'May Revolution' in perspective
By Aboeprijadi Santoso
JAKARTA (JP): Only a few weeks ago, many analysts watching political developments in Indonesia tended to think in terms of two models of change: the so-called Tiananmen model and the "People Power" model. Much to everybody's surprise, the events in Jakarta turned out to be neither so bloody as in China, nor as abrupt as in the Philippines, but a quick and largely peaceful transition.
Still, the two other models remain relevant as there may be both hope and worry about things to come.
The Tiananmen model of June 4, 1989, assumed that some heavy handed acts of the state's repressive apparatus might ultimately be found necessary and should be made acceptable internationally to resolve the crisis.
Indeed, the Chinese authorities effectively managed to preserve the very bases of the state, which were challenged by the students, and restored stability after changes in the state and party elite and limiting further social and economic damage of the three-month-long revolt.
Even in terms of its diplomatic consequences -- perhaps the most damaging effects Beijing had to suffer -- the situation seemed to be controllable after only some five to seven years.
Thus, at the end of the day, a monolithic regime was able to remain in place because the state found its recipe to restore the status quo by bloodily crushing the opposition forces.
The People Power of the EDSA highways in Manila in 1986, on the other hand, may be the reverse of the Chinese solution.
Popular anger against Ferdinand Marcos' dictatorship was expressed at all social levels. Political and spiritual leadership was manifested readily in the persons of the widow of the assassinated popular senator Benigno Aquino, Corazon Aquino, and Cardinal Jaime Sin.
Popular opposition platforms were ready and led by the left wing nationalistic front, the National Democratic Front (NDF), and other movements.
Since decades of Marcos' dictatorship had heavily politicized and radicalized the Filipino society, all one needed to do to oust the dictator, so to speak, was merely a few acts on the part of his generals to change sides. This happened at a crucial moment when General Fidel Ramos did just that.
However, the People Power movement also opened, and was soon threatened by, a momentum of continuing military rivalries and rebellions, with the Rambo game of Col. Gringo Honasan being the most well known example.
On a broader level, a significant divide occurred as well when the NDF boycotted Cory Aquino's first general election. Had theNDF not done so, the political landscape of the Philippines would have been very different.
Hence the new political game became a democratic one, but elitistic in nature. The EDSA revolution thus ended up in what some Filipinos called an "elitistic democracy".
In short, while both revolts were clearly supported by most sections of society, the mainly urban-based student revolt in China was too small and weak to face the state apparatuses.
In the Philippines, in contrast, the disobedience and revolt were truly mass based, while the state apparatuses were too weak and divided to effectively act against the social dissonances.
Jakarta's "May Revolution", as the student protests leading to the fall of Soeharto are now called, contained mixed elements. Like in China, the structural imbalances between the student movement and state apparatuses in Indonesia were obvious, although China, of course, is a party state in which the armed forces are subjugated under the party's leadership.
Like in China, the student rebellion was actively and implicitly widely supported by the society, but the state leadership in Indonesia -- both before and after the fall of Soeharto -- suffered from a much more serious crisis than their counterparts in China.
Symbolism emanating from student power in Jakarta and Beijing seemed to have created greater trouble and in so doing provoked a quicker act of the state than it did in Manila.
Like the Chinese, the Indonesian students chose the very locus of the power they challenged for their protest.
The building complex of the legislature and People's Consultative Assembly (DPR/MPR) at Senayan and the National Monument were supposed to signify the legitimacy of their protest against what they saw as the illegitimate people's representative and governmental bodies (although the planned gathering at the National Monument was canceled at the eleventh hour). Echoes of Jakarta in Pakistan and Zimbabwe emphasize this symbolic effect.
Much the same way, it was the legitimacy of the "Heavenly Peace Mandate" supposedly bestowed upon the government and parliament which the Chinese students challenged by occupying the Tiananmen ("The Great Square of Heavenly Peace").
No state government would tolerate such a pointed humiliation before the eyes of the world one minute longer than needed.
Hence, in Beijing, just like in Jakarta, the government was desperate to act quickly to end the international embarrassment: five days in the case of Jakarta and few months for Beijing.
In the Chinese case, however, there was little, if any, specific moral anger so deep as to precipitate an awakening of popular and middle classes movements like in Manila and Jakarta.
Certainly, the Chinese students and urban masses' struggle for freedom was motivated by a general protest against the monopolistic communist regime.
But the Tiananmen model lacked the great and specifically directed moral force manifested in the Philippines and Indonesia following, respectively, Aquino's cold-blooded killing and the tragic death of students at Trisakti University in Jakarta.
This explains the broader social support the Indonesian and Filipino protest movements gathered. But if China's model lacks specific crucial ingredients, the role of its armed forces represents a potential threat that could happen elsewhere in different way or at a later stage.
Indonesian opposition figure Amien Rais has claimed the reason he called off the mass gathering on the early morning of May 20th was that one Indonesian general warned him that "we too could do a Tiananmen blow".
If this is true, it may prove to be a significant aspect of Jakarta events that could remind us of China's way to end a state crisis. In the present day context of the post-Soeharto transition, uneasy and uncertain as it is, this potential also needs to be considered in the future.
Indonesia's Armed Forces (ABRI) played a decisive, but very cautious role. Gen. Syarwan Hamid, who as vice chairman of the legislature gave permission to the students to stage a big protest at the Senayan DPR/MPR complex, would not have done it without consent from the top. More importantly, at the top level, ABRI had during the crucial weeks in mid May "only" played a waiting game and finally agreed to ask Soeharto to step down.
However, as a big ally and key powerholder during the three decades of Soeharto rule, it is only natural that ABRI faced an internal crisis which only intensified as the national leadership crisis aggravated.
Salim Said and others pointed out that ABRI had gone through its own crises for some time and started accordingly to do what they promised: tut wuri handayani, playing a guiding social role from the back seat. In the era of globalization -- an era of "Reform or Die" -- there seemed to be no other choices for the ABRI top brass than to structurally adapt to the new situation.
Hence, like in the Philippines, the People Power action in Jakarta also tended to provoke and intensify the already existing military rivalries. The sudden fall of the commander of the Strategic Army Reserve (Kostrad), Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subijanto, would seem to strengthen the impression that Jakarta's events also had their own version of Gringo Honasan. Although the Honasan-like game in Jakarta could not be played out openly, the essential ingredients, like in Manila, were there.
They are to remain there as long as the Habibie government or its successor fails to restore its both domestic and international credibility and ability to guarantee the people's basic needs.
"The most important prerequisite to reform is... efficient and capable national leadership," said the ABRI chief of Sociopolitical Affairs, Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, recently. "I'd like to stress (the importance) of state leadership because it is of paramount importance in the campaign for reform" (The Jakarta Post May, 30, 1998).
At the end of Annus Mirabilis, the European "Year of Miracles" of 1989, a great number of students, joined and supported by human rights and church affiliated organizations marched in the city of Leipzig and Dresden chanting "Wir sind Das Volk," (We Are The (sic!) People).
It was a famous march of a prodemocracy movement that led to the fall of Erich Honnecker's communist regime in East Germany. The call effectively targeted the regime that claimed to be theonly true representative of the people.
The call for Reformasi Total from Senayan against a regime which refused to do real reforms, could have had deeper effects -- not only the fall of Soeharto, but also the real acts to fulfill the needs of the people and to start a democratization proses like in East Germany -- if the "Jakarta May Revolution" does not suffer too much from Chinese-like structural imbalance and the Philippines' Honasan-like maneuvering.
Like in Beijing, but unlike in Manila and Leipzig, the prodemocracy movement in Jakarta lacked a solid political platform to lead the momentum of change because the student protest was insulated as "a moral force" and the politicians were too divided. Conversely, the non-governmental and mass organizations were politically too weak as a result of Soeharto's three decades of repressive policy and its paralyzing impacts.
The writer is a journalist based in Amsterdam. He watched closely the events in Jakarta recently, in Manila in 1986-1987 and in Eastern Europe in 1989-1990.
Window: In the Philippines, in contrast the disobedience and revolt were truly mass based, while the state apparatuses were too weak and divided to effectively act against the social dissonances.