Military operation becoming a goal in itself

Military operation becoming a goal in itself

Munir, Executive Director, Impartial, Jakarta

The government has finally decided to extend martial law in
Aceh, which should have ended on Nov. 19. Coordinating Minister
for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, also
in his capacity as daily executive of the Central Martial Law
Authority (PDMP), said the decision was based on evaluations of
regional martial law officials, ulema, regional executives and
councillors, who had agreed on the extension.

In addition, the minister stated the government "will
formulate a new strategy in Aceh, in view of the fact that the
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has changed its strategy into pure
guerrilla warfare."

This martial law extension obviously brings Aceh back to a
dark point without any settlement prospect.

The hope for an alternative settlement other than the military
approach is apparently getting slimmer. This is reflected in the
lack of concern on the part of national political leaders over
the Aceh issue. There is even an increasing tendency to leave the
Aceh quandary to the military, based on considerations of
competence as well as calculations of political concession.

The government's argument for the extension of martial law
just indicates the domination of the need of Jakarta's political
players rather than the understanding of evaluations of Aceh's
conditions. The main argument that the extension has resulted
from the growing demand by Aceh's community and political circles
is not a new frame of reference.

This is because what happens does not represent the success of
military operations so far to win the hearts and minds of the
Acehnese. Rather, it is the fruit of the strategy to create new
dependence of the Acehnese on the martial law authorities, namely
the Indonesian military (TNI).

Under martial law, part of the civilians in Aceh have been
positioned as a force vis-a-vis GAM. This has been done by
mobilizing students, civil servants, ulema and the general public
to make open declarations supporting "national integration" or to
cooperate with the military. The issuance of red-and-white
citizen identity cards has forced the entire Aceh population to
choose a political position. The other strategy is the formation
of militias in Central and South Aceh, such as Puja Kesuma, in
which civilians are employed to assist military units in their
mobility.

Consequently, the major achievement of martial law since May
2003 has been the creation of new dependence of part Acehnese
people on military protection and cooption. The fear of the
absence of military protection after any termination of martial
law has become a main issue among community groups, making them
important players in mass actions demanding martial law
extension. The demand at the same time proves that martial law
has never turned out a secure atmosphere enabling normal life in
society.

Among local political players in Aceh, martial law,
originally accepted with apprehension, has become a political
advantage. While martial law was fully underway, restrictions on
civilian freedom have proceeded almost without correction. This
has paralyzed all the capability of social control of civilians,
previously a main force of reform in Aceh. It has also opened a
wide opportunity for local political leaders and bureaucrats to
be set apart from criticisms for public control.

It is not too surprising that local political circles have
promptly demanded the extension. It has made them desirous of
proposing an emergency structure of a permanent nature in Aceh.
This situation will lead to the maintenance of extra power
benefits in the name of martial law such as abuse of authority,
ending public participation and corrupt practices. Martial law
will eventually produce the necessity to perpetuate an emergency
state, which should actually last for a very limited period.

This situation would also be favorable to national political
figures in the government as well as in the legislature. It
imposes no extra hard work on decision makers to seek new ways
that may disturb short-term political interests, like next year's
general election and their relationship with the TNI.

The martial law extension argument made against the background
of GAM's new strategy of pure guerrilla warfare makes it even
more difficult to comprehend. According to the government, the
change in GAM's strategy has caused the operation to make less
achievements, with many GAM leaders even having escaped.

The position as if the government had only recently understood
GAM's guerrilla strategy is very ironical and reflects confusion
in making an argument merely to justify its political decision.
In fact, GAM has from the beginning been an armed group waging a
guerrilla war, even for over 20 years. The statement that GAM has
changed its strategy is thus a dishonest way of informing the
public, to gain support for martial law extension.

When the government decided to stop all dialog with GAM, the
formulation of its action through the military was obviously
counter-guerrilla in nature. But the government chose martial law
based on Law No.23/1959. Pursuant to the law, martial law is not
a model designed for a condition against an armed rebellion,
because it is mainly aimed at restoring the disrupted system of
administration. In this context, there is no relevance between
martial law by the standard of normal administrative capacity in
Aceh and the counter-guerrilla attempt.

The tendency taking place is that martial law becomes a goal
in itself. Even if military methods are to be continued, the
government could launch limited counter-guerrilla military
operations backed by presidential authority.

The choice of extending martial law is indeed a compromise
between various political interests, by placing Aceh as an object
of all short-term civilian and military political needs. While
all government arguments are merely aimed at securing public
support without honest intentions, Aceh will remain obscured by a
protracted tragedy of humanity.