Militant Islam: A fumbling attempt to explain its presence

Militant Islam: A fumbling attempt to explain its presence

Solahudin, Contributor, Jakarta

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Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror
Zachary Abuza
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Boulder, USA & London, UK 2003
281 pp
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Tracing militant Islamic groups is comparable to searching for
ants on black stones in the dark; it's a tough task, as the
groups are careful, stay underground and keep their activities
clandestine.

Zachary Abuza, an associate professor of international
relations at Simmons College in Boston, attempts to uncover the
dark shroud cloaking militant Islam in Southeast Asia. Abuza
focuses his attention on the group known as Jamaah Islamiyah
(JI), allegedly responsible for various bombings in Southeast
Asia and believed to be part of al-Qaeda's network in the region.

It's a bold step on his part (some would say foolhardy),
because he is actually an expert on Vietnam, and militant Islam
in Southeast Asia is a new field of study for him.

It takes knowledge of language, history and, of course, Islam
to conduct academic research on militant Islam. Sadly, Abuza has
a minimum mastery of the relevant areas, and he is a fish out of
water in this academic area. Consequently, the 281-page book,
despite the congratulatory words from various academics on the
back cover, is saddled down by factual and spelling mistakes.

An example is a passage about Jafar Umar Thalib, ex-commander
of Laskar Jihad. "He was drawn to jihad and entered a mujahidin
training camp where he was influenced by the 'Caller' Ahlus Sunah
Wal Jama'ah, ulema of Yemen, who fought in Afghanistan with the
mujahidin. Ahlus was a preacher of khwarji, a school of teaching
that seeks to establish an Islamic state by means of revolution"
(page 69).

Abuza makes serious mistakes. First, he considers Ahlus Sunah
Wal Jama'ah (ASWJ) the name of a person. In fact, ASWJ in the
context of Jafar Umar, is Islam's salafiyah school. Second, ASWJ
or salafiyah is seen as similar to khawarij (not "khwarji" as
misspelled by Abuza). This is a terrible blunder because the two
schools are different and hostile to each other. According to the
teachings of salafiyah, khawarij is a heretical group in Islam
that must be opposed. With basic knowledge of schools in Islam,
such errors would not appear.

The book is littered with misspellings; kumpulan (collection)
written "kampulan", gerakan (movement) as "geragan" and bai'at
(initiation) as "bayat". Proper names are not spared either, like
Kartosuwiryo, written as Kartosuniryo, and Sidney Jones as Sydney
Jones.

Any message he may be wishing to convey is impaired by such
nagging inaccuracies. An example is his analysis of Laskar
Jundullah: "The second JI paramilitary group, the Laskar
Jundullah, a small militant organization that conducted sweeps of
foreigners in Solo and was at the forefront of sectarian conflict
in Poso, Sulawesi, was founded by M. Kolono and Agus Dwikarna in
October 2000" (pg. 146).

Abuza is confusing two different organizations, Laskar
Jundullah under M. Kalono (not M. Kolono) in Solo (Surakarta) and
Laskar Jundullah, led by Agus Dwikarna in South Sulawesi. Despite
the same name, both are organizationally unconnected.

Worse still, he calls Laskar Jundullah a JI paramilitary
group; actually, JI's military wing is Laskar Jamaah Islamiyah
under Aris Sumarsono alias Zulkarnain alias Daud. Agus Dwikarna's
Laskar Jundullah is a military arm of the South Sulawesi Syariat
Islam Upholding Committee (KPSI), a splinter group of Laskar
Wahdah Islamiyah, South Sulawesi, headed by Syarifuddin alias Abu
Jamiah. M. Kalono's Laskar Jundullah is a local militia in
Surakarta, more like a party task force than a paramilitary body.

His minimal knowledge of Islam, and ignorance of Arabic,
Indonesian or Malay and of Islam in Southeast Asia, led him to
cull information for the book from secondary sources. A simple
example is that though the study mostly deals with JI, it makes
no reference to JI's constitution, the General Guide to JI
Struggle (PUPJI). This is noticeable when he describes the
structure of JI, which is very different from that according to
PUPJI.

The same discrepancies apply when Abuza discusses Majelis
Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), without referring to the Report on the
Congress of Mujahidin and Upholding of Syariat Islam (RKMPSI). As
a result, he cannot distinguish between MMI's two structures:
Ahlul Halli Wal Aqdi (AHWA), with the task of general policy
making (including program drafting), and Lajnah Tanfidziyah, in
charge of executing AHWA's decisions, among other activities. He
mixes up both to produce a version of MMI that totally diverges
from the original MMI based on the congress report (pg 142).

Almost 80 percent of the book's footnotes state that
information was obtained from press coverage, with the remaining
20 percent derived from intelligence reports or findings of
research agencies. Abuza also quotes books and includes
interviews. Unfortunately, however, some of his quotations are
out of context.

For instance, when he quotes Harold Crouch's article, Qaida in
Indonesia? The Evidence Doesn't Support Worries, from the
International Herald Tribune of Oct. 23, 2001, Abuza indicates
that Crouch does not believe that Indonesian radical Islamic
organizations have needed Al-Qaeda aid for their actions. In the
article, Crouch is actually referring to anti-American
demonstrations by Islamic groups.

In Crouch's own words: "There is speculation that bin Laden's
agents may have helped to organize anti-American demonstrations
after the U.S. attack on Afghanistan began. But it is hard to
believe that Indonesia's radical Islamic organizations needed
such outside assistance."

This analysis has too many mistakes to serve as a reference
book. It would be advisable for Abuza to correct the errors in
the second edition. But if the revisions are too numerous to
make, Abuza may just as well consider rewriting this study.

The reviewer is a journalist and researcher on militant Islam.