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Megawati's foreign policy legacy

| Source: JP

Megawati's foreign policy legacy

Teuku Faizasyah, Jakarta

Despite domestic political hiccups at the sunset of Megawati
Soekarnoputri's Cabinet -- that is, controversy surrounding the
Cabinet's reshuffle -- within the sphere of foreign policy,
Megawati's government apparently is not clouded by mischief.

Megawati's government appears resolute in moving forward with
its foreign policies choices, and in implementing programs that
have been decided earlier. An example of this, is that all
preparations, both in terms of substantive and administrative,
for the convening of the Asia-Africa Summit 2005 are well in
progress.

The case of the Summit preparations shows the kind of platform
that Megawati has instituted within the realms of Indonesian
foreign policy. To put it succinctly, there is a legacy of
Megawati in Indonesian foreign policy.

The foreign policy is shaped by her strategic decisions of
appointing a professional from the ministry, Hassan Wirajuda, to
lead the office; and appointing Ali Alatas and Nana Sutresna, the
two most seasoned Indonesian diplomats, as her advisers and
special envoys.

The Indonesian diplomatic community has benefited from this
strategic move. The appointment of a professional to lead the
ministry resulted in internal consolidation, that is, the
restructuring of the ministry to meet the present challenges. The
two most important features of the new structure are the post of
the ministry's spokesperson and an office responsible for the
protection of Indonesian citizens abroad.

Clearly, the spokesperson and the citizen protection's office
are efforts to reach out and project a down-to-earth foreign
policy. Seemingly, the ministry wishes to inject a new image that
it deals with issues of public interests and not with "ivory
tower" issues. Despite the host of many factors that led to the
release of Indonesian nationals kidnapped in Iraq, the ministry
did assume a leadership role at national level to deal with the
case involving Indonesians abroad.

The internal consolidation also resulted in a more focused
foreign policy. Indonesian foreign policy under Megawati can be
called pragmatic, but always maneuvering between idealism and
realism. It has to be pragmatic because Indonesia's post-crisis
has been weakened, in terms of its capacity and credibility. The
intention of former president Wahid was that Indonesia played an
active role in solving numerous international conflicts sounded
hollow, in the wake of Wahid's government inability to overcome
the problems of Aceh and Ambon.

Therefore, Megawati's government decision to concentrate its
energy in its immediate region is a pragmatic one. Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) again becomes the cornerstone of
Indonesian foreign policy. During its chairmanship in ASEAN,
Indonesia re-established its cardinal position by ways of
successfully charting the future direction of the grouping
through ASEAN Community conception, consisting of three pillars:
ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN
Socio-cultural Community. The ASEAN Security Community pillar,
proposed by Indonesia, provides the region with assurance that
the members would always opt for peaceful means in settling their
differences.

Indonesia has also been able to maneuver between idealism and
realism. Its idealism is shown in the way it handled the debacle
following the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and its allies.
Although, Indonesia could empathize with the U.S.' grief of their
loss following the Sept. 11 attack, Indonesia censured the U.S.
so-called rights for the preemptive strike in Afghanistan and
Iraq.

Nevertheless, Indonesia's willingness to engage many countries
in counterterrorism cooperation, including the U.S. and
Australia, is a pure case of realism in its foreign policy.
Having limited resources, Indonesia needs the support of these
countries to counter any threats posed by extremist groups from
within and outside Indonesia.

The appointment of Ali Alatas and Nana Sutresna as advisers
and special envoys, serves Megawati's interest to have Indonesia
play a prominent international role. At the same time, the
special envoy is Megawati's means to cut short the backlog of
bureaucracy. She assigned Alatas to Sweden to make clear to the
highest authority there, Indonesia's position about the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) and she dispatched Sutresna to North Korea to
outline Indonesia's position about the nuclear crisis in the
peninsula. On the latter case, Megawati's diplomatic chip is
Indonesia's cordial relations with North Korea, as well as with
South Korea and the rest of the countries engage in the six peace
talks.

Certainly, by way of appointing a special envoy, Megawati has
gained more leeway in the conduct of Indonesian diplomacy. She
assigned the envoys to deal with selected cases where Indonesia,
in her eyes, has some political advantages. In the North Korean
case, for instance, seemingly she wishes to capitalize on the
personal relationship between the leaders of the two countries:
Between her late-father and Kim Il-sung, and between herself and
Kim Jong-il.

To conclude, Megawati should feel content that the strategic
moves she took have helped Indonesia reposition its foreign
policy. Indeed, she helped resuscitate foreign policy, which at
one point in time, during Wahid's government, lost its soul.

Two questions remain, however, what would be Indonesia's
foreign policy post-Megawati? Would the next president continue
with the platform laid by Megawati? At the moment there are not
many clues because, in contrast to other issues, foreign policy
is the least discussed subject during the campaign trail. Without
sufficient insight, it is hoped that the new government would
remain faithful on the good things that the predecessor
government has done.

The writer has a Ph.D in Diplomatic History and Conflict
Resolution, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand. He
currently serves with the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. The
opinions in this article are personal and do not reflect the
policy of the Foreign Ministry.

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