Military battles to win over Acehnese

Military battles to win over Acehnese

By Ati Nurbaiti

LHOKSEUMAWE, North Aceh (JP): Police and the military, who the
Acehnese consider the source of their troubles, are on a campaign
to regain the trust of local residents by changing their name.
And through smiles.

Military roadblocks are commonplace on the highway to North
Aceh following renewed signs of activity of the separatist Free
Aceh Movement (GAM). Officers from the National Police units of
the elite mobile brigade or bomb squad Gegana ask motorists to
pull over. Drivers are requested to open the hoods of their
vehicles, truck cargoes are poked around and identity cards are
checked.

Gone, however, are the harsh words and rude manner of the
past.

It is the new face of the police security operation, called
"Operasi Sadar Rencong II" and launched on Aug. 1. The name
"Crack Riot Troops", strongly associated with arson and killings
here, is no longer used.

But problems remain. It is unclear who is in command between
the military and police. The riot troops, whose members were from
both the police and military, were theoretically under the
police, as are the new operations since Aug. 1.

Although formal separation of the police from the Indonesian
Military (TNI) started on April 1, some Aceh residents say they
find it difficult to distinguish between friend and foe.

"We're tired of filing reports... (we'd) better (be silent)
to avoid trouble," a private employee here said in referring to
alleged extortion by soldiers.

Siding with GAM is no guarantee of protection. Suspected
separatist sympathizers are hunted down every day.

The confusion is compounded by the military's continued
enjoyment of wide-ranging powers under the dual-function
"sociopolitical" doctrine. Little seems to have changed.

An officer at the Pidie Military Command acknowledged the
police rule of a maximum 24-hour detention. He added that
permission from the police gave them the "right to detain a
person on the grounds of security and political (threat), and to
hold him in detention for questioning as long as necessary".

Residents said the death of a suspected GAM sympathizer from
three gunshot wounds in July was committed by personnel at the
command. The local police chief said the man suffered a heart
attack and scratched his body falling on the asphalt.

The provincial police chief and his subordinates have publicly
backed the military's far-reaching authority but, in reality,
police officers have reportedly haggled for the release of some
detainees following requests from their relatives and activists.

Rights activist and lawyer M. Yacob Hamzah said "the
Subversion Act has been revoked. There has not been an
announcement of a new status of military operations, so I don't
see the justification of (such an authority)," he said.

He said arbitrary detention of people by soldiers has
continued even after the new police operations.

Another problem may be insensitivity on the part of the
government, leading to bad public relations. National Police
Chief Gen. Roesmanhadi recently announced the new series of six-
month-long operations to crush the rebels.

His "shoot on sight" order only served to reinforce misgivings
that instead of shooting armed rebels, once again security
personnel would abuse or even kill unarmed civilians.

Statements that the earlier deployed Crack Riot Troops no
longer existed, as they had been replaced, brought little comfort
as many of the soldiers in the current operation were members of
the former troops known by the acronym PPRM .

"There is no more PPRM," says Aceh police chief Col.
Bachrumsyah. The new operation stresses not only a security
approach but also a "cultural and religious approach," he said.

In North Aceh, operations commander Col. Nurdin said half of
the Crack Riot Troops had been sent home from the regency,
leaving only one battalion supported by members of the National
Police and members of respective local military commands.

In all, Lilawangsa military commander Col. Syafnil Armen,
overseeing north-east Aceh and Pidie, says he now has 90 percent
of the ideal figure of 5,000 troops, beefing up security in the
regency.

The failure of the earlier deployed troops to crush armed
uprisings is blamed by police on them being wrongly equipped to
face crowds, with only rubber bullets or blanks, and shields.

Distrust

Those with real bullets among the Crack Riot Troops were
"relatively small" in number, Bachrumsyah said, while police and
the military say they do not know the number of enemies they
really face.

The partial withdrawal of the Crack Riot Troops was not done
with fanfare. Indeed an announcement would not have been entirely
welcomed as not all the troops were withdrawn. The addition and
reduction of troops here is an issue clouded in distrust,
regardless to what the authorities actually say.

Without adequate action to prevent more violence, and merely
denials from the authorities and the Free Aceh rebels regarding
their suspected involvement, the public has been left to a
guessing game of "whodunit".

Identification of armed groups differ among military and
police officers. Some say the "GBPK" or armed disturbance groups,
are the proper names for the Free Aceh Movement while others
refer to both as the groups to watch over their backs for.

A few police officers have acknowledged the possible
involvement of military troops in arson and intimidation of
civilians. However this does not include the abduction and
killings of security personnel blamed on "armed hoodlums."

Aceh police chief Col. Bahrumsjah says they do not know who
the armed hoodlums are despite intelligence work by the military
and police.

"Since President B.J. Habibie visited Aceh in March and
pledged that the violence would end, hundreds have died," a
journalist of the Kontras tabloid said in Banda Aceh.

Spokesman for police operations, Lt.Col. Armin Karim, said the
new operation stresses on "repressive action supported by
preventive action to uphold the law."

But one other obstacle is that the operation and orders to
shoot on sight were launched in the absence of a political
approach to problems in Aceh, inherited from the military
operations status of 1989 to 1998 and following sporadic
violence.

In such a condition the police chief's claim that the
operation includes "cultural and religious approaches" has not
met much response.

Trauma

Scholars and activists have pointed to the widespread trauma
which is far from healed. The rest of the country was made aware
of the killings, torture and rape and abduction of Acehnese only
after people spoke out when Soeharto quit the presidency last
year.

The cultural and religious approach is indeed in line with
suggestions by scholars and community leaders of Aceh.

But at the same time while local authorities have not ruled
out dialog with Free Aceh leaders, those in Jakarta say talks
over the possibility of an independent Aceh, including students'
demands of a referendum, is unthinkable.

When criticized that his office has been too silent regarding
Aceh, the best that the Minister of Home Affairs Syarwan Hamid
could come up with was that while Acehnese aspirations should be
respected, "it should be in the context of a unified state."

Aceh scholars have said the failure of the government to
legally enact its status of a special province has greatly
contributed to the problems here.

The unbalanced comparison of what Aceh has contributed in
terms of its oil, gas and agricultural resources, to what it has
gained from the government, has widely been cited as a reason for
its problems. People know by heart the estimates that less than 1
percent of Aceh's contribution to the national budget comes back
to the province.

People here say that "Jakarta only needs Aceh's land and rich
resources, and does not need its people."

Late

Meanwhile life continues to be tense in many parts of Aceh,
and dissatisfaction remains.

The violence associated with security personnel and a
seemingly detached government, render the new police operations
inadequate. Supposedly friendly security personnel now welcome
refugees, while only two weeks ago they were deliberately roaring
their trucks past refugee camps housing up to 145,000 people.
"But the refugees ignore (their friendly gestures) now," a
student doing volunteer work for refugees said.

Another problem hindering efforts to win over Acehnese trust
is the continued cloud of secrecy over decisions regarding
security personnel. Their numbers announced by Roesmanhadi and
local authorities do not exactly match, with the former
mentioning some 11,000 and the latter 7,000 "including largely
non-combat personnel."

One highly placed police officer in Banda Aceh says he is not
sure of the figure.

Another issue which has become a source of gossip, in absence
of reliable information, is the deployment of Jakarta officers to
Aceh who do not report to local authorities.

While a military spokesman earlier said Jakarta officers Lt.
Gen. Fachrul Razi, an Acehnese, and Maj.Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin,
a former Jakarta military commander, had come to Aceh earlier
this year "to seek input," police and military leaders here say
they have not been informed of results of the visits.

"But whoever is sent here (from military headquarters) must
come with good intentions," says Lilawangsa military commander
Col. Syafnil Armen. A lack of transparency on the issue has
contributed to hearsay that the Indonesian military or the
government has unknown plans for the province, while it cannot
control or lacks intention to control the armed groups.