Mass media a hero in the coverage of E. Timor
Mass media a hero in the coverage of E. Timor
By Veven Sp Wardhana
JAKARTA (JP): The view of East Timor from Indonesia reminds
one of the local adage "Far from the eye, but close to the
heart," twisted parody-like into "Close to the eye, but far from
the heart." This is particularly evident from various reports on
this region carried in Indonesia's mass media ever since East
Timor was integrated with Indonesia in 1975.
There are many reasons why this has been the case, one of
which is the limited access to the territory and to the
proindependence groups among Indonesian journalists. Also,
various reports about East Timor have mostly come from the
Indonesian government or military authorities.
In the case of the referendum, much of the coverage on East
Timor kept away from problems related to refugees and the post-
referendum future of the region. Coverage instead was geared
toward the likelihood of a diplomatic war between the Indonesian
and Australian governments -- complete with reports on
demonstrations staged by Indonesians against Interfet (the
International Force in East Timor), burning of Australian flags
and demonstrations in front of the Australian embassy.
Some quarters stressed nationalism. It was aroused, among
other things, by the shooting of a member of the police mobile
brigade by Interfet troops in Mota Ain, the border area between
East Timor and East Nusa Tenggara and the reported burning alive
of prointegration militia by Interfet close to Dili's seaport,
and also by emphasizing that most members of Interfet, including
its commander-in-chief, were Australians.
A little further back, before the referendum and the
referendum proper, allegations that the United Nations Mission in
East Timor (Unamet) had practiced fraud and discrimination in the
direct ballot had strengthened the conviction that Indonesian
nationalism had actually been dallied with by foreign powers.
The question is: Were the facts presented by the media
correct? Many quarters, for example, displayed near conviction in
the case of the burning alive of some prointegration militia
despite the denial made by Maj.Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, then the
commander in East Timor following the announcement of martial law
in the territory.
His denial did not receive wide coverage. As far as the denial
was not reported, the reality accepted by the public was that the
burning actually occurred.
In the same way, regarding the alleged discrimination
practiced by Unamet, on Sept. 6, an electoral session was held in
Dili to clarify the protests regarding allegations of fraud, in
which they were unable to be proved. This did not gain much
coverage either; the opinion shaped was that Unamet and the
United Nations ignored the protests, leading to the arrogant
image of the international institutions.
There are other facts that have not been reported, or have
been removed from reports. Examples include the lack of reporting
on the number of Interfet troops, said to be dominated by
Australians, and also about Interfet itself.
The domination of Australians was inevitable considering that
logistics requirements could be fulfilled only by the Australian
side. This would be the better explanation than the suggested
"unheeding" attitude of the United Nations to Indonesia's
objection of having Interfet led and dominated by Australians.
Australian dominance in Interfet should also be understood in
the light of inevitability on the part of the United Nations to
ensure that Interfet would not fall into the trap of showing
"solidarity" ala ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, toward Indonesia.
The Indonesian political elite were quoted as stating their
hopes that most Interfet members should come from Southeast Asia,
and should be led by Asians, presuming officers from the region
would "better understand the Indonesian psychology."
This harked of similar phrases such as "a democracy particular
to Indonesia," which has never solved problems.
The interest of the UN, which was not described in the mass
media, reduced "objectiveness" in viewing the Interfet issue.
Little understanding was given to the public that Interfet
soldiers were indeed authorized to pursue militias who they were
assigned to disarm. Pointing guns at disarmed civilians
overpowered on the roads was inevitable for combat-ready troops.
The background given to the violence following the ballot in
East Timor was largely limited to the explanation that it
reflected fury among prointegration militia against Unamet after
their loss in the direct ballot of Aug. 30. This was also
conveyed in the analysis of military analyst Salim Said in a
private television broadcast.
Hardly any background was provided about who the Falintil took
up arms against -- some members of the media wrote that
Falintil's enemy was the Indonesian Military but a larger portion
of coverage was on demands that Falintil should also lay down
their arms just like the prointegration militias. Such demands
were therefore off the mark, leading to allegations that Interfet
was discriminatory to the favor of Falintil.
Indeed, during the Soeharto regime, there was a missing link
in the history of East Timor. The Soeharto administration and the
military used to argue that this former Portuguese colony was
geographically close and at the same time close at heart. The
discourse which developed placed Portugal as an antagonist,
similar to the way Indonesian history has placed the Dutch
colonial rulers, the Japanese occupational troops and the
Indonesian Communist Party. Those rejecting integration were also
considered antagonists: Jose Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao, Jose
Ramos Horta, the proindependence organization CNRT, Falintil,
Fretilin and so forth.
Those taking sides with the proindependence groups were also
regarded as adversaries, with the simple label of
antinationalists. Unfortunately, the mass media also carried this
discourse.
The reproduction of this military discourse was also seen from
the choice of diction in reporting, for example, the shooting of
a member of the police mobile brigade. Almost all television
media here narrated the incident as "shooting of an Indonesian
soldier", "Interfet attacks Indonesian troops", "Interfet attack
in Indonesia's territory", "Interfet pursues militia" and
"Interfet kills Mobile Brigade member." In the print media, among
others the Kompas daily and Tempo weekly, the incident was
described differently, namely "armed contact" or "armed
conflict".
An attack is obviously different from armed contact. In the
former version, Interfet is pictured as an aggressor -- on a par
with the term chosen by then Foreign Minister Ali Alatas:
transgression. From the discourse reproduced by the media,
particularly the electronic media, the press not only did away
with "covering both sides," but they were also coopted to place
themselves as protagonists, or heroes, the role played by the
Soeharto regime and the Indonesian Military.
The experience, shared by Indonesians condemning Australia and
Interfet, brings to mind a hero which may be symbolized as
Kumbokarno, a shadow puppet figure in the Ramayana epic story.
Kumbokarno, so the story goes, does his utmost to defend
Burisrawa, his elder brother, who has kidnapped Sinta, Rama's
wife, and taken her hostage. Kumbokarno may be compared with his
other brother, Wibisono, who sides with Rama for the sake of
truth. In a simple sentence, Kumbokarno's philosophy is "right or
wrong is my country", while Wibisono stresses "right or wrong is
right or wrong."
Unfortunately, "Kumbokarnoism" is found not only in Indonesia
but also in the foreign media -- which is also guilty of
simplification, by changing the role of the antagonist with that
of the protagonist and the other way round.
The writer is coordinator of the Media Watch Program of the
Institute of Studies on the Free Flow of Information, and also
works for PT Gramedia Majalah in Jakarta
Window: ...the press not only did away with "covering both sides,"
but they were also coopted to place themselves as protagonists,
or heroes, the role played by the Soeharto regime and the
Indonesian Military.