Megawati may retain power until 2009

Megawati may retain power until 2009

R. William Liddle, Political Scientist, The Ohio State University

Voter perceptions of the qualities of individual leaders
appear to play an important part in Indonesian elections,
according to the earlier mentioned survey. Megawati Soekarnoputri
was the clear favorite of voters according to our data, and
probably pulled the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI Perjuangan)
along with her. The difference between the former Indonesian
Nationalist Party's (PNI) 22 percent in 1955 and PDI Perjuangan's
34 percent in 1999 is almost certainly due in part to Megawati's
appeal.

Various actions of Megawati, such as her support for the
reelection of Governor Sutiyoso in Jakarta, have been widely
condemned. Many local observers also claim that she will be hurt
by the slowness of economic recovery and by evidence that she is
unwilling to fight corruption.

Few leaders of other parties, however, calculating their
chances against hers, believe that she has been hurt
significantly either by her actions or by her non-actions and
silences on important issues (for which she is also notorious).
They see her, though they did not use the term, as a "teflon
president" (no accusation sticks) like Ronald Reagan in the
United States. Her support is more personal than political, in
the sense of not being driven by issues. Her inherited charisma
is part of her appeal, but she is also learning how to charm
audiences, as she apparently did on her recent trip to Algeria.

Fifth, they believe that Megawati has the TNI, the armed
forces, in her pocket. During the New Order, the Indonesian
Military played a critical role in assuring a large Golkar
victory, election after election from 1971 to 1997, at the
direction of then-President Soeharto. This was achieved in two
ways: Through direct repression of opposition parties and through
stiffening the spine, when necessary, of the civilian government
officials who led Golkar, then the state party.

In the regions, the principal instrument of this political
strategy was the "territorial system," a hierarchy of military
commands from the province to the village that engaged in both
surveillance of and operations against the New Order's opponents.

The territorial commands still exist, but do not appear to
have been much used in the 1999 election campaign, when they
would have been deployed on president B.J. Habibie's and Golkar's
behalf. They are not likely to be openly active in 2004 either.
Too much is at stake for Megawati and PDI Perjuangan in terms of
democratic legitimacy, which requires maintaining a sharp
distinction between the controlled authoritarian elections of the
New Order and the open democratic elections of this reform era.

Nonetheless, there is now a general consensus among observers
and actors that the TNI is happy with Megawati's leadership. She
places the highest policy priority on national integrity, and
supports the use of armed force against separatist rebels. Like
TNI leaders (and her father), she is a centralizer, determined to
correct what she sees as a pendulum swing too far in the
direction of autonomous regional government.

With regard to the prosecution of past (and current) human
rights violations by officers and soldiers, her instinct is to
protect the armed forces. Moreover, she appears to have little
concern with the anti-democratic implications of the territorial
system or of the financial independence from the state budget of
the armed forces. Therefore much TNI-connected money and other
forms of behind-the-scenes support at the national and regional
levels are likely to be directed Megawati's way in 2004. Little
armed forces money and support are likely to go elsewhere, except
perhaps to the party of Megawati's vice-presidential candidate (a
consideration for party leaders too).

Finally, the party leaders whom I interviewed see Megawati as
accommodating and predictable. They know that no one of their
parties, given the multi-partyism and constitutional structure,
can totally control the government in the foreseeable future.
They also want to be represented in the executive branch, not
just in the legislature.

This desire, to be represented in the executive, is one of the
most powerful forces at work in Indonesian politics today (and
perhaps throughout the whole of the independence period). The
party leaders therefore seek a president who will rule not on the
basis of a narrow majority, just enough parties to form a minimum
winning coalition in the legislature, but rather one who will
cast a wide, inclusive net, giving them opportunities to hold
cabinet positions or other important governmental posts.

In July 2001 Megawati, though the leader of a party hostile to
political Islam, encouraged the vice-presidential candidacy of
United Development's (PPP) Hamzah Haz and appointed several
Muslim leaders, modernists and traditionalists, from all of the
major parties, to her cabinet. None of these ministers appears to
be in danger of losing his or her job between now and 2004.

The leaders of the largest parties can thus predict with some
confidence that, if elected president in 2004, Megawati will
behave as she did in July 2001. A first test of this prediction
will be her choice of a vice-presidential candidate prior to the
2004 election. Of course the leaders of Golkar, the National
Awakening Party (PKB) and PPP respectively expect (or at least
hope) that she will choose from their party. Their main concern,
however, is that she demonstrate her continuing accommodative
stance by selecting a running mate whose party and political base
are different from hers. In particular, they expect that Islam
and/or non-Java will be represented.

The party leaders' belief that Megawati is accommodating and
predictable contrasts with their evaluation of the earlier
presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid and also with their previous
evaluation of Megawati as a potential president. Abdurrahman
chose a vice-president, Megawati, whose party and political base
were different from his, but then insulted and harassed her for
the 20 months of their joint tenure in office. He also chose a
"rainbow cabinet". Within weeks, however, he had fired one
coordinating minister, from PPP, and three ministers, from PDI
Perjuangan, Golkar, and Crescent Star Party (PBB), effectively
obliterating the rainbow and all but dooming his presidency.

Megawati famously but foolishly declared PDI Perjuangan the
winner of the 1999 parliamentary election. She forgot or ignored
the fact that her party had only 34 percent of votes and,
crucially, an even smaller percentage of the seats in the MPR,
the People's Consultative Assembly, which elected the president.

Unwilling to negotiate with other parties, in particular
unwilling to accommodate the fears of pious Muslims, she lost the
presidential contest to Abdurrahman. Her long months as vice-
president appear to have had a beneficial learning effect,
however, since as president she has not repeated her
predecessor's errors.

How long is Megawati likely to serve as Indonesia's president?
The 1945 Constitution, as amended, specifies that a president may
serve for two terms. The period 2004-2009 could be construed as
either her second or her first term. Under similar constitutional
conditions, Lyndon Johnson served out the term of the
assassinated John F. Kennedy (1961-1965), was elected in his own
right in 1964, and could have run again in 1968.

Perhaps Megawati's eligibility in 2009 will be one of the
first issues resolved by the new Constitutional Court.