Managing the Asia-Pacific quadrangle

Managing the Asia-Pacific quadrangle

The sixth informal annual workshop on Managing Potential
Conflicts in the South China Sea is scheduled to open in the East
Kalimantan city of Balikpapan today. Noted political scientist
Juwono Sudarsono looks at the issue from a geo-political
perspective.

JAKARTA (JP): China, Russia, Japan and the United States
constitute the evolving strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific
region. Within this political, economic and military nexus lies
the most promising post-Cold War economic phenomenon as well as
the most intractable remnant of Cold War rivalry.

More than 40 percent of the world's trade is conducted in and
through the region. Intra-Pacific trade increases by 15 percent
annually. At the same time, the Oct. 23, 1994, Agreed Framework
on Korea attests to the reality that the overall politico-
security dimension has a direct bearing on the region's future
growth.

The importance of the strategic quadrangle is only partially
reflected by the current assessments being undertaken by the four
major powers. The United States and Russia continue to cooperate
in joint conventional military exercises as part of confidence
and security-building measures in the post-Cold War era.
Confidence-building between the two major nuclear powers
constitutes an important follow-through to the strategic arms
reduction agreement reached five years ago.

On the other hand, the Asia-Pacific region is gearing up to
the gradual but perceptible rise in the political and military
importance of Japan and China. A delicate balance of interests is
evolving within the strategic quadrangle as these two Asian
powers reposition themselves to an increasingly Asian-centered
security environment. The new environments in Northeast Asia and
the South China Sea will be profoundly affected by the
reassessment of the major powers' strategic intent, particularly
with regard to maritime policy and naval strategy.

For Russia and United States, the main concern centers on
adjusting strategy from one that was aimed at naval engagement
based on global competition in the high seas to one that focuses
on coastal, near-shore and littoral region conflicts. For their
part, Japan and China are aiming to enhance their political and
military influence through increased force modernization and
naval capability to move beyond coastal defense.

These moves are made more acute by competition for sea-based
resources and burgeoning off-shore markets across the Asia
Pacific economies. China's continued participation in the current
(Oct. 10-13) Balikpapan workshop on managing conflict in the
South China Sea is a welcome indication of its commitment to
explore solutions based on broad agreements of "rules of the
road" as stipulated in the 1982 Law of the Sea rather than on
unilateral claims of territorial jurisdiction.

The workshop on the South China Sea, though not a negotiating
forum, remains of considerable importance. It reaffirms the
viability of an informal intra-Pacific dialog, which, by chance,
complements the defused situation in Northeast Asia arising from
the implementation of the Agreed Framework on Korea.

The rapid rise in intra-Asia-Pacific trade and investments has
underscored the importance of seaborne commerce and its
implications on naval strategy, tactics and the procurement of
weapons systems. Worldwide, maritime commerce accounts for over
80 percent of trade among nations, exceeding 3.6 billion tons a
year. Fishing is likewise concentrated in coastal waters and
reached 100 million metric tons in 1992-93. The creation of
200-mile exclusive economic zones has not been accompanied by
increased attention to the depletion of fishstocks and damage to
the environment.

Given the renewed attention to contemporary ocean issues
arising from competition for energy resources and market access,
it would be appropriate for an Asia-Pacific multilateral advisory
committee to be drawn from all sectors of the ocean industry.
This would include representatives from coastal and distant-water
fishing, processing industries, off-shore oil and gas interests,
the shipping industry and the maritime science community, all of
whom would map out further guidelines and possible benchmarks.

The ASEAN states can play an important role in testing such
informal devices which might, depending on the circumstances,
later be transformed into a full-fledged negotiating forum on
joint authority exploration.

The United States, Russia, Japan and China must commit
themselves to a broader array of intersecting peacetime roles:
strategic presence, sea control, crisis response, sea-lift
capability and counter-narcotics operations. The United States'
willingness to secure Japan's economic lifeline is a positive
indication that common objectives could be achieved through the
recognition of a strategic agreement among all the powers
concerned.

Adherence to the Law of the Sea framework is but one step in
the continuous effort to manage political, economic and security
arrangements affecting the delicate but crucial strategic
quadrangle among the major powers.

The writer is Vice Governor of Lemhannas, the National Resilience
Institute, Jakarta.