Military action in Aceh, Papua not the solution

Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, Research Associate, United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR), Jakarta, zulfan.unsfir@un.or.id

The current critical development of the peace process in Aceh and the latest status of the security condition in Papua tells us that the settling of peace in those two hot spot regions in Indonesia still has long way to go. The two provinces, rich in natural resources and representing the most western (Aceh) and the most eastern (Papua) parts of the country, have had long standing separatist movements for decades.

The movements were born out of economic and political grievances, local identity and later, the violation of human rights by those trying to quell them. However, these two cases represent what may be termed central versus regional disputes that have escalated into violent conflagrations.

We can also add the other two resource-rich regions in the country, Riau and East Kalimantan to the list of outlying provinces that have grievances with the central government in Jakarta. Even though neither of those have degenerated to a point of armed conflict and separatism, the demand for a federal system has nonetheless emerged from the those provinces. Such aspirations have faded somewhat since fiscal decentralization -- the Autonomy Law -- was put into effect.

Why do these conflicts exist in Indonesia? What is the underlying general explanation of this regional discontent?

The increasing discontent in these regions since the beginning of the economic crisis in mid 1997, followed by political collapse, social unrest and the separation of East Timor in 1999, have made disintegration a very real threat to Indonesia as we know it. The threat has not originated from poorer regions, but as is usually the case in other parts of the world, from the richer ones.

Economic grievances are only one side of the picture. All four provinces display a high level of per capita output, mainly from the extraction of natural resources, such as oil, gas, other minerals, timber and cash crop plantations. However, a wealth of provincial natural resources, in most cases, has not translated into a high degree of community welfare.

Even though their per capita output is much higher than the national average, their community welfare indicators are only more or less similar to, or (in extreme case) far lower than, national figures. In 1999, per capita gross domestic product in the regency of North Aceh, where PT Exxon Mobil has been exploiting oil and gas since the 1970s, was more than three times the national average, but per capita income (the amount the local population earns) was 26 per cent below the national average and the regency's level of human development index was 2 per cent lower than the national average.

According to the 1999 records, the regency of Fak Fak in Papua, where P.T. Freeport Indonesia has been mining gold, silver and copper for decades, had a per capita GDP 18 times higher than the national average, making it the wealthiest district in the country. However, data from (the 1999) National Socio Economic Survey (Susenas) showed that poverty for the residents of Fak Fak was almost 2.5 times higher than the national poverty rate.

Based on data from an inter-regency, cross-sectional analysis by UNSFIR, the conclusion is that by region, a correlation between output level and community welfare is very low and local people are largely denied the benefits from the prosperity of their region.

This outcome has generated a collective awareness in the rich regions, particularly among local communities, that they are not receiving what they see as their fair share of wealth generated from "their" land. The aspirations of these people to the share in the wealth that is produced by their region reflect not so much a desire for equality as, in the Indonesian context, an "aspiration to inequality".

The aspirations are a response to the people's first-hand experience of their community welfare being reduced to, or even lowered below, the national average, even though their regions are rich in natural resources. These people are rising up against more than 30 years of political and economic repression under the New Order. They are disrupting the artificial stability achieved under the New Order's policies of imposing uniformity.

Studies attempting to analyze the correlation between economic inequalities and economic growth rates frequently convey the common assumption that low inequality reflects low potential for social conflict.

However, looking at the data from Indonesia, the level of inter-regional inequality, which is relatively low by international standards, does not in itself reflect a low potential for social conflict. This is because the indeces examined illustrate only general economic/welfare differences between regions.

Vertical conflict in Indonesia is not the product of the magnitude of these differences, but of the position of particular regions within the overall distribution, and the correlation between regions' prosperity and their community welfare level.

This means that even though welfare inequality is low nationwide, for people living in rich areas whose welfare status is not always above, sometimes even below the national average, the sense of injustice can become a trigger for conflict. Inevitably, the people of the rich regions ask why they are not benefiting from their region's wealth.

Other factors, of course, have also fed into such vertical conflicts and many of these are a derivative of the regional "inequality" problem. One obvious example was the violation of human rights when heavy military operations were launched to handle separatist movements in Aceh and Papua. Clearly, the aspirations and sense of injustice felt by inhabitants of these resource-rich regions must be taken into account as an effective move to reduce vertical conflict.

The philosophy behind the New Order's policy of uniformity as a means for national unity is clearly unsustainable.

Relaunching a military operation to overcome the separatist movement in Aceh, as is currently being considered by the government, would therefore be far from a good option to solve the problem.

The views expressed herein are entirely those of the author.