Fri, 28 Feb 2003

Megawati must learn from history

Ignas Kleden, The Center for East, Indonesian Affairs/CEIA, Jakarta

From time to time Indonesia has had to grapple with serious questions when public concern rises to a certain point.

One such question is of national leadership.

During Sukarno's time, nation-building was the main concern. Initially, it appeared to be a question of whether it was possible and viable to have so many ethnic groups, speaking some 500 languages, into a united nation, which would share similar national beliefs and be committed to common national ideals.

By the end of his rule in 1965 the question arose again. Should the country tolerate all political groupings or should there be some limitations in order not to endanger the existence and the survival of the new nation? Sukarno was brought down by his political opponents and the New Order regime was born.

Soeharto came to power strongly believing that if one wanted to save the nation something had to be done with the economy. He did, and it turned out to work well. However it became increasingly clear that economic growth as such could not become a national savior unless it was guided by some political and social principles.

The true wealth of a nation is not merely the result of economic growth per se, but rather a democratic way of handling that growth. The direction of national development set by Soeharto was clear, but still many were misled. Soeharto who won the hearts of people because of the economic success had to step down because of an insurmountable economic crisis in 1998.

B.J. Habibie, the then vice president, took over the government partly because of Soeharto's own appointment without an approval of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). It became a case of a government without legality or legitimacy.

Under his rule, the exchange rate of the rupiah relative to US dollars was pushed up from Rp 16,700 on June 17, 1998 to Rp 7,000 on Oct. 20, 1999. However, the main political struggle for Habibie was to win his legitimacy outside the MPR, both domestically as well as internationally.

Domestically, he pushed for political openness. These measures were his response to the public's aspirations in order to show that he stood fully committed to democracy and an open society.

Internationally, the same effort was made to demonstrate his determination to encourage democracy and human rights. East Timor was given the free option to become independent from Indonesia or become an autonomous province of Indonesia.

Despite the majority of Indonesians who supported democratic reform, East Timor's freedom was seen as a slap in the face of the nation by those same people.

None of these achievements gave Habibie's enough legitimacy to overcome the people's dislike of the New Order, which he was still considered part of, and he had to give way to Abdurrahman Wahid who became the first president to come to power in a democratic election.

Abdurrahman was a very popular Muslim leader, who was known for his commitment to democracy, his advocacy for the minorities, and his fundamental stand for political moderation. His popularity was due partly to his personal background as the grandson of the founder of Nadhatul Ulama (NU) (the country's largest Muslim organization) and the son of the first minister of religious affairs. One can neiter forget his own performance and achievement as a leading Muslim scholar, who enjoyed national and international recognition.

He was also an outspoken intellectual familiar with many intellectual communities and was welcome in various cultural centers. His courage to struggle for freedom of expression became a great nuisance for the regime of Soeharto.

So there was no problem of legitimacy for Abdurrahman. If Habibie and his government suffered from a lack of legitimacy, Abdurrahman ran the risk of becoming over-legitimate -- which can become a risk for both the ruler and the ruled.

If the ruler has too much of a mandate he/she can easily neglect power accountability. For the ruled this situation can become a liability -- the ruler is not challenged to do something which benefits the people to get their recognition and submission in return.

Such a mandate gave Abdurrahman the courage to deal with the political institutions of the New Order establishment, much of which were still firmly in place, for better or for worse. He forced the military to withdraw from power politics, this being done in a surprisingly peaceful way and in a very short time.

He dissolved the ministry for information and suggested a peaceful resolution in Aceh. However, when he called for the dissolution of the legislature after a slew of no-confidence votes against him, he had brought the nation to the brink of crisis. A special MPR session was convened, after it was dissolved by the president, which decided to end his presidency.

Megawati Soekarnoputri was immediately installed as president by the MPR on July 23, 2001 and was given a vote of confidence to lead the nation until the next 2004 elections. Her Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) won the 1999 election with a third of all the votes. She was a respected leader able to lead her party through difficult times when her party seemed powerful enough to become a rival for Golkar, the then ruling party.

Her background as Sukarno's daughter played obviously an important role in strengthening her position as a political leader. During political repression under Soeharto, Megawati stayed firm, unshaken and solid. Silence was golden at that time, a dignified attitude of political resistance. However, people now expect her to provide guidance and direction.

People want to know, for instance, what her position is with regard to the case of Akbar Tandjung, or the sale of Indosat. People are curious about her responses towards student demonstrations or how she plans to deal with flooding in Jakarta.

There should be a substantial change in roles played by both Megawati and PDI Perjuangan according to the new political position they are now in.

The rise and fall of Indonesian national leaders clearly show that the strengths which can put a president in office turn out to become the very things which bring about presidential failure.

Sukarno's undaunted elan for nation-building and national unity helped him succeed in bringing various ethnic groups and various political groupings together as one nation. However, his preoccupation with national unity made him reluctant to dissolve the then Indonesian Communist Party as demanded forcefully by the students, the military and the religious groups. He was finally toppled by his own indecisiveness on that issue.

In the case of Soeharto economic growth was his obvious success, but the failure to overcome the crisis was the death of him.

Habibie suffered from a lack of legitimacy and therefore struggled during his administration to win recognition and acceptance of the people. However, his decision to give East Timor freedom made him too unpopular with nationalists.

Abdurrahman was supported by full legitimacy. And yet his over-legitimate position made him less cautious in dealing with political institutions. He was ousted, essentially for being too zealous with institutional reforms.

Thus, Megawati should heed this pattern, develop a political vision and tell us about it, and not allow her former strength to become the very weakness which could bring her down.