Military battles to win over Acehnese

By Ati Nurbaiti

LHOKSEUMAWE, North Aceh (JP): Police and the military, who the Acehnese consider the source of their troubles, are on a campaign to regain the trust of local residents by changing their name. And through smiles.

Military roadblocks are commonplace on the highway to North Aceh following renewed signs of activity of the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Officers from the National Police units of the elite mobile brigade or bomb squad Gegana ask motorists to pull over. Drivers are requested to open the hoods of their vehicles, truck cargoes are poked around and identity cards are checked.

Gone, however, are the harsh words and rude manner of the past.

It is the new face of the police security operation, called "Operasi Sadar Rencong II" and launched on Aug. 1. The name "Crack Riot Troops", strongly associated with arson and killings here, is no longer used.

But problems remain. It is unclear who is in command between the military and police. The riot troops, whose members were from both the police and military, were theoretically under the police, as are the new operations since Aug. 1.

Although formal separation of the police from the Indonesian Military (TNI) started on April 1, some Aceh residents say they find it difficult to distinguish between friend and foe.

"We're tired of filing reports... (we'd) better (be silent) to avoid trouble," a private employee here said in referring to alleged extortion by soldiers.

Siding with GAM is no guarantee of protection. Suspected separatist sympathizers are hunted down every day.

The confusion is compounded by the military's continued enjoyment of wide-ranging powers under the dual-function "sociopolitical" doctrine. Little seems to have changed.

An officer at the Pidie Military Command acknowledged the police rule of a maximum 24-hour detention. He added that permission from the police gave them the "right to detain a person on the grounds of security and political (threat), and to hold him in detention for questioning as long as necessary".

Residents said the death of a suspected GAM sympathizer from three gunshot wounds in July was committed by personnel at the command. The local police chief said the man suffered a heart attack and scratched his body falling on the asphalt.

The provincial police chief and his subordinates have publicly backed the military's far-reaching authority but, in reality, police officers have reportedly haggled for the release of some detainees following requests from their relatives and activists.

Rights activist and lawyer M. Yacob Hamzah said "the Subversion Act has been revoked. There has not been an announcement of a new status of military operations, so I don't see the justification of (such an authority)," he said.

He said arbitrary detention of people by soldiers has continued even after the new police operations.

Another problem may be insensitivity on the part of the government, leading to bad public relations. National Police Chief Gen. Roesmanhadi recently announced the new series of six- month-long operations to crush the rebels.

His "shoot on sight" order only served to reinforce misgivings that instead of shooting armed rebels, once again security personnel would abuse or even kill unarmed civilians.

Statements that the earlier deployed Crack Riot Troops no longer existed, as they had been replaced, brought little comfort as many of the soldiers in the current operation were members of the former troops known by the acronym PPRM .

"There is no more PPRM," says Aceh police chief Col. Bachrumsyah. The new operation stresses not only a security approach but also a "cultural and religious approach," he said.

In North Aceh, operations commander Col. Nurdin said half of the Crack Riot Troops had been sent home from the regency, leaving only one battalion supported by members of the National Police and members of respective local military commands.

In all, Lilawangsa military commander Col. Syafnil Armen, overseeing north-east Aceh and Pidie, says he now has 90 percent of the ideal figure of 5,000 troops, beefing up security in the regency.

The failure of the earlier deployed troops to crush armed uprisings is blamed by police on them being wrongly equipped to face crowds, with only rubber bullets or blanks, and shields.

Distrust

Those with real bullets among the Crack Riot Troops were "relatively small" in number, Bachrumsyah said, while police and the military say they do not know the number of enemies they really face.

The partial withdrawal of the Crack Riot Troops was not done with fanfare. Indeed an announcement would not have been entirely welcomed as not all the troops were withdrawn. The addition and reduction of troops here is an issue clouded in distrust, regardless to what the authorities actually say.

Without adequate action to prevent more violence, and merely denials from the authorities and the Free Aceh rebels regarding their suspected involvement, the public has been left to a guessing game of "whodunit".

Identification of armed groups differ among military and police officers. Some say the "GBPK" or armed disturbance groups, are the proper names for the Free Aceh Movement while others refer to both as the groups to watch over their backs for.

A few police officers have acknowledged the possible involvement of military troops in arson and intimidation of civilians. However this does not include the abduction and killings of security personnel blamed on "armed hoodlums."

Aceh police chief Col. Bahrumsjah says they do not know who the armed hoodlums are despite intelligence work by the military and police.

"Since President B.J. Habibie visited Aceh in March and pledged that the violence would end, hundreds have died," a journalist of the Kontras tabloid said in Banda Aceh.

Spokesman for police operations, Lt.Col. Armin Karim, said the new operation stresses on "repressive action supported by preventive action to uphold the law."

But one other obstacle is that the operation and orders to shoot on sight were launched in the absence of a political approach to problems in Aceh, inherited from the military operations status of 1989 to 1998 and following sporadic violence.

In such a condition the police chief's claim that the operation includes "cultural and religious approaches" has not met much response.

Trauma

Scholars and activists have pointed to the widespread trauma which is far from healed. The rest of the country was made aware of the killings, torture and rape and abduction of Acehnese only after people spoke out when Soeharto quit the presidency last year.

The cultural and religious approach is indeed in line with suggestions by scholars and community leaders of Aceh.

But at the same time while local authorities have not ruled out dialog with Free Aceh leaders, those in Jakarta say talks over the possibility of an independent Aceh, including students' demands of a referendum, is unthinkable.

When criticized that his office has been too silent regarding Aceh, the best that the Minister of Home Affairs Syarwan Hamid could come up with was that while Acehnese aspirations should be respected, "it should be in the context of a unified state."

Aceh scholars have said the failure of the government to legally enact its status of a special province has greatly contributed to the problems here.

The unbalanced comparison of what Aceh has contributed in terms of its oil, gas and agricultural resources, to what it has gained from the government, has widely been cited as a reason for its problems. People know by heart the estimates that less than 1 percent of Aceh's contribution to the national budget comes back to the province.

People here say that "Jakarta only needs Aceh's land and rich resources, and does not need its people."

Late

Meanwhile life continues to be tense in many parts of Aceh, and dissatisfaction remains.

The violence associated with security personnel and a seemingly detached government, render the new police operations inadequate. Supposedly friendly security personnel now welcome refugees, while only two weeks ago they were deliberately roaring their trucks past refugee camps housing up to 145,000 people. "But the refugees ignore (their friendly gestures) now," a student doing volunteer work for refugees said.

Another problem hindering efforts to win over Acehnese trust is the continued cloud of secrecy over decisions regarding security personnel. Their numbers announced by Roesmanhadi and local authorities do not exactly match, with the former mentioning some 11,000 and the latter 7,000 "including largely non-combat personnel."

One highly placed police officer in Banda Aceh says he is not sure of the figure.

Another issue which has become a source of gossip, in absence of reliable information, is the deployment of Jakarta officers to Aceh who do not report to local authorities.

While a military spokesman earlier said Jakarta officers Lt. Gen. Fachrul Razi, an Acehnese, and Maj.Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, a former Jakarta military commander, had come to Aceh earlier this year "to seek input," police and military leaders here say they have not been informed of results of the visits.

"But whoever is sent here (from military headquarters) must come with good intentions," says Lilawangsa military commander Col. Syafnil Armen. A lack of transparency on the issue has contributed to hearsay that the Indonesian military or the government has unknown plans for the province, while it cannot control or lacks intention to control the armed groups.