Managing the military goes beyond maintaining loyalty

The following are excerpts of an interview with Jun Honna, assistant professor at the Faculty of International Relations of Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto, who has studied the Indonesian military for many years. He is a member of a Japanese government- sponsored team studying Indonesia.

Question: How do you view the current position of the Indonesian Military?

Answer: The military has dominated Indonesian politics for the last 32 years, it is very difficult to change their mind-set. Even today there are so many military officers who say we are in the era of democratization, reform, but their mentality is that of the New Order -- which (dictates) that the military must be responsible to safeguard national integration.

That mentality is still very relevant today, which poses some problems for the military, because they think that they are responsible for national integration.

They are easily prompted to involve themselves in politics. So without changing their mind-set it will be very difficult to completely segregate them from the political arena ... even though there are some reform-minded officers like Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, Lt. Gen Agus Wijoyo ...

So you think there's hardly been any democratization in TNI?

Of course there have been some movements for reforms, but this has been very gradual ... taking place only since the fall of Soeharto. During the last three years the military have only taken small steps like reducing the number of military representatives in the legislature. They say that they no longer have the military doctrine of dual function, but this change has not been significant.

To democratize civil-military relations, we need to strengthen the mechanism of civilian control. Without proper management of the military it would be quite difficult to safeguard the transition to democracy. So what Gus Dur (President Abdurrahman Wahid) is doing these days is not civilian control, but political control of the military ... a change of personnel to maintain the loyalty of the military. But some people say that this is not managed well (by Gus Dur). This (type of) control cannot be inherited by the next president.

So far (the control on the military) is good, but once the President has some problems, he or she will have to start from the beginning. It means there is no institutional basis for civilian control. That is a major problem.

What kind of control mechanism on the military would you suggest?

There are some approaches for constitutional control. One is the legal structure ... But there are only a few defense-related laws. You have to complete the defense laws to ensure a civilian control mechanism. So far the military defense policy is only handled by military people. But civilians should get involved ...

At the military command level, the governor should be involved, and at the national level, maybe a national security council. (Policy making on defense) should be led by a civilian ... But there are not enough civilian experts on Indonesian defense policy now, so all defense policies are dominated by military people ...

We need legal networking and also civilian involvement in the policy decision process. Also, it is very important to change the current educational curriculum in the military colleges, in the Army Staff and Command School for example.

This is urgent as the education system is still the same, which adheres to the doctrine that the military is defender of the nation, and has the responsibility to safeguard the nation. Its doctrine is modeled on a kind of heroism.

So they think that they are great people, that they are the nation's guardians. But their actual role is limited by the President. There is frustration (stemming from) a gap between their expectations and their actual role. This has to be balanced and to do this, we need to change the education.

Could you elaborate on remaining evidence of the dual function?

Officially it has been abolished, but as an ideology it is still there, which means that the military must be responsible in national security -- which means (involvement in) politics.

In Indonesia defense and security is difficult to distinguish, because there is no external threat, so national defense means internal security.

The military these days say security is in the hands of police, and military should concentrate on defense. However actually defense includes internal security.

Internal security also means politics. They still think that politics as an important issue which must involve the military.

Is there already a consensus between the police and military on defense and security?

That is the problem. Politicians should make a very clear distinction between the police and the military. But presently they do not care, they just want to cut the role of the military, to expand the civilian role.

But you need to give a respectable role to the military, otherwise they will be frustrated. For example, dispatch officers for international missions, or as peacekeeping forces and other honorable jobs.

Is it only the military now which are best equipped to handle the current violence.

We expect the police to handle this problem, but the number of police is very small, we need to expand the police force to about five times larger than it is now, but that would take about 10 years.

Speculations about a coup has surfaced during the current political instability. Your comment?

Society is watching to see whether the military can maintain stability; if they cannot control the situation, the people will say we do not need the military.

As an institution, the current situation is a big challenge. But the military now is not solid as an institution ...

For some factions in the military this is an advantage to delay reforms, because political issues are dominated by the issue of security ...

What is important now is to maintain stability. Some groups of pro-status quo officers, who were involved in dirty activities in the past, worry about the progress of reforms ...

These people do not like Gus Dur promoting political reform, military reform. So if one stirs up problems in some local areas to create instability, Gus Dur will only focus on that issue, and would not have time to fight for reforms.

That is the scenario ...

Army Chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto has distanced himself from the President. Would this reflect the stance of TNI?

It's not only him, I think most of the military officers do not like Gus Dur. They do not trust him for several reasons. The most important factor is Gus Dur's involvement in the military personnel change. Gus Dur wants to pick loyalists like Agus Wirahadikusumah and former army chief Gen. Tyasno Sudharto. That upset many officers who think that they work seriously for military, but Agus' promotion was just like an expressway.

It is quite understandable that many officers are not satisfied with Gus Dur's handling of the military, and also his security policy on Aceh and Irian Jaya ... for the military Gus Dur has not been consistent.

For example he said, we had a referendum in East Timor -- why not in Aceh, which made the Acehnese hopeful of gaining independence.

In Irian Jaya he said the flag (of the Free Papua Movement) could be raised and he also provided money for their congress. (Irianese) could loudly voice their plans for independence; this kind of management (of a country) makes the military unhappy.

Now strong authority is needed where there is none. Your comment?

That is the problem of Gus Dur. He needs to secure TNI's loyalty, but he is always criticized by politicians (inside and outside the legislature). He needs to promote reform within the military, but at the same time he also needs their loyalty to maintain his survival.

Gus Dur has to bargain with the military. They sometimes have stronger bargaining power than the president, because his position is very vulnerable ...

Now his bargaining power with the military is declining. That is why the military sometimes push Gus Dur as in the replacement of Agus Wirahadikusumah.

However there is also the dilemma faced by the civilian (government) during this transitional period. The military is getting stronger. Former president B.J. Habibie also had the same problem, because he had no support from the military, only from Golkar, but Golkar (party) was no longer the majority.

Then Habibie became more dependent on Gen. Wiranto, and Wiranto became very strong. This is not a personal problem, this is a structural problem.

How do you view Endriartono's stance?

He belongs to the professional group. But the military is different from that in the Philippines .... (where) the professional or career officers means those who stick to democracy and civilian supremacy. But in Indonesia professional officers mean hardliners.

How do you see the overtures toward Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri by members of the military?

The relations between the military and Megawati are much better than their relations with Gus Dur, because top military officers believe that Megawati can share some of their basic values, for instance national integration. Megawati is very conservative. She understands the military's frustration with Gus Dur, and that is why officers always consult Megawati regarding policies.

But Megawati was also the victim of the military in the past.

She needs the support of the military too, otherwise once she becomes President, it would be very difficult to maintain the situation. Of course Megawati herself does not like certain officers ... but her relations with current officers are very good ... She always welcomes the generals who come to her house. Military officers feel they now have easier access to her.

Is this because the military needs Gus Dur less now?

This is more of a tactical relationship. Military officers think if they push Megawati, Megawati can push Gus Dur (into making a policy). If they push Gus Dur directly, it can be taken as disloyalty to the President ...

Megawati is very conservative compared to Gus Dur. This is one reason why the military feels more comfortable talking to her. Yet they also know that under Megawati there are the masses, her supporters, who are strongly antimilitary.

They are radical students, NGOs, people originating from the grass roots, many of whom were oppressed by the military in the last 33 years ...

The military think that Megawati can be used right now in lobbying Gus Dur. But once she becomes the President, the military may also have problems with people with antimilitary sentiments.

Does Megawati play her role in military affairs?

Yes, she coordinates relations between the military and the President. The question is whether she can control the military. But she can use her advisors. She is very close to officers Hendropriyono and Agum Gumelar. She has some close friends in the military too, like Agus Widjoyo, Ryamizard Ryacudu, chief of the army's strategic reserves command.

How would you identify current factions within the military?

One is a group of officers close to Wiranto, and another group is close to Agus Wirahadikusumah who still has some influence and leads the pro-Gus Dur officers.

There are anti-Gus Dur officers led by Wiranto, they can also be said to be close to the pro-status quo perspective. In the middle there are people close to TNI Commander Adm. Widodo. Widodo is the official leader, but their de facto leader is Agus Wijoyo. They are very intellectual and moderate. It is interesting because they are actually conducting military reforms.

But they can't function significantly, because they are sandwiched between the two opposing groups. Agus Wirahadikusumah is very political, but actual reforms are conducted by Widodo and Widjoyo.

Do you think Wiranto is still strong?

Yes, he still has influence in the military, because his personal network is still there. He is stronger than the second group under Widodo. Many officers are afraid of being punished for their past human rights abuses in East Timor and in Aceh. People in the special forces and in the army strategic reserves command still worry. They are antireformist.

Not only in Indonesia, in many parts of the world, the intelligence and special forces are antireformist ...

How long do you think the military can tolerate the current condition? Do you think they will launch a coup?

I do not think there will be a coup, because there is an agreement among the military leadership that a coup is too risky ... (in) international relations. And actually there is no need to stage a coup.

They just have to wait for Abdurrrahman's government to collapse by itself. But the possibility (of a coup) is because of the gray area regarding the constitutional way to replace the head of state.

You can use the umbrella of the constitution and pressure the civilian government, and undermine its power, and make the government rely on the military.

For example, if the military decides to make problems, such as (provoking) a demonstration in a number of cities, say in Medan, Surabaya and other cities, they would tell the President that they cannot control the situation any more and may ask the President ... for special authority to handle the situation.

Will the current situation favor the military?

For ordinary people, whether it's the military or the police (in power), what's important is stability. This is a very important characteristic of Indonesia. Usually when an authoritarian regime collapses, the important agenda is to democratize the country, which means reducing the role of the military.

But in the case of Indonesia, when Soeharto's regime collapsed, what happened was not only democratization, but also national disintegration. Other countries do not have (this) problem. (Kornelius Purba)