Mass media a hero in the coverage of E. Timor

By Veven Sp Wardhana

JAKARTA (JP): The view of East Timor from Indonesia reminds one of the local adage "Far from the eye, but close to the heart," twisted parody-like into "Close to the eye, but far from the heart." This is particularly evident from various reports on this region carried in Indonesia's mass media ever since East Timor was integrated with Indonesia in 1975.

There are many reasons why this has been the case, one of which is the limited access to the territory and to the proindependence groups among Indonesian journalists. Also, various reports about East Timor have mostly come from the Indonesian government or military authorities.

In the case of the referendum, much of the coverage on East Timor kept away from problems related to refugees and the post- referendum future of the region. Coverage instead was geared toward the likelihood of a diplomatic war between the Indonesian and Australian governments -- complete with reports on demonstrations staged by Indonesians against Interfet (the International Force in East Timor), burning of Australian flags and demonstrations in front of the Australian embassy.

Some quarters stressed nationalism. It was aroused, among other things, by the shooting of a member of the police mobile brigade by Interfet troops in Mota Ain, the border area between East Timor and East Nusa Tenggara and the reported burning alive of prointegration militia by Interfet close to Dili's seaport, and also by emphasizing that most members of Interfet, including its commander-in-chief, were Australians.

A little further back, before the referendum and the referendum proper, allegations that the United Nations Mission in East Timor (Unamet) had practiced fraud and discrimination in the direct ballot had strengthened the conviction that Indonesian nationalism had actually been dallied with by foreign powers.

The question is: Were the facts presented by the media correct? Many quarters, for example, displayed near conviction in the case of the burning alive of some prointegration militia despite the denial made by Maj.Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, then the commander in East Timor following the announcement of martial law in the territory.

His denial did not receive wide coverage. As far as the denial was not reported, the reality accepted by the public was that the burning actually occurred.

In the same way, regarding the alleged discrimination practiced by Unamet, on Sept. 6, an electoral session was held in Dili to clarify the protests regarding allegations of fraud, in which they were unable to be proved. This did not gain much coverage either; the opinion shaped was that Unamet and the United Nations ignored the protests, leading to the arrogant image of the international institutions.

There are other facts that have not been reported, or have been removed from reports. Examples include the lack of reporting on the number of Interfet troops, said to be dominated by Australians, and also about Interfet itself.

The domination of Australians was inevitable considering that logistics requirements could be fulfilled only by the Australian side. This would be the better explanation than the suggested "unheeding" attitude of the United Nations to Indonesia's objection of having Interfet led and dominated by Australians.

Australian dominance in Interfet should also be understood in the light of inevitability on the part of the United Nations to ensure that Interfet would not fall into the trap of showing "solidarity" ala ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, toward Indonesia.

The Indonesian political elite were quoted as stating their hopes that most Interfet members should come from Southeast Asia, and should be led by Asians, presuming officers from the region would "better understand the Indonesian psychology."

This harked of similar phrases such as "a democracy particular to Indonesia," which has never solved problems.

The interest of the UN, which was not described in the mass media, reduced "objectiveness" in viewing the Interfet issue. Little understanding was given to the public that Interfet soldiers were indeed authorized to pursue militias who they were assigned to disarm. Pointing guns at disarmed civilians overpowered on the roads was inevitable for combat-ready troops.

The background given to the violence following the ballot in East Timor was largely limited to the explanation that it reflected fury among prointegration militia against Unamet after their loss in the direct ballot of Aug. 30. This was also conveyed in the analysis of military analyst Salim Said in a private television broadcast.

Hardly any background was provided about who the Falintil took up arms against -- some members of the media wrote that Falintil's enemy was the Indonesian Military but a larger portion of coverage was on demands that Falintil should also lay down their arms just like the prointegration militias. Such demands were therefore off the mark, leading to allegations that Interfet was discriminatory to the favor of Falintil.

Indeed, during the Soeharto regime, there was a missing link in the history of East Timor. The Soeharto administration and the military used to argue that this former Portuguese colony was geographically close and at the same time close at heart. The discourse which developed placed Portugal as an antagonist, similar to the way Indonesian history has placed the Dutch colonial rulers, the Japanese occupational troops and the Indonesian Communist Party. Those rejecting integration were also considered antagonists: Jose Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao, Jose Ramos Horta, the proindependence organization CNRT, Falintil, Fretilin and so forth.

Those taking sides with the proindependence groups were also regarded as adversaries, with the simple label of antinationalists. Unfortunately, the mass media also carried this discourse.

The reproduction of this military discourse was also seen from the choice of diction in reporting, for example, the shooting of a member of the police mobile brigade. Almost all television media here narrated the incident as "shooting of an Indonesian soldier", "Interfet attacks Indonesian troops", "Interfet attack in Indonesia's territory", "Interfet pursues militia" and "Interfet kills Mobile Brigade member." In the print media, among others the Kompas daily and Tempo weekly, the incident was described differently, namely "armed contact" or "armed conflict".

An attack is obviously different from armed contact. In the former version, Interfet is pictured as an aggressor -- on a par with the term chosen by then Foreign Minister Ali Alatas: transgression. From the discourse reproduced by the media, particularly the electronic media, the press not only did away with "covering both sides," but they were also coopted to place themselves as protagonists, or heroes, the role played by the Soeharto regime and the Indonesian Military.

The experience, shared by Indonesians condemning Australia and Interfet, brings to mind a hero which may be symbolized as Kumbokarno, a shadow puppet figure in the Ramayana epic story.

Kumbokarno, so the story goes, does his utmost to defend Burisrawa, his elder brother, who has kidnapped Sinta, Rama's wife, and taken her hostage. Kumbokarno may be compared with his other brother, Wibisono, who sides with Rama for the sake of truth. In a simple sentence, Kumbokarno's philosophy is "right or wrong is my country", while Wibisono stresses "right or wrong is right or wrong."

Unfortunately, "Kumbokarnoism" is found not only in Indonesia but also in the foreign media -- which is also guilty of simplification, by changing the role of the antagonist with that of the protagonist and the other way round.

The writer is coordinator of the Media Watch Program of the Institute of Studies on the Free Flow of Information, and also works for PT Gramedia Majalah in Jakarta

Window: ...the press not only did away with "covering both sides," but they were also coopted to place themselves as protagonists, or heroes, the role played by the Soeharto regime and the Indonesian Military.