Military faces dilemma at MPR General Session

Military faces dilemma at MPR General Session

By D. Ali Nurdin

JAKARTA (JP): The Indonesian Military (TNI) may have passed
the test of neutrality in the 1999 general election, but the real
test will be the presidential election at the General Session of
the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in November.

As a political force with a guaranteed 38 seats -- on top of
the military allotment from group representatives and, possibly,
from regional representatives -- the "TNI party" is a power to be
reckoned with in the MPR session. It is clear that the military
are very interested in who will lead Indonesia and what his/her
agenda is for the next five years. The interest does not only
concern TNI's political position in the future order of
Indonesia, but is linked with concessions in the economic field.
TNI will certainly not support a presidential candidate who wants
to abolish the military's dual function.

Signals that TNI will not be neutral in the presidential
election have been given by its Commander in chief Gen. Wiranto.
He argued that if TNI representatives do not exercise their right
in the election of the president and the vice-president, it would
be contrary to the principle of democracy, because the military
is also responsible for the future of this country (The Jakarta
Post, June 15).

Considering that no political party will have an absolute
majority of votes (half of the votes plus one) at the MPR, the
process leading to the election of the president and the vice
president is certain to be very dynamic. It will also be
susceptible to unsuspected changes, such as maneuvers,
bargaining, agreements and concessions (probably money politics
too) by political parties at the MPR.

Observing the tendencies of the voting pattern in the 1999
general election, political forces in the coming presidential
election will apparently be divided into two main groups:
Megawati and Habibie. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
(PDI Perjuangan), the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the
Justice and Unity Party (PKP) will most likely champion Megawati.

In the other group, the Golkar Party will probably receive the
support of the United Development Party (PPP), the Crescent Star
Party (PBB) and the Justice Party (PK) to fight for Habibie.

Although there is as yet no certainty about the number of
seats each political party will obtain at the House of
Representatives (DPR) and the MPR, no one party will gain the
required minimum number of votes to dominate the MPR. A majority
of 351 seats will be required -- assuming that the election of
the president and the vice president will use the "one man one
vote" system.

A coalition of PDI Perjuangan, PKB and PKP will, at the most,
yield 200 to 210 seats at the DPR. If Golkar, PPP, PBB and PK
join forces they will obtain between 190 and 200 seats.

With the polarization, the two camps are highly dependent on
the support of the TNI, the regional and group representatives
and the National Mandate Party (PAN). PAN has stated that it will
not coalesce with either Golkar or the PDI Perjuangan camp. The
question remains though whether PAN representatives will join in
the election of the president and vice president. However, it is
highly possible that PAN's votes -- amounting to approximately 40
-- will be divided between the two big groups.

Regional representatives (135 persons) may have chosen their
colors, because their presence will be determined by each
Regional House of Representatives in the province. PDI Perjuangan
and PKB have the possibility of obtaining 60 to 70 additional
seats from the regional representatives, while the Golkar group
may get 30 to 40 seats.

TNI, with an allotment of 10 percent in each Regional House of
Representatives, will probably obtain an additional 14 regional
representatives (10 percent of 135). The group representatives
(65 persons) decided by the General Elections Commission (KPU)
may be fairly evenly split into the two groups.

According to this estimate, the PDI Perjuangan-PKB camp has
the possibility to obtain the support of 310 to 320 votes at the
MPR, while the Golkar-PPP camp could obtain 280 to 290 votes. If
the latter group can convince PAN (though the possibility is
small), the Habibie group will have approximately 330 votes.
However, this total will not be sufficient to secure the
presidency. Therefore, the two groups will fight for the
"floating mass" of TNI representatives.

Military observer Salim Said is of the opinion that TNI will
determine who will be the president and vice president (Kompas,
June 18). Unlike the votes of political parties, there is little
possibility that the votes of TNI representatives at the MPR will
be divided, because they will submit to the command of TNI
headquarters. With its capacity to make a neat package of the
votes, TNI is in a position to determine who they want to
champion. In this way, the military can have an optimum political
bargaining position, and, if necessary, the vice presidency.

When they have to choose, TNI will certainly support the group
with the biggest chance of winning and the one that will give a
number of concessions to the military. TNI's support of one of
the groups will certainly be decided at the last moment, when
support for the presidential and vice presidential candidates
becomes increasingly clear. By supporting the forces that win,
TNI will avoid the risk of losing face as the instigators.

However, the dilemma of TNI at the DPR-MPR is precisely at
this point. The military will face the risk that the party they
support will fail in the next general election, even before five
years of government.

Isn't politics identical with change? There are neither
eternal friends nor foes. There is only interest. Maybe this time
TNI will be safe to allow one of the groups to reign from 2000 to
2005. However, what will happen if five years later the TNI-
supported party is defeated and is outside the government? Will
TNI join the opposition camp? Or will it change partners and
follow the party of the new ruler? If this was the case, would
TNI be willing to be branded as opportunistic?

In the past, TNI had the experience of working hand in hand
with Golkar, which by various means endeavored to maintain its
power for three decades. But in the democracy era, where the
ruling party may change from one general election to another, TNI
must be more careful in channeling its support to one of the
political forces.

The safest position for TNI is to distance itself from
political matters. Even though currently TNI has been allotted
seats at the DPR and MPR, the military can still maintain
distance by not joining in the election of the president and vice
president. If TNI continues to support one of the candidates and
a certain party, it is only to be hoped that TNI will not help
engineer the success of the party it supports to extend its power
at the next general election.

The writer is chairman of the Karsa Utama Mandiri Foundation.