Milestone in ties between China and U.S.
By Dipankar Banerjee
Hopefully, the U.S.-China Summit marked the end of the post- Tiananmen phase of relations between the two countries
The unfolding U.S.-China relations have a major potential to affect the world in the fading years of this century and for several decades in the next. How will this relationship evolve?
President Jiang Zemin's recent trip to the United States has perhaps set the course for the future, just as Deng Xiaoping's visit did nearly two decades ago. The latter marked the final end of China's isolation. It saw the beginning of a period of strategic engagement which helped isolate the Soviet Union and quickened its demise. Through an understanding of and adjustment to each other's interests it led to stability in Asia and facilitated China's rise in the 1980s, which in turn, contributed to economic growth in the regions around China.
This period in their relations came to an end with the Tiananmen incident of 1989. A debate raged in Washington next over containment or engagement. Hopefully this phase too has now ended.
Yet, a number of issues remain contentious, whether concerning the most favored nation treatment, membership of the World Trade Organization or the revised guidelines to the US.-Japan security treaty that fueled the debate in 1997, as did the Taiwan question the previous year. A degree of uncertainty and unpredictability has characterized the relationship between these two countries in the past few years.
Jiang visited the U.S. in very changed circumstances. Beijing is now a global player of major importance. Its booming economy is second only to that of the U.S. in GDP measured in purchasing power parity terms. Its foreign exchange reserves are expected to total $140 billion by the end of 1997. It has a trade surplus with America of $40 billion a year.
China wields considerable influence today in the world and especially in Asia in a number of diverse areas. Relations between the U.S. and China need to be seen in the perspective of both economic and security issues, and the visit both as an event and as a process.
The economic content of the visit was indeed very high. President Clinton set the stage with his radio address to the American people on Oct. 25, entitled "China and the national interest".
It reflected his administration's determination to give priority to trade over other issues. A number of economic agreements took place as a result.
China will buy 50 Boeing aircraft (this is but a tip of the iceberg; in the next 20 years, Beijing may need to buy commercial aircraft worth a mind-boggling $124 billion). Other deals worth $1.26 billion were signed. China continues to be the biggest buyer of U.S. wheat. Its plans for infrastructure upgrading, whether in power, railways or road construction, are so enormous that it has all major industrial nations and multi-national corporations begging for a share.
A more important development was the nuclear energy agreement. President Clinton said that he would certify that China was not exporting nuclear technology to Iran. All that was required of China was for its Foreign Minister to sign a letter agreeing to this.
It will then facilitate the implementation of the 1985 U.S.- China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement that will open up the sale of nuclear reactors and technology that may be worth about $60 billion over the years. This will also meet to some extent China's vast energy needs to fuel its economy in the future.
Other areas of agreement during the visit related to:
Strengthening of maritime security;
Increasing military contacts which go back to the mid 1980s;
Military information exchanges;
Guidelines on pricing of commercial space launch services;
The 1994 Joint Statement on Missile Non-Proliferation and MTCR guidelines.
Future security relations may be seen as role determined, with the U.S. as a status quo power and China appearing to challenge it.
Will this lead to conflict? This may depend on whether China is a revisionist or a revolutionary rising power. If the former, then conflict may be restricted to the diplomatic level. If it is the latter, then it might indeed turn violent to change the status quo.
A lot will depend on China's internal political development and its adjustment to the world. Beijing knows that at this stage of its development and integration with the world, the U.S. will be both an adversary as well as the source of its modernization. There is every possibility then that Beijing's policies will be tempered with caution and reason.
This is where the process through which relations develop assumes criticality. The course set out during the visit has been termed as one of constructive strategic partnership.
What is meant by this is not entirely clear. It is open to as many interpretations as there are analysts.
At a minimum, it implies a continued high level dialog on many fronts, beginning with Clinton's visit to China, probably in the spring of 1998, to military exchanges and co-operation in specific areas. For the present it is unlikely to mean anything more.
The visit has been projected by China as highly successful. The economic element was highlighted and Jiang harped much on this during the visit. But from the U.S. perspective the visit was less than glorious.
Wherever Jiang went he was dogged by pro-Tibet and human rights demonstrators. The press briefing on the lawns of the White House saw an unseemly debate between the two leaders on the issue of human rights.
Anti-China feelings remain strong in the Congress. On nine China-related bills that came up for discussion in the House immediately following Jiang's visit, the voting went overwhelmingly against Beijing. At one level it demonstrates a certain narrowness in Washington's thinking, the reality of which cannot be ignored.
As the world enters the new millennium and a new period in international interactions, there will be much focus on U.S.- China relations. The trend that it has taken, of dialog and discussion, is entirely positive. It is also likely that in the last two years of his presidency, Clinton will attempt to rise over narrow parochial interests and try and leave a mark on history. If so, there is no other area that might leave greater dividends.
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Dipankar Banerjee is presently a Visiting Fellow at the Stimson Center, Washington, and is the Co-Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, India.