Making sense of Beijing's conduct in S. China Sea

Making sense of Beijing's conduct in S. China Sea

By Santo Darmosumarto

JAKARTA (JP): Last week, quarrels broke out again between
China and the Philippines after the latter protested the presence
of Chinese fishing boats around Scarborough Shoal in the Spratly
Islands, just 128 miles west of Luzon.

In recent years, the Philippine Navy has repeatedly
intercepted Chinese fishermen encroaching in its waters; at
times, violence has broken out when these fishing boats were
boarded. The frequency of incidents raises serious concern
because the area is known as a possible flashpoint for regional
conflict.

Beijing has not been responsive to Manila's protests; the
Chinese simply claim that they hold no responsibility over its
citizens' private conduct in the South China Sea. However,
experts argue that, in the long term, China may actually benefit
from its continued inaction.

Considering the potential for unwanted, region-wide alarm
caused by the use of direct military force, the Chinese are
seemingly trying to extend their influence by establishing a
maritime frontier based on non-military strategy.

Expansion through "frontier" strategy can be traced to the Qin
Dynasty (221-207 B.C.). At that time, the Chinese State had not
yet been fully consolidated and was vulnerable to foreign
encroachment. China's military deficiencies and questions
regarding the depth to which it could penetrate an un-Chinese and
physically challenging terrain constricted movement beyond the
Great Wall (Lattimore, 1940).

A "frontier-style" expansion was therefore adopted and it
mainly consisted of non-military approaches such as extending
diplomacy, transport routes, trade activities and agricultural
settlements. Although the push for expansion was primarily a
state effort, the involvement of private and unofficial
enterprise was crucial.

Presently, the expansion scheme of the People's Republic of
China (PRC) seemingly emulates that of the Qin Dynasty. Indeed,
the levels of statehood in China during these two periods are
different; the same can be said about the conduct of
international relations then and now.

Nevertheless, the above conditions justify interpreting the
comparison as a means to understanding China's resolve in
situations of military weakness.

Both Inner Asia and the South China Sea are strategically
located as platforms for expanding Chinese hegemony and trade.

However, China has neither the political leverage compared to
its surrounding neighbors, nor the absolute military power to
engage in such a policy. Chinese rulers wanted to expand into
Inner Asia partly because of the area's strategic location along
the "silk route", which served as a major trade link between
China and Europe.

They did not necessarily aspire for direct control over the
area, consisting of rugged, uninhabitable land, but rather to
make it part of their frontier zone.

The same can be said about the South China Sea where most of
its land features are uninhabitable. China's interest mainly
lies in establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone surrounding each
island or reef.

In spite of the basin's resources such as fish, oil and
minerals, China's interest is mainly based on the area's
strategic location. The establishment of Chinese hegemony, even
through indirect control, will infer domination over these
trading lanes as well as allow for potential to expand influence
further into the region.

Presently, preference for a "frontier-style" expansion is
reflected in Beijing's reluctance to specify claims in the South
China Sea. With this strategy, the Chinese avoid limiting their
gains to only a particular island or reef.

The most important consideration is to ensure that China's
dominance becomes prevalent enough for it to hold sway over most
activities within the disputed area. To achieve this, China
cannot simply rely on its military might -- doing so would not
only impose excessive stress on its limited capabilities, but
also cause region-wide alarm. Therefore, the intensified
presence of non-military Chinese nationals and the employment of
"unconventional" strategies become invaluable.

Beijing has not remained idle in sustaining the consequential
benefits of its private citizens' activities. For example, in
order to encourage a higher presence of Chinese fishermen around
the Spratlys, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has built
shelters for them on land features that China currently occupies.

The Chinese have also constructed stations supposedly for
scientific purposes; however, when observed from air-surveillance
photos, these structures resemble military fortifications.

The most alarming concern, however, is the perception that
China is allowing piratical activities to flourish in the area.
Between 1994 and 1998, numerous reports noted a high occurrence
of piracy committed by Chinese citizens, often wearing military
fatigues and carrying small arms.

It is questionable that the pirates conduct their activities
with the calculated intention of extending China's maritime
jurisdiction; however, the fact that the central government is
not doing enough to deter these activities poses a strong cause
for concern.

Through establishment of a "reign of terror", Chinese pirates
are indirectly exerting Chinese influence over the disputed
territory. If these accusations are true, the PRC would not be
the first to engage in such a strategy because European colonial
powers frequently took advantage of piratical activities for
similar purposes in the region.

Although the military plays an important role in consolidating
and sustaining state goals, Chinese leaders also value non-
military methods which might subdue an opponent without requiring
military engagement.

Normally credited to a sixth century strategist, Sun Zi, the
above concept has been very popular in East Asia, especially
among Chinese, Japanese and Vietnamese, leaders. Although
derived from Chinese history, this analogy provides a reference
for understanding the China's present strategic behavior.

Deceit, manipulation and other non-military courses allow a
chance for the military to build strength. They are also
essential elements of delaying tactics, waiting for change in the
balance of power, or for the enemy to shoot itself in the foot.

With time, the enemy will hopefully lower its guard --
revealing its intentions, strengths and weaknesses -- thus
allowing one's military to exploit available opportunities.

The application of Sun Zi's thinking benefits countries that
are politically or militarily at a relative disadvantage.
Although China's military power and political influence are
growing, it is not yet strong enough to be considered as the
undisputed regional power.

The United States has not completely withdrawn from the
region, Japan remains an influential economic giant, and China's
main rivals in the South China Sea often unite under the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Furthermore, despite PLAN's growing potential for projecting
power, years of inactivity and lack of government attention have
left a large development gap that is only slowly being closed by
recent weapons acquisitions and doctrinal changes.

In the past, Chinese policymakers believed that by
incorporating Inner Asia into its "frontier" realm, direct
hegemony would follow naturally. Physical control of the whole
South China Sea is certainly desired, but for the time being,
China appears comfortable with aspiring to establish a strong
presence through the employment of "unconventional" and non-
military strategies.

The attainment of state goals by turning a blind eye on
illegal fishing and piracy is a example of the "tao (way) of
deception". Without disengaging from the disputed area, the
state strengthens its military forces while waiting for the right
moment to pounce on favorable shifts in the region's political
and security climate.

The writer is a Jakarta-based analyst and researcher of
Southeast Asian security issues.