Managing the military goes beyond maintaining loyalty

Managing the military goes beyond maintaining loyalty

The following are excerpts of an interview with Jun Honna,
assistant professor at the Faculty of International Relations of
Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto, who has studied the Indonesian
military for many years. He is a member of a Japanese government-
sponsored team studying Indonesia.

Question: How do you view the current position of the
Indonesian Military?

Answer: The military has dominated Indonesian politics for the
last 32 years, it is very difficult to change their mind-set.
Even today there are so many military officers who say we are in
the era of democratization, reform, but their mentality is that
of the New Order -- which (dictates) that the military must be
responsible to safeguard national integration.

That mentality is still very relevant today, which poses some
problems for the military, because they think that they are
responsible for national integration.

They are easily prompted to involve themselves in politics. So
without changing their mind-set it will be very difficult to
completely segregate them from the political arena ... even
though there are some reform-minded officers like Lt. Gen. Agus
Wirahadikusumah, Lt. Gen Agus Wijoyo ...

So you think there's hardly been any democratization in TNI?

Of course there have been some movements for reforms, but this
has been very gradual ... taking place only since the fall of
Soeharto. During the last three years the military have only
taken small steps like reducing the number of military
representatives in the legislature. They say that they no longer
have the military doctrine of dual function, but this change has
not been significant.

To democratize civil-military relations, we need to strengthen
the mechanism of civilian control. Without proper management of
the military it would be quite difficult to safeguard the
transition to democracy. So what Gus Dur (President Abdurrahman
Wahid) is doing these days is not civilian control, but political
control of the military ... a change of personnel to maintain the
loyalty of the military. But some people say that this is not
managed well (by Gus Dur). This (type of) control cannot be
inherited by the next president.

So far (the control on the military) is good, but once the
President has some problems, he or she will have to start from
the beginning. It means there is no institutional basis for
civilian control. That is a major problem.

What kind of control mechanism on the military would you
suggest?

There are some approaches for constitutional control. One is
the legal structure ... But there are only a few defense-related
laws. You have to complete the defense laws to ensure a civilian
control mechanism. So far the military defense policy is only
handled by military people. But civilians should get involved ...

At the military command level, the governor should be
involved, and at the national level, maybe a national security
council. (Policy making on defense) should be led by a
civilian ... But there are not enough civilian experts on
Indonesian defense policy now, so all defense policies are
dominated by military people ...

We need legal networking and also civilian involvement in the
policy decision process. Also, it is very important to change the
current educational curriculum in the military colleges, in the
Army Staff and Command School for example.

This is urgent as the education system is still the same,
which adheres to the doctrine that the military is defender of
the nation, and has the responsibility to safeguard the nation.
Its doctrine is modeled on a kind of heroism.

So they think that they are great people, that they are the
nation's guardians. But their actual role is limited by the
President. There is frustration (stemming from) a gap between
their expectations and their actual role. This has to be balanced
and to do this, we need to change the education.

Could you elaborate on remaining evidence of the dual
function?

Officially it has been abolished, but as an ideology it is
still there, which means that the military must be responsible in
national security -- which means (involvement in) politics.

In Indonesia defense and security is difficult to distinguish,
because there is no external threat, so national defense means
internal security.

The military these days say security is in the hands of
police, and military should concentrate on defense. However
actually defense includes internal security.

Internal security also means politics. They still think that
politics as an important issue which must involve the military.

Is there already a consensus between the police and military
on defense and security?

That is the problem. Politicians should make a very clear
distinction between the police and the military. But presently
they do not care, they just want to cut the role of the military,
to expand the civilian role.

But you need to give a respectable role to the military,
otherwise they will be frustrated. For example, dispatch officers
for international missions, or as peacekeeping forces and other
honorable jobs.

Is it only the military now which are best equipped to handle
the current violence.

We expect the police to handle this problem, but the number of
police is very small, we need to expand the police force to about
five times larger than it is now, but that would take about 10
years.

Speculations about a coup has surfaced during the current
political instability. Your comment?

Society is watching to see whether the military can maintain
stability; if they cannot control the situation, the people will
say we do not need the military.

As an institution, the current situation is a big challenge.
But the military now is not solid as an institution ...

For some factions in the military this is an advantage to
delay reforms, because political issues are dominated by the
issue of security ...

What is important now is to maintain stability. Some groups of
pro-status quo officers, who were involved in dirty activities in
the past, worry about the progress of reforms ...

These people do not like Gus Dur promoting political reform,
military reform. So if one stirs up problems in some local areas
to create instability, Gus Dur will only focus on that issue, and
would not have time to fight for reforms.

That is the scenario ...

Army Chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto has distanced himself from
the President. Would this reflect the stance of TNI?

It's not only him, I think most of the military officers do
not like Gus Dur. They do not trust him for several reasons. The
most important factor is Gus Dur's involvement in the military
personnel change. Gus Dur wants to pick loyalists like Agus
Wirahadikusumah and former army chief Gen. Tyasno Sudharto. That
upset many officers who think that they work seriously for
military, but Agus' promotion was just like an expressway.

It is quite understandable that many officers are not
satisfied with Gus Dur's handling of the military, and also his
security policy on Aceh and Irian Jaya ... for the military Gus
Dur has not been consistent.

For example he said, we had a referendum in East Timor -- why
not in Aceh, which made the Acehnese hopeful of gaining
independence.

In Irian Jaya he said the flag (of the Free Papua Movement)
could be raised and he also provided money for their congress.
(Irianese) could loudly voice their plans for independence; this
kind of management (of a country) makes the military unhappy.

Now strong authority is needed where there is none. Your
comment?

That is the problem of Gus Dur. He needs to secure TNI's
loyalty, but he is always criticized by politicians (inside and
outside the legislature). He needs to promote reform within the
military, but at the same time he also needs their loyalty to
maintain his survival.

Gus Dur has to bargain with the military. They sometimes have
stronger bargaining power than the president, because his
position is very vulnerable ...

Now his bargaining power with the military is declining. That
is why the military sometimes push Gus Dur as in the replacement
of Agus Wirahadikusumah.

However there is also the dilemma faced by the civilian
(government) during this transitional period. The military is
getting stronger. Former president B.J. Habibie also had the same
problem, because he had no support from the military, only from
Golkar, but Golkar (party) was no longer the majority.

Then Habibie became more dependent on Gen. Wiranto, and
Wiranto became very strong. This is not a personal problem, this
is a structural problem.

How do you view Endriartono's stance?

He belongs to the professional group. But the military is
different from that in the Philippines .... (where) the
professional or career officers means those who stick to
democracy and civilian supremacy. But in Indonesia professional
officers mean hardliners.

How do you see the overtures toward Vice President Megawati
Soekarnoputri by members of the military?

The relations between the military and Megawati are much
better than their relations with Gus Dur, because top military
officers believe that Megawati can share some of their basic
values, for instance national integration. Megawati is very
conservative. She understands the military's frustration with Gus
Dur, and that is why officers always consult Megawati regarding
policies.

But Megawati was also the victim of the military in the past.

She needs the support of the military too, otherwise once she
becomes President, it would be very difficult to maintain the
situation. Of course Megawati herself does not like certain
officers ... but her relations with current officers are very
good ... She always welcomes the generals who come to her house.
Military officers feel they now have easier access to her.

Is this because the military needs Gus Dur less now?

This is more of a tactical relationship. Military officers
think if they push Megawati, Megawati can push Gus Dur (into
making a policy). If they push Gus Dur directly, it can be taken
as disloyalty to the President ...

Megawati is very conservative compared to Gus Dur. This is one
reason why the military feels more comfortable talking to her.
Yet they also know that under Megawati there are the masses, her
supporters, who are strongly antimilitary.

They are radical students, NGOs, people originating from the
grass roots, many of whom were oppressed by the military in the
last 33 years ...

The military think that Megawati can be used right now in
lobbying Gus Dur. But once she becomes the President, the
military may also have problems with people with antimilitary
sentiments.

Does Megawati play her role in military affairs?

Yes, she coordinates relations between the military and the
President. The question is whether she can control the military.
But she can use her advisors. She is very close to officers
Hendropriyono and Agum Gumelar. She has some close friends in the
military too, like Agus Widjoyo, Ryamizard Ryacudu, chief of the
army's strategic reserves command.

How would you identify current factions within the military?

One is a group of officers close to Wiranto, and another group
is close to Agus Wirahadikusumah who still has some influence and
leads the pro-Gus Dur officers.

There are anti-Gus Dur officers led by Wiranto, they can also
be said to be close to the pro-status quo perspective. In the
middle there are people close to TNI Commander Adm. Widodo.
Widodo is the official leader, but their de facto leader is Agus
Wijoyo. They are very intellectual and moderate. It is
interesting because they are actually conducting military
reforms.

But they can't function significantly, because they are
sandwiched between the two opposing groups. Agus Wirahadikusumah
is very political, but actual reforms are conducted by Widodo and
Widjoyo.

Do you think Wiranto is still strong?

Yes, he still has influence in the military, because his
personal network is still there. He is stronger than the second
group under Widodo. Many officers are afraid of being punished
for their past human rights abuses in East Timor and in Aceh.
People in the special forces and in the army strategic reserves
command still worry. They are antireformist.

Not only in Indonesia, in many parts of the world, the
intelligence and special forces are antireformist ...

How long do you think the military can tolerate the current
condition? Do you think they will launch a coup?

I do not think there will be a coup, because there is an
agreement among the military leadership that a coup is too
risky ... (in) international relations. And actually there is no
need to stage a coup.

They just have to wait for Abdurrrahman's government to
collapse by itself. But the possibility (of a coup) is because of
the gray area regarding the constitutional way to replace the
head of state.

You can use the umbrella of the constitution and pressure the
civilian government, and undermine its power, and make the
government rely on the military.

For example, if the military decides to make problems, such as
(provoking) a demonstration in a number of cities, say in Medan,
Surabaya and other cities, they would tell the President that
they cannot control the situation any more and may ask the
President ... for special authority to handle the situation.

Will the current situation favor the military?

For ordinary people, whether it's the military or the police
(in power), what's important is stability. This is a very
important characteristic of Indonesia. Usually when an
authoritarian regime collapses, the important agenda is to
democratize the country, which means reducing the role of the
military.

But in the case of Indonesia, when Soeharto's regime
collapsed, what happened was not only democratization, but also
national disintegration. Other countries do not have (this)
problem. (Kornelius Purba)