powerful conspirational force.

The influence of military territorial officers is reflected in the political decision making and in determining which people hold local political posts. It is very easy for officers to determine who will become regent, who will become regional secretary, the provincial head of a ministry and so forth. The capability of these military officers in such things far surpasses other local politicians.

This has produced an extraordinary imbalance among local political institutions.

Another political implication is the creation of what is called "local military structures" parallel to the civilian bureaucracy.

Everywhere in Indonesia, all levels of local bureaucracies are accompanied or politically overshadowed by the bureaucracy of the military's territorial institutions. The Babinsa is parallel to the village head; the Koramil to the district head and so on. Those military officers mainly have the function of control.

Such institutional parallelism has had serious implications to civilian political life, which is systematically controlled 24 hours-a-day by a very tight military structure through local soldiers in the midst of civilian life.

Actually such an implication does not only affect civilians; it also affects local political institutions and the civilian bureaucracy.

What about the implications on the local economy?

In military and political affairs the hierarchy is evident; the Kodim has very tight and strong control of the Koramil. But this hierarchy does not operate in economy and business.

The result is that all territorial institutions from top to bottom, even their battle units, become very independent "business empires." So it is quite likely that they will target their income from the same source.

For instance one Kodam (could gain income) through its cooperative, its generals or its business group -- whether a normal business, a security business, a black-market operation, a gambling operation or others. So one privately-owned firm could be practically besieged by soldiers from different levels in the hierarchy; one company would have to pay such amount of money to the Kodim, another amount to the Koramil for back up etc.

This results in extraordinary economic distortion because production costs become very high, which is then a burden on all consumers. Furthermore there are very strong indications in a number of areas of the deep involvement of the military in illegal businesses.

In gambling, for instance, from sophisticated forms to those like cock fighting, you are likely to find soldiers supporting the business. The same goes for drugs. The flourishing black- market is indirectly because of the presence of soldiers and their territorial institutions. In Kupang, for instance, soldiers are allegedly behind the illicit trafficking of goods, likewise in East Nusa Tenggara; in Kalimantan soldiers have reportedly been found to be involved in timber thefts and more.

Would you say the dual function doctrine has only been a mask for soldiers' economic interests?

There are indeed strong indications that the degree of will on the part of the military to intervene in local politics is determined by local economic potential. Where an area has a high economic potential, soldiers will control the local political structure. All across Java the governor cannot be separated from the military, or at the least he is someone they can control. Riau, North Sumatra and other areas with economic potential have always been dominated by the military.

Bali is an interesting example. In the early 1970s when Kuta beach began showing big economic potential the military suddenly became involved. This was evident from the election of the regent who was from the military, whereas previously the military did not care a bit about Kuta. This continues today and (military involvement) has become hard to let go, while soldiers are eying different positions in Kuta.

The main conclusion here is a suspicion that military involvement in politics may be more determined by economic interests rather than political and ideological considerations which they claim, like communist threats, national stability and others.

What is the influence of the institutions on local social and cultural life?

Maybe only 60 percent of soldiers in the institutions stay in military camps, the rest stay in civilian settlements. This has posed difficulties for people, because the military members are not supervised 24 hours-a-day, they're free to go out after their work hours. The most problematic thing for locals is when a dispute occurs among villagers.

For instance, if a village where a military member stays is caught up in a dispute with another village, the military will be used to frighten the other side. Military members are often brought into land disputes which can lead to unfair decisions in court.

All this results in an escalation of conflict from time to time. Furthermore, it has turned out that escalations like this can spread to other units within the TNI and the National Police, if, for instance, one side is supported by the Army and the other is supported by the Police Mobile Brigade or the Air Force. This frequently happens in local areas.

Have the territorial institutions been found to be involved in the settlement of crime, something which is actually under the police's authority?

Yes, this is very important. In many areas we find that territorial institutions are involved in handling public order cases, like those involving young delinquents. However, their involvement has complicated things even more. For example, if a gang of youngsters are caught committing crimes or engaged in an intergang fight. Those caught by soldiers from the Kodim may well be treated harshly during their detention. But the ridiculous thing is that they will feel proud and compare themselves with the rival gang whose members were only arrested by the police, which is considered lower in prestige. Then those who were only arrested by the police will be encouraged to commit more serious crimes so they can be caught by soldiers.

This leads to an escalation of social problems in the younger generation and at the same time causes the police, who should uphold the law and maintain law and order, to lose their authority entirely. So once again, the high level of violence in society is a logical consequence of the presence of territorial institutions which intervene in civilian's daily life.

The presence of territorial institutions also poses a problem when used by government offices which feel they cannot complete a program without the help of the military and its ability to use force. The most clear example here is the National Family Planning Board (BKKBN); because (officials) could not make people come to listen to lectures and take part in the family planning program they asked for the military's help.

Their method was to use the health section of the Armed Forces in Villages program (AMD). This practice may not have been too prevalent in Java, but outside Java this was normal.

There was no persuasion in the family planning program (in such areas). Outside Java such practices caused extraordinary panic. It distanced the government from the people.

Similar things happened in the implementation of programs from the ministry of agriculture. Soldiers were used to force farmers to use new types of fertilizers, new technology and to force people to leave their homes because a dike or another project was planned on their land.

The presence of the military in areas through territorial institutions has led to many social complications. And it has greatly burdened civilians. Meanwhile people have begun to believe -- at least they have become used to -- the use of violence to settle disputes, and people have become used to soldiers and they don't trust any other party. This alone results in a negative culture.

What makes people accept military territorial institutions?

I don't know for sure, maybe they have been around so long we have become used to their presence, and also to their negative implications. But clearly the continuing, systematic ideological process regarding the military's social and political role has been profoundly powerful, to the extent that society does not realize what should have been, or what should be the case. People do not consider the presence of a Korem strange; it has been there for ages. People accept it as it is. They can complain of its negative influences but they do not know that the source is the territorial institution. People complain about soldiers supporting cock fighting but they do not think that if the Babinsa or Koramil weren't there, the support for such activities would not be there either.

Do TNI senior officials realize that the military, through territorial institutions, make things worse in the regions?

Many soldiers still think the appearance of social and political problems in various regions is a sign of disintegration and an absence of military territorial institutions in those areas. This is visible from their response when Aceh heated up; they proposed the establishment of a military command in Aceh.

In Maluku the Kodam was activated, in West Kalimantan a Kodam was planned and in East Nusa Tenggara even the district police station was to be made into a Korem.

So they think that a military territorial institution is the solution to all regional problems. This is a serious problem regarding our military.

Instead, it is their presence which is the source of the social and political problems. More so because their presence has failed to catch up with political developments. For instance, many areas do not have a regional commander while officers in the same area have become the speaker of the local legislature or the regent. So the military is greatly lacking in officers. But they have a surplus of officers to fill in political positions, that is what is absurd.

The military's jargon has it that the TNI is the nation's dinamisator (dynamist), stabilisator (stabilizer), integrator and a host of other things. But their territorial institutions have become a source of disasters in many areas because of the use of violence in settling problems.

Would you say the institutions have contributed to disintegration movements in a number of areas?

Not directly, but indirectly yes. Disintegration movements are accumulative responses to military actions, reflected in such resistance. Excessive and irresponsible use of violence by security forces at the lower level would not have happened if there were no powerful institutions protecting them, and in most cases such institutions are the military's territorial ones.

Has too deep a military involvement in civilian life led to people's hatred toward the government in general?

We cannot possibly build respect for state institutions by upholding the law with violence. I think Aceh's experience is a concrete example which shows there are limits to the use of force, particularly in imposing public obedience or loyalty to the state.

If we learned a good lesson from the experience, we should have discarded our former belief that we need strong battle units across the archipelago. This is why the eradication of these territorial military institutions from the Kodam downwards is terribly important. Or to avoid a shake up in the military which could spread to national politics, at least we could start with the eradication of the Babinsa at the village and the Koramil at the district level.

What should be prepared for when military territorial institutions are done away with?

We must strengthen our police. Police personnel must be added and they should be placed right down to the village level. But what is also important is that the police are trained to become real police officers. If it's only police substituting for soldiers this would be worse, because all this time their authority has been trampled on and their behavior has become like the soldiers.

The TNI has often promised to discipline its members implicated in crime and other undisciplined acts ...

I do not believe in disciplining individual members because it must be done institutionally. If we say "arrest corporal A" who is involved in an illegal business, this would not resolve anything, because "A's" behavior is as a result of interests based on the entire military institution. A sergeant would not dare to back up an illegal business if he did not represent a powerful institution like the Kodim for instance.

So the eradication of territorial institutions is a must if we want a better political life in the future. In fact, there should be an all-out purge of military institutions including the so- called Directorate General of Social and Political Affairs in the Ministry of Home Affairs as well as their subordinate offices. They are wasting their energy and funds, their only job is to screen people and watch over civil servants.

A further (target) is the "conspiring oligarchy organization" in civilian bureaucracies which manifests itself in the Muspida (regional consultative councils) where the military always dominate decision making. (The Muspida should) deliver public policy in the provinces or regions to governors and regents who have been elected democratically at the local level.

Do you agree to the gradual removal of territorial institutions?

I do think (the eradication) should go through a stage by stage process ... if only to reduce its psychological impact and potential sociopolitical costs.

We can predict that a drastic eradication of the institutions would lead to demoralization on a large scale within TNI. This could lead to resistance, indiscipline, collective chaos, ethnic or religious disputes generated by disappointed soldiers.

While a phasing out is done, the government must also prepare the necessary infrastructure. We do not know what the project of "returning the military to the barracks" will be like. What if we return them to their dormitories, while the buildings are not in decent condition? Respectable dormitories, decent wages, a decent budget and other things must be prepared. At the same time, their curricula must be changed. They must be prepared to become military professionals. So there will be an outgoing generation and a new generation growing up and educated in another way.

What would be an ideal budget for the military?

We cannot fix a (figure) to say what is ideal. What is clear is that all this time they have controlled unlimited economic resources. If all these resources were converted into tax for the government, part of which would then be allocated to the military, the money would be enough for military needs.

And what senior TNI officials have forgotten is that we don't want to produce rich officers. The difference is as follows: If we can implant a new way of thinking within the military, success would not be measured in the number or luxuriousness of the generals' houses, but if military units have sophisticated equipment.

Show me a poor general, while military units have limited means and poor equipment. Outdated weaponry and old equipment mean our military is among the most backward in the world. (Asip Agus Hasani)