Megawati and the military

By Kusnanto Anggoro

JAKARTA (JP): The three most important political and security portfolios in the new Cabinet lineup go to generals: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, coordinating minister for political and security affairs; Hari Sabarno, minister of home affairs; and Agum Gumelar, minister of transportation. A civilian, Matori Abdul Djalil, is now in charge of defense. It remains to be seen whether this signifies a further step toward more democratic control of the armed forces.

Indeed, by focusing on what has developed after the downfall of Soeharto, few significant trends or programs show a discernible path toward civilian supremacy.

Generals do, however, appear to have accepted the notion of authority within civilian institutions, while Indonesian Military (TNI) delegates at the legislature played a reasonably constructive role in the battle between Abdurrahman Wahid and the House of Representatives (DPR) over the "Bruneigate" and "Buloggate" scandals. Nevertheless, contemporary behavior of the military may indicate the opposite.

Under the government of Abdurrahman, the military questioned the judgment of a democratically elected President. They rejected the president's decree on the state of emergency. Depending on whether moral judgment or real politics was the barometer, their stance could signal either "commitment to constitutional democracy" or "insubordination to the Commander in Chief". The military may have played politics without doing anything.

Indeed, the military might only have reacted to Abdurrahman's erratic style of leadership. Nonetheless, nothing is certain. Civilian control of the military will still be a contentious issue in future years. In fact, too many issues must be resolved, starting with human rights abuses, illegitimate use of force and unaccountable governance of the military. These issues are closely related to the agenda of reform and thus, may even become the eventual powerful issues needed to boost popular legitimacy for Megawati.

Questions abound about the prospect, direction and substance of military reform. The prospect of having to deal with tremendous internal stability, a prerequisite for a stable government, may also, for better or worse, invite the military to play a role in domestic affairs. Also, Megawati might owe the military for her ascension to the presidency. Many have even speculated that the military will be pulling the strings of her government from behind the scenes.

Furthermore, Megawati and the military share a conservative outlook of statehood and statecraft. They are the conservatives, though not necessarily reactionaries, in the highly needed program of reform, including amendment of the Constitution and the devolution of centralized power to the regions.

Several retired military and police generals are members of her party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI- Perjuangan). Such a close rapport may hinder Megawati in reining in the military.

On the positive side, however, Megawati had struggled against the military-backed regime of Soeharto for more than a decade. She appears to understand that Indonesia needs a strong military, but that it should remain a defense force used to protect the nation's unity.

Indeed, she may have no clear idea or practical program for what needs to be done with the military, but the recent presidential decree issued to expand an East Timor human rights investigation, in which high-ranking officers could be implicated, may indicate her commitment to dealing with the military.

In all probability, it is almost certain that Megawati will be more cautious than Abdurrahman was. Her style will be different from his, which involved strategies that relied heavily on intrigue, political maneuvering and divide-and-conquer tactics. Her adherence to "legal process" will make it less possible for her to devise dramatic programs and gestures.

Of course, this should not necessarily signal weakness. Style is no more important than substance. Appropriate style, a sensible approach and reasonable policies are equally necessary. One only has to look at Abdurrahman's gestures to see that they were actually hollow -- never actually delivered or only carried out with extreme caution due to political discord. In fact, reform of the TNI during Abdurrahman's leadership, was primarily the result of internal dynamics within the TNI.

Perhaps reforming the military is too large a task to be undertaken by Megawati alone. The DPR should play a decisive legislative role and exercise budgetary control in defense and security affairs.

Civil society must play a role in advancing public concerns and awareness of the military's excessive role in politics. The defense ministry should provide a "window of opportunity" for involvement of civilians in the policy-making process. Most importantly, the military needs to realize the psyche of transition from a post-military dominated regime and must recognize the limits to their sphere of influence.

That could well be a perilous trajectory. Listening from the back bench of the DPR to the discussion on the State Defense Act last July, my doubt is not that the military will be able to revive their glory of past, but that we have no common agenda and coherent strategy for placing the military under democratic civilian control.

Dr. Kusnanto Anggoro is a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and a lecturer in strategic studies for the postgraduate studies program at the University of Indonesia.