Megawati's foreign policy legacy

Teuku Faizasyah, Jakarta

Despite domestic political hiccups at the sunset of Megawati Soekarnoputri's Cabinet -- that is, controversy surrounding the Cabinet's reshuffle -- within the sphere of foreign policy, Megawati's government apparently is not clouded by mischief.

Megawati's government appears resolute in moving forward with its foreign policies choices, and in implementing programs that have been decided earlier. An example of this, is that all preparations, both in terms of substantive and administrative, for the convening of the Asia-Africa Summit 2005 are well in progress.

The case of the Summit preparations shows the kind of platform that Megawati has instituted within the realms of Indonesian foreign policy. To put it succinctly, there is a legacy of Megawati in Indonesian foreign policy.

The foreign policy is shaped by her strategic decisions of appointing a professional from the ministry, Hassan Wirajuda, to lead the office; and appointing Ali Alatas and Nana Sutresna, the two most seasoned Indonesian diplomats, as her advisers and special envoys.

The Indonesian diplomatic community has benefited from this strategic move. The appointment of a professional to lead the ministry resulted in internal consolidation, that is, the restructuring of the ministry to meet the present challenges. The two most important features of the new structure are the post of the ministry's spokesperson and an office responsible for the protection of Indonesian citizens abroad.

Clearly, the spokesperson and the citizen protection's office are efforts to reach out and project a down-to-earth foreign policy. Seemingly, the ministry wishes to inject a new image that it deals with issues of public interests and not with "ivory tower" issues. Despite the host of many factors that led to the release of Indonesian nationals kidnapped in Iraq, the ministry did assume a leadership role at national level to deal with the case involving Indonesians abroad.

The internal consolidation also resulted in a more focused foreign policy. Indonesian foreign policy under Megawati can be called pragmatic, but always maneuvering between idealism and realism. It has to be pragmatic because Indonesia's post-crisis has been weakened, in terms of its capacity and credibility. The intention of former president Wahid was that Indonesia played an active role in solving numerous international conflicts sounded hollow, in the wake of Wahid's government inability to overcome the problems of Aceh and Ambon.

Therefore, Megawati's government decision to concentrate its energy in its immediate region is a pragmatic one. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) again becomes the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. During its chairmanship in ASEAN, Indonesia re-established its cardinal position by ways of successfully charting the future direction of the grouping through ASEAN Community conception, consisting of three pillars: ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-cultural Community. The ASEAN Security Community pillar, proposed by Indonesia, provides the region with assurance that the members would always opt for peaceful means in settling their differences.

Indonesia has also been able to maneuver between idealism and realism. Its idealism is shown in the way it handled the debacle following the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and its allies. Although, Indonesia could empathize with the U.S.' grief of their loss following the Sept. 11 attack, Indonesia censured the U.S. so-called rights for the preemptive strike in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Nevertheless, Indonesia's willingness to engage many countries in counterterrorism cooperation, including the U.S. and Australia, is a pure case of realism in its foreign policy. Having limited resources, Indonesia needs the support of these countries to counter any threats posed by extremist groups from within and outside Indonesia.

The appointment of Ali Alatas and Nana Sutresna as advisers and special envoys, serves Megawati's interest to have Indonesia play a prominent international role. At the same time, the special envoy is Megawati's means to cut short the backlog of bureaucracy. She assigned Alatas to Sweden to make clear to the highest authority there, Indonesia's position about the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and she dispatched Sutresna to North Korea to outline Indonesia's position about the nuclear crisis in the peninsula. On the latter case, Megawati's diplomatic chip is Indonesia's cordial relations with North Korea, as well as with South Korea and the rest of the countries engage in the six peace talks.

Certainly, by way of appointing a special envoy, Megawati has gained more leeway in the conduct of Indonesian diplomacy. She assigned the envoys to deal with selected cases where Indonesia, in her eyes, has some political advantages. In the North Korean case, for instance, seemingly she wishes to capitalize on the personal relationship between the leaders of the two countries: Between her late-father and Kim Il-sung, and between herself and Kim Jong-il.

To conclude, Megawati should feel content that the strategic moves she took have helped Indonesia reposition its foreign policy. Indeed, she helped resuscitate foreign policy, which at one point in time, during Wahid's government, lost its soul.

Two questions remain, however, what would be Indonesia's foreign policy post-Megawati? Would the next president continue with the platform laid by Megawati? At the moment there are not many clues because, in contrast to other issues, foreign policy is the least discussed subject during the campaign trail. Without sufficient insight, it is hoped that the new government would remain faithful on the good things that the predecessor government has done.

The writer has a Ph.D in Diplomatic History and Conflict Resolution, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand. He currently serves with the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. The opinions in this article are personal and do not reflect the policy of the Foreign Ministry.