Military action in Aceh, Papua not the solution

Military action in Aceh, Papua not the solution

Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, Research Associate, United Nations
Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR), Jakarta,
zulfan.unsfir@un.or.id

The current critical development of the peace process in Aceh
and the latest status of the security condition in Papua tells us
that the settling of peace in those two hot spot regions in
Indonesia still has long way to go. The two provinces, rich in
natural resources and representing the most western (Aceh) and
the most eastern (Papua) parts of the country, have had long
standing separatist movements for decades.

The movements were born out of economic and political
grievances, local identity and later, the violation of human
rights by those trying to quell them. However, these two cases
represent what may be termed central versus regional disputes
that have escalated into violent conflagrations.

We can also add the other two resource-rich regions in the
country, Riau and East Kalimantan to the list of outlying
provinces that have grievances with the central government in
Jakarta. Even though neither of those have degenerated to a point
of armed conflict and separatism, the demand for a federal system
has nonetheless emerged from the those provinces. Such
aspirations have faded somewhat since fiscal decentralization --
the Autonomy Law -- was put into effect.

Why do these conflicts exist in Indonesia? What is the
underlying general explanation of this regional discontent?

The increasing discontent in these regions since the beginning
of the economic crisis in mid 1997, followed by political
collapse, social unrest and the separation of East Timor in 1999,
have made disintegration a very real threat to Indonesia as we
know it. The threat has not originated from poorer regions, but
as is usually the case in other parts of the world, from the
richer ones.

Economic grievances are only one side of the picture. All four
provinces display a high level of per capita output, mainly from
the extraction of natural resources, such as oil, gas, other
minerals, timber and cash crop plantations. However, a wealth of
provincial natural resources, in most cases, has not translated
into a high degree of community welfare.

Even though their per capita output is much higher than the
national average, their community welfare indicators are only
more or less similar to, or (in extreme case) far lower than,
national figures. In 1999, per capita gross domestic product in
the regency of North Aceh, where PT Exxon Mobil has been
exploiting oil and gas since the 1970s, was more than three times
the national average, but per capita income (the amount the local
population earns) was 26 per cent below the national average and
the regency's level of human development index was 2 per cent
lower than the national average.

According to the 1999 records, the regency of Fak Fak in
Papua, where P.T. Freeport Indonesia has been mining gold, silver
and copper for decades, had a per capita GDP 18 times higher than
the national average, making it the wealthiest district in the
country. However, data from (the 1999) National Socio Economic
Survey (Susenas) showed that poverty for the residents of Fak Fak
was almost 2.5 times higher than the national poverty rate.

Based on data from an inter-regency, cross-sectional analysis
by UNSFIR, the conclusion is that by region, a correlation
between output level and community welfare is very low and local
people are largely denied the benefits from the prosperity of
their region.

This outcome has generated a collective awareness in the rich
regions, particularly among local communities, that they are not
receiving what they see as their fair share of wealth generated
from "their" land. The aspirations of these people to the share
in the wealth that is produced by their region reflect not so
much a desire for equality as, in the Indonesian context, an
"aspiration to inequality".

The aspirations are a response to the people's first-hand
experience of their community welfare being reduced to, or even
lowered below, the national average, even though their regions
are rich in natural resources. These people are rising up against
more than 30 years of political and economic repression under the
New Order. They are disrupting the artificial stability achieved
under the New Order's policies of imposing uniformity.

Studies attempting to analyze the correlation between economic
inequalities and economic growth rates frequently convey the
common assumption that low inequality reflects low potential for
social conflict.

However, looking at the data from Indonesia, the level of
inter-regional inequality, which is relatively low by
international standards, does not in itself reflect a low
potential for social conflict. This is because the indeces
examined illustrate only general economic/welfare differences
between regions.

Vertical conflict in Indonesia is not the product of the
magnitude of these differences, but of the position of particular
regions within the overall distribution, and the correlation
between regions' prosperity and their community welfare level.

This means that even though welfare inequality is low
nationwide, for people living in rich areas whose welfare status
is not always above, sometimes even below the national average,
the sense of injustice can become a trigger for conflict.
Inevitably, the people of the rich regions ask why they are not
benefiting from their region's wealth.

Other factors, of course, have also fed into such vertical
conflicts and many of these are a derivative of the regional
"inequality" problem. One obvious example was the violation of
human rights when heavy military operations were launched to
handle separatist movements in Aceh and Papua. Clearly, the
aspirations and sense of injustice felt by inhabitants of these
resource-rich regions must be taken into account as an effective
move to reduce vertical conflict.

The philosophy behind the New Order's policy of uniformity as
a means for national unity is clearly unsustainable.

Relaunching a military operation to overcome the separatist
movement in Aceh, as is currently being considered by the
government, would therefore be far from a good option to solve
the problem.

The views expressed herein are entirely those of the author.