Megawati must learn from history

Megawati must learn from history

Ignas Kleden, The Center for East, Indonesian Affairs/CEIA,
Jakarta

From time to time Indonesia has had to grapple with serious
questions when public concern rises to a certain point.

One such question is of national leadership.

During Sukarno's time, nation-building was the main concern.
Initially, it appeared to be a question of whether it was
possible and viable to have so many ethnic groups, speaking some
500 languages, into a united nation, which would share similar
national beliefs and be committed to common national ideals.

By the end of his rule in 1965 the question arose again.
Should the country tolerate all political groupings or should
there be some limitations in order not to endanger the existence
and the survival of the new nation? Sukarno was brought down by
his political opponents and the New Order regime was born.

Soeharto came to power strongly believing that if one wanted
to save the nation something had to be done with the economy. He
did, and it turned out to work well. However it became
increasingly clear that economic growth as such could not become
a national savior unless it was guided by some political and
social principles.

The true wealth of a nation is not merely the result of
economic growth per se, but rather a democratic way of handling
that growth. The direction of national development set by
Soeharto was clear, but still many were misled. Soeharto who won
the hearts of people because of the economic success had to step
down because of an insurmountable economic crisis in 1998.

B.J. Habibie, the then vice president, took over the
government partly because of Soeharto's own appointment without
an approval of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). It
became a case of a government without legality or legitimacy.

Under his rule, the exchange rate of the rupiah relative to US
dollars was pushed up from Rp 16,700 on June 17, 1998 to Rp 7,000
on Oct. 20, 1999. However, the main political struggle for
Habibie was to win his legitimacy outside the MPR, both
domestically as well as internationally.

Domestically, he pushed for political openness. These measures
were his response to the public's aspirations in order to show
that he stood fully committed to democracy and an open society.

Internationally, the same effort was made to demonstrate his
determination to encourage democracy and human rights. East Timor
was given the free option to become independent from Indonesia or
become an autonomous province of Indonesia.

Despite the majority of Indonesians who supported democratic
reform, East Timor's freedom was seen as a slap in the face of
the nation by those same people.

None of these achievements gave Habibie's enough legitimacy to
overcome the people's dislike of the New Order, which he was
still considered part of, and he had to give way to Abdurrahman
Wahid who became the first president to come to power in a
democratic election.

Abdurrahman was a very popular Muslim leader, who was known
for his commitment to democracy, his advocacy for the minorities,
and his fundamental stand for political moderation. His
popularity was due partly to his personal background as the
grandson of the founder of Nadhatul Ulama (NU) (the country's
largest Muslim organization) and the son of the first minister of
religious affairs. One can neiter forget his own performance and
achievement as a leading Muslim scholar, who enjoyed national and
international recognition.

He was also an outspoken intellectual familiar with many
intellectual communities and was welcome in various cultural
centers. His courage to struggle for freedom of expression became
a great nuisance for the regime of Soeharto.

So there was no problem of legitimacy for Abdurrahman. If
Habibie and his government suffered from a lack of legitimacy,
Abdurrahman ran the risk of becoming over-legitimate -- which can
become a risk for both the ruler and the ruled.

If the ruler has too much of a mandate he/she can easily
neglect power accountability. For the ruled this situation can
become a liability -- the ruler is not challenged to do something
which benefits the people to get their recognition and submission
in return.

Such a mandate gave Abdurrahman the courage to deal with the
political institutions of the New Order establishment, much of
which were still firmly in place, for better or for worse. He
forced the military to withdraw from power politics, this being
done in a surprisingly peaceful way and in a very short time.

He dissolved the ministry for information and suggested a
peaceful resolution in Aceh. However, when he called for the
dissolution of the legislature after a slew of no-confidence
votes against him, he had brought the nation to the brink of
crisis. A special MPR session was convened, after it was
dissolved by the president, which decided to end his presidency.

Megawati Soekarnoputri was immediately installed as president
by the MPR on July 23, 2001 and was given a vote of confidence to
lead the nation until the next 2004 elections. Her Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) won the 1999
election with a third of all the votes. She was a respected
leader able to lead her party through difficult times when her
party seemed powerful enough to become a rival for Golkar, the
then ruling party.

Her background as Sukarno's daughter played obviously an
important role in strengthening her position as a political
leader. During political repression under Soeharto, Megawati
stayed firm, unshaken and solid. Silence was golden at that time,
a dignified attitude of political resistance. However, people now
expect her to provide guidance and direction.

People want to know, for instance, what her position is with
regard to the case of Akbar Tandjung, or the sale of Indosat.
People are curious about her responses towards student
demonstrations or how she plans to deal with flooding in Jakarta.

There should be a substantial change in roles played by both
Megawati and PDI Perjuangan according to the new political
position they are now in.

The rise and fall of Indonesian national leaders clearly show
that the strengths which can put a president in office turn out
to become the very things which bring about presidential failure.

Sukarno's undaunted elan for nation-building and national
unity helped him succeed in bringing various ethnic groups and
various political groupings together as one nation. However, his
preoccupation with national unity made him reluctant to dissolve
the then Indonesian Communist Party as demanded forcefully by the
students, the military and the religious groups. He was finally
toppled by his own indecisiveness on that issue.

In the case of Soeharto economic growth was his obvious
success, but the failure to overcome the crisis was the death of
him.

Habibie suffered from a lack of legitimacy and therefore
struggled during his administration to win recognition and
acceptance of the people. However, his decision to give East
Timor freedom made him too unpopular with nationalists.

Abdurrahman was supported by full legitimacy. And yet his
over-legitimate position made him less cautious in dealing with
political institutions. He was ousted, essentially for being too
zealous with institutional reforms.

Thus, Megawati should heed this pattern, develop a political
vision and tell us about it, and not allow her former strength to
become the very weakness which could bring her down.