Megawati and the military

Megawati and the military

By Kusnanto Anggoro

JAKARTA (JP): The three most important political and security
portfolios in the new Cabinet lineup go to generals: Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, coordinating minister for political and
security affairs; Hari Sabarno, minister of home affairs; and
Agum Gumelar, minister of transportation. A civilian, Matori
Abdul Djalil, is now in charge of defense. It remains to be seen
whether this signifies a further step toward more democratic
control of the armed forces.

Indeed, by focusing on what has developed after the downfall
of Soeharto, few significant trends or programs show a
discernible path toward civilian supremacy.

Generals do, however, appear to have accepted the notion of
authority within civilian institutions, while Indonesian Military
(TNI) delegates at the legislature played a reasonably
constructive role in the battle between Abdurrahman Wahid and the
House of Representatives (DPR) over the "Bruneigate" and
"Buloggate" scandals. Nevertheless, contemporary behavior of the
military may indicate the opposite.

Under the government of Abdurrahman, the military questioned
the judgment of a democratically elected President. They rejected
the president's decree on the state of emergency. Depending on
whether moral judgment or real politics was the barometer, their
stance could signal either "commitment to constitutional
democracy" or "insubordination to the Commander in Chief". The
military may have played politics without doing anything.

Indeed, the military might only have reacted to Abdurrahman's
erratic style of leadership. Nonetheless, nothing is certain.
Civilian control of the military will still be a contentious
issue in future years. In fact, too many issues must be resolved,
starting with human rights abuses, illegitimate use of force and
unaccountable governance of the military. These issues are
closely related to the agenda of reform and thus, may even become
the eventual powerful issues needed to boost popular legitimacy
for Megawati.

Questions abound about the prospect, direction and substance
of military reform. The prospect of having to deal with
tremendous internal stability, a prerequisite for a stable
government, may also, for better or worse, invite the military to
play a role in domestic affairs. Also, Megawati might owe the
military for her ascension to the presidency. Many have even
speculated that the military will be pulling the strings of her
government from behind the scenes.

Furthermore, Megawati and the military share a conservative
outlook of statehood and statecraft. They are the conservatives,
though not necessarily reactionaries, in the highly needed
program of reform, including amendment of the Constitution and
the devolution of centralized power to the regions.

Several retired military and police generals are members of
her party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-
Perjuangan). Such a close rapport may hinder Megawati in reining
in the military.

On the positive side, however, Megawati had struggled against
the military-backed regime of Soeharto for more than a decade.
She appears to understand that Indonesia needs a strong military,
but that it should remain a defense force used to protect the
nation's unity.

Indeed, she may have no clear idea or practical program for
what needs to be done with the military, but the recent
presidential decree issued to expand an East Timor human rights
investigation, in which high-ranking officers could be
implicated, may indicate her commitment to dealing with the
military.

In all probability, it is almost certain that Megawati will be
more cautious than Abdurrahman was. Her style will be different
from his, which involved strategies that relied heavily on
intrigue, political maneuvering and divide-and-conquer tactics.
Her adherence to "legal process" will make it less possible for
her to devise dramatic programs and gestures.

Of course, this should not necessarily signal weakness. Style
is no more important than substance. Appropriate style, a
sensible approach and reasonable policies are equally necessary.
One only has to look at Abdurrahman's gestures to see that they
were actually hollow -- never actually delivered or only carried
out with extreme caution due to political discord. In fact,
reform of the TNI during Abdurrahman's leadership, was primarily
the result of internal dynamics within the TNI.

Perhaps reforming the military is too large a task to be
undertaken by Megawati alone. The DPR should play a decisive
legislative role and exercise budgetary control in defense and
security affairs.

Civil society must play a role in advancing public concerns
and awareness of the military's excessive role in politics. The
defense ministry should provide a "window of opportunity" for
involvement of civilians in the policy-making process. Most
importantly, the military needs to realize the psyche of
transition from a post-military dominated regime and must
recognize the limits to their sphere of influence.

That could well be a perilous trajectory. Listening from the
back bench of the DPR to the discussion on the State Defense Act
last July, my doubt is not that the military will be able to
revive their glory of past, but that we have no common agenda and
coherent strategy for placing the military under democratic
civilian control.

Dr. Kusnanto Anggoro is a senior researcher at the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies and a lecturer in strategic
studies for the postgraduate studies program at the University of
Indonesia.