Military professionalism pays off but not enough to end conflict in Aceh

Lela E. Madjiah, The Jakarta Post, Banda Aceh

Improving professionalism among troops has been the focus of attention and efforts of the Indonesian Military (TNI) ever since the country embarked on the reform movement in 1998.

Indeed, professionalism is one of the three objectives of reform within the military, the first being TNI's withdrawal from politics and the second the shelving of its security role.

It has been nearly four years since the reform process began, and there has been a lot of skepticism about the military's will for reform. Despite constraints, criticism and even distrust of its genuine desire for changes, there are indicators of serious efforts to keep the reform commitment.

While it is obvious that on a grand scale reform is still far from being accomplished -- with the military still occupying seats in the House of Representatives and the People's Consultative Assembly, for example -- there are signs of relative success on a more practical level.

TNI's success in reducing GAM's strength and its influence on the population is one indicator and TNI attributes its operational achievements to improved professionalism.

Although TNI attributes this shift to its operational success, it also shows how fragile popular support is. It is easy for the people to change their loyalty, one day to the security forces, the next to GAM, depending on who has got the upper hand at the time.

Given this shifting loyalty and dubious support, there is an awareness among the TNI leadership and troops that they still have a long way to go to win the war in Aceh. This realization has pushed the need for a professional army even further and prompted changes in training.

Troops deployed to conflict areas including Aceh are given extra training that ranges from around three to four months to improve their military skills and military character.

Discipline tops the priority list.

"Without discipline, there is no professionalism," Army Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri told troops in Aceh during a visit there last week.

Discipline should guide troops in combat and non-combat situations. In a combat situation, troops train to become good combatants who fully understand and respect the rules of engagement.

"Sixty percent of the training is focused on improving their understanding of the rules of engagement to avoid civilian casualties. In one of the exercises, troops are given four seconds to decide whether they are facing an armed enemy or an innocent civilian. Only when they are sure that they are facing an armed enemy can they shoot," explained Kiki.

TNI should be concerned about civilian casualties, whose number remains high. A total of 676 civilians were killed throughout 2000. Human rights groups reported more than 1,000 civilian deaths last year, and from January to March this year more than 200 civilians have been reported killed. AFP meanwhile reported on April 6 that more than 400 people have been killed in Aceh this year.

According to Kiki, the four-second time frame is crucial because a good shooter will be able to pull the trigger within that short span of time. If a soldier misjudges the situation, he will become the target instead, or shoot an innocent civilian, for which he will be prosecuted for violating the law of war. On the other hand, if he judges correctly and kills an armed enemy, then he will not be prosecuted for human rights violations.

Kiki admitted, however, that the training of a professional army was costly and TNI was far from capable of financing such an essential program.

"Our training budget only meets 0.03 percent of the requirement," he said.

Apart from special training, TNI has also issued a pocket guideline for troops sent to conflict areas. The guideline contains basic instructions in combat situations, with emphasis on the rules of engagement and respect for human rights. The results are reflected in increasing popular support for the military and the resumption of general and economic activities in certain areas.

Kirsten Schulze, a lecturer in international history at the London School of Economics, in her article Battle to quell GAM moves to rural Aceh that appeared in the March issue of Jane's Intelligence Review, writes that many Acehnese, although often behind closed doors, express satisfaction with the behavior of the TNI as a whole, especially compared to the past. Similar approval has also been expressed for the organic police. Popular criticism continues to center on the non-organic police mobile brigade (Brimob) and GAM, Schulze continues.

Despite such serious efforts by TNI, reports of abuses by troops continue to make news, although GAM, too, is guilty of similar abuses.

A recent report issued by the International Crisis Group (ICG), titled Aceh: A Slim Chance for Peace, issued on March 27 this year, states that the military has had some success in improving its battered public image, though soldiers still seem largely unaccountable to the law, and reports continue of civilians being killed.

"As for GAM, parts of the movement have degenerated into banditry, costing it some support in Aceh," the report says.

ICG also blames both the security forces and GAM for atrocities, including mass murder, in the past year.

Both Djali and Kiki admitted there were violations by troops, although the number had declined.

"There are violations, but not serious ones. Also, there are reports of extortion by troops, but the number continues to decline," Kiki said without elaborating.

Poor welfare is believed to be one reason behind undisciplined acts and violations committed by troops. A soldier receives Rp 10,000 (US$1.04) in daily meal allowance and another Rp 4,000 (41 cents) of daily pocket money.

There is also the problem of rotation. With such a large area of conflict, troops are spread thin and as a result many often spend more than the usual one-year commission in combat, with little time for recovery and training before the next assignment. Morale is often low and dissatisfaction, even frustration, high.

All these problems, coupled with the government's policy inconsistency in dealing with the Aceh problem, have proved to be a serious constraint in building confidence among troops that they are not alone in the drive to restore security and order in Aceh.

The government's inconsistency has resulted in its inability to restore civilian rule and revive the social and economic activities. It has also placed the security forces at the forefront and has led to an impression that Aceh is a strictly military business, which it is not.

Rather than taking advantage of the relative success of the security operations in the past year and using the momentum provided by increasing popular support, the government remains undecided over the next step in ending the conflict.

Without a firm and consistent strategy that incorporates all aspects of life and involves all the relevant institutions in Aceh, it is difficult for the security forces to get the moral support needed to perform its job.