Military operation becoming a goal in itself

Munir, Executive Director, Impartial, Jakarta

The government has finally decided to extend martial law in Aceh, which should have ended on Nov. 19. Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, also in his capacity as daily executive of the Central Martial Law Authority (PDMP), said the decision was based on evaluations of regional martial law officials, ulema, regional executives and councillors, who had agreed on the extension.

In addition, the minister stated the government "will formulate a new strategy in Aceh, in view of the fact that the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has changed its strategy into pure guerrilla warfare."

This martial law extension obviously brings Aceh back to a dark point without any settlement prospect.

The hope for an alternative settlement other than the military approach is apparently getting slimmer. This is reflected in the lack of concern on the part of national political leaders over the Aceh issue. There is even an increasing tendency to leave the Aceh quandary to the military, based on considerations of competence as well as calculations of political concession.

The government's argument for the extension of martial law just indicates the domination of the need of Jakarta's political players rather than the understanding of evaluations of Aceh's conditions. The main argument that the extension has resulted from the growing demand by Aceh's community and political circles is not a new frame of reference.

This is because what happens does not represent the success of military operations so far to win the hearts and minds of the Acehnese. Rather, it is the fruit of the strategy to create new dependence of the Acehnese on the martial law authorities, namely the Indonesian military (TNI).

Under martial law, part of the civilians in Aceh have been positioned as a force vis-a-vis GAM. This has been done by mobilizing students, civil servants, ulema and the general public to make open declarations supporting "national integration" or to cooperate with the military. The issuance of red-and-white citizen identity cards has forced the entire Aceh population to choose a political position. The other strategy is the formation of militias in Central and South Aceh, such as Puja Kesuma, in which civilians are employed to assist military units in their mobility.

Consequently, the major achievement of martial law since May 2003 has been the creation of new dependence of part Acehnese people on military protection and cooption. The fear of the absence of military protection after any termination of martial law has become a main issue among community groups, making them important players in mass actions demanding martial law extension. The demand at the same time proves that martial law has never turned out a secure atmosphere enabling normal life in society.

Among local political players in Aceh, martial law, originally accepted with apprehension, has become a political advantage. While martial law was fully underway, restrictions on civilian freedom have proceeded almost without correction. This has paralyzed all the capability of social control of civilians, previously a main force of reform in Aceh. It has also opened a wide opportunity for local political leaders and bureaucrats to be set apart from criticisms for public control.

It is not too surprising that local political circles have promptly demanded the extension. It has made them desirous of proposing an emergency structure of a permanent nature in Aceh. This situation will lead to the maintenance of extra power benefits in the name of martial law such as abuse of authority, ending public participation and corrupt practices. Martial law will eventually produce the necessity to perpetuate an emergency state, which should actually last for a very limited period.

This situation would also be favorable to national political figures in the government as well as in the legislature. It imposes no extra hard work on decision makers to seek new ways that may disturb short-term political interests, like next year's general election and their relationship with the TNI.

The martial law extension argument made against the background of GAM's new strategy of pure guerrilla warfare makes it even more difficult to comprehend. According to the government, the change in GAM's strategy has caused the operation to make less achievements, with many GAM leaders even having escaped.

The position as if the government had only recently understood GAM's guerrilla strategy is very ironical and reflects confusion in making an argument merely to justify its political decision. In fact, GAM has from the beginning been an armed group waging a guerrilla war, even for over 20 years. The statement that GAM has changed its strategy is thus a dishonest way of informing the public, to gain support for martial law extension.

When the government decided to stop all dialog with GAM, the formulation of its action through the military was obviously counter-guerrilla in nature. But the government chose martial law based on Law No.23/1959. Pursuant to the law, martial law is not a model designed for a condition against an armed rebellion, because it is mainly aimed at restoring the disrupted system of administration. In this context, there is no relevance between martial law by the standard of normal administrative capacity in Aceh and the counter-guerrilla attempt.

The tendency taking place is that martial law becomes a goal in itself. Even if military methods are to be continued, the government could launch limited counter-guerrilla military operations backed by presidential authority.

The choice of extending martial law is indeed a compromise between various political interests, by placing Aceh as an object of all short-term civilian and military political needs. While all government arguments are merely aimed at securing public support without honest intentions, Aceh will remain obscured by a protracted tragedy of humanity.