May, 21, 1998 marks the end of an autocratic regime
By Santi W.E. Soekanto
JAKARTA (JP): "I quit as president."
Those words were uttered by Soeharto when on May 21, 1998, he stepped aside and handed over the power that had been in his hands for 32 years to Vice President B.J. Habibie. Indonesia was in a fever, engulfed in massive, nationwide demonstrations led by students calling for political and economic reform.
Those words were music to millions of Indonesian ears here and abroad. Jubilant students -- especially the thousands who were still at the House of Representatives (DPR) building that they had been occupying for several days -- cheered, sang, wept, prostrated in gratitude, high-fived and slapped each other's back.
A mission previously deemed impossible, was accomplished: forcing Soeharto to bow out.
Those same words, however, were probably a curse for those who for the past three decades had hitched their wagons to Soeharto's powerful coattail. Politicians and business tycoons such as Muhammad "Bob" Hasan and Sudono Salim, who grew gargantuan because of Soeharto's protection, suddenly found the ground beneath them collapsed.
Those words heralded a breathing space so long denied to many, including the media. They were the ushering in of a time of liberation for some, of revenge for others, and of fear, may be, for yet others. Euphoria was soon followed by confusion and a loss of direction.
The year 1998 is certainly among the most historic in Indonesia's history, when an autocratic rule came to an end following massive upheavals that claimed the lives of 1,200 people and led to the violation of at least 76 women during the worst street riots to hit Jakarta and other major cities.
The trouble, of course, began much earlier but the boiling point was reached in May. President Soeharto, 77 years old, was probably feeling the clock ticking when he made an impassioned plea for stability -- which, in hindsight, looked pathetic -- shortly before he departed for a week-long trip to attend the G- 15 Summit in Cairo on May 9.
"I am leaving the country calm, hopeful that political and national stability can be maintained. I plead for people's understanding," he said.
Soeharto came home to a capital where thousands of buildings were charred in the May 13 and May 14 rioting, when public outrage over the shooting of four Trisakti University students on May 12 was palpable.
The man who had built the New Order's political system and was honored as the Father of Development tried to hold on the last shreds of his tattered power, summoning just about everybody that could come up with a piece of advice.
In the meantime, those who for years have been circling his orbit repositioned themselves. One of his oldest loyalists, House Speaker Harmoko, turned away and joined the escalating demands that he resign. Eleven ministers, including his long-time aide Ginandjar Kartasasmita, tendered their resignation.
"Enough is enough. Soeharto must go," said Muslim leader Amien Rais.
Analysts, however, believed the real turning point came on Wednesday night, May 20. Armed Forces Commander Gen. Wiranto went to Soeharto's Jl. Cendana residence to deliver a message on the behalf of the Armed Forces (ABRI) leadership -- which up until then had stood by Soeharto despite mounting calls for his resignation -- asking the president to resign.
It was reported that the military's top brass had met earlier Wednesday and decided the situation demanded the president stand down rather than face the possibility of an impeachment process.
The next morning, Soeharto said the country's situation had become such that it was impossible for him to carry out his state duties. "I hereby declare that I quit as president of the Republic of Indonesia, effective from the time I'm reading this statement today, Thursday, May 21, 1998."
After the ceremony, Soeharto congratulated Habibie, who is 16 years his junior. Habibie kissed the hand of the elder statesman, his onetime "super genius" political professor.
The "power" was thus transferred to a Soeharto loyalist, whose credibility was questioned by many, and who promised "gradual reforms" in the face of people's growing impatience.
Distance
Shortly after the transfer of power, most of the students took a breather and stopped demonstrating. Their elders -- reform leaders, scholars and just about anybody who was suddenly proreform -- took up where the students left off and continued the pressure on Habibie.
The new President consulted the House and on May 28, set up his political reform agenda, including the holding of a Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in November, and a general election and a presidential election in 1999.
By so doing, Habibie was indirectly acknowledging that his was merely a transitional administration and that he would not serve out the remainder of his tenure to 2003.
Over the course of seven months since May, however, he has swung back and forth. A few times he expressed his intention to run for reelection, only to change the tone the next time by saying he had no intention of remaining the head of state after 1999.
With growing criticism of his past record under Soeharto, Habibie made a display of his effort to distance himself from the former ruler.
He freed political prisoners. He eased control on the media. He allowed the establishment of organizations which proclaimed themselves to be "Habibie's opposition". He introduced a new set of political bills that were, at certain points, more relaxed than some government critics expected.
He introduced an opening that never existed before. The public responded and established their own political parties because they wanted to channel their political aspirations.
At last count, there were 107 new parties. Analysts, however, believed the serious contenders would still be the old three -- Golkar, the United Development Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party -- plus several new heavyweights, including Amien Rais' National Mandate Party, Abdurrahman Wahid's National Awakening Party and Yusril Ihza Mahendra's Crescent Star Party.
Critics and students wanted more. Habibie appeased them with a promise that he truly was different from Soeharto, and that he would have the guts to investigate the latter for alleged corruption and abuse of power.
It has been more than six months since Lt. Gen. A.M. Ghalib was installed the new attorney general on June 17, and he has only come up with the following statement regarding investigation into Soeharto: "Further checks are needed before Soeharto can be declared a suspect in a corruption case."
ABRI
The opening of the political space led to unprecedented pressure on Indonesia's most powerful institution -- the Armed Forces. Case upon case of military atrocities in many parts of the country during Soeharto's regime were revealed with rapidity.
East Timor, Irian Jaya and Aceh were found to have suffered the most because of the military operations there. Thousands had been killed or disappeared, widowed or orphaned. The unthinkable Chamber of Torture was even found in a village of North Aceh where men were killed and women were raped and brutalized. A young boy witnessed a military personnel shoot and scalp his father.
The Army's Special Force (Kopassus) came under the glaring public light when it was revealed that its officers were involved in the abduction and torture of political activists.
Armed Forces Commander Gen. Wiranto made all the appropriate gestures -- apologizing and promising stern measures against errant officers. Between August and October, he lifted the military operations status and withdrew combat troops from the three provinces. He visited victims and relatives of victims.
He took a step many management gurus would be proud of to save a failing company: repositioning (or at least promising to do so) the Armed Forces in the country's sociopolitical affairs.
After proclaiming its intention to take a backseat, however, ABRI forged ahead with its campaign to maintain a strong enough presence -- namely enough seats -- in the House of Representatives.
Reawakening
Around October, students across the country took to the streets again and brought down another heavy load of pressure on Habibie. Their demands varied, from the immediate convening of the general election, to Habibie and Wiranto's resignation.
Tensions surged in November around the Special Session, which was aimed at preparing decrees that would serve as the legal groundwork for a political reform agenda. Some of the students were against the session, others supported it with the condition that the legislators heed their voices.
ABRI handled the situation with its usual attitude. It deployed 25,000 military personnel and 125,000 civilians to safeguard the MPR/DPR compound where the country's 1,000 legislators were convening.
Students' attempts to enter and deliver their aspirations to the legislators in Jakarta were repeatedly blocked. Clashes between students and security personnel broke out on Nov. 12, but the tension came to a head the next day, Friday Nov. 13, when troops opened fire on the demonstrators.
Fourteen students and others died in the Black Friday incident even as legislators inside the compound were laughing at their successful completion of the session.
Indonesia mourned. But the students vowed they would continue.
Violence
Another ugly side to the seven-month-old Reformed Indonesia was the unleashed violence. Beginning in July, Banyuwangi and other East Java towns witnessed a series of horrendous murders of Muslim clerics and others suspected of practicing witchcraft.
The waves of murders spread to Central Java and West Java towns. They were started by a group of masked men, called "ninjas", but later changed into a frenzy of killing as residents attacked anyone they suspected of being a "ninja".
The public witnessed how easy it was to incite and breed violence. Two of the ugliest incidents occurred in November. The first was in Ketapang, West Jakarta, on Nov. 22, where residents attacked churches and 14 people died in the unrest. The second was in Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara, where residents attacked mosques and other facilities belonging to Muslims.
A fear of national disintegration prompted Muslim leader Abdurrahman Wahid to seek a national dialog with existing political forces. He met Habibie, Wiranto and even a former minister of defense known for wielding considerable political clout, Gen. (ret) L.B. "Benny" Moerdani.
The shocking development was that Abdurrahman, fondly known as Gus Dur, also met with Soeharto, at the latter's residence.
Why Soeharto, of all people? some people asked.
Abdurrahman's reason was because Soeharto still has lots of followers, still wields a strong political influence, and he is probably the reason why the murder spree in Banyuwangi and the violence in Ketapang and Kupang took place.
Abdurrahman may or may not be right. But ...
There. Seven months after he quit, Soeharto still has his hands everywhere.