Making sense of Beijing's conduct in S. China Sea

By Santo Darmosumarto

JAKARTA (JP): Last week, quarrels broke out again between China and the Philippines after the latter protested the presence of Chinese fishing boats around Scarborough Shoal in the Spratly Islands, just 128 miles west of Luzon.

In recent years, the Philippine Navy has repeatedly intercepted Chinese fishermen encroaching in its waters; at times, violence has broken out when these fishing boats were boarded. The frequency of incidents raises serious concern because the area is known as a possible flashpoint for regional conflict.

Beijing has not been responsive to Manila's protests; the Chinese simply claim that they hold no responsibility over its citizens' private conduct in the South China Sea. However, experts argue that, in the long term, China may actually benefit from its continued inaction.

Considering the potential for unwanted, region-wide alarm caused by the use of direct military force, the Chinese are seemingly trying to extend their influence by establishing a maritime frontier based on non-military strategy.

Expansion through "frontier" strategy can be traced to the Qin Dynasty (221-207 B.C.). At that time, the Chinese State had not yet been fully consolidated and was vulnerable to foreign encroachment. China's military deficiencies and questions regarding the depth to which it could penetrate an un-Chinese and physically challenging terrain constricted movement beyond the Great Wall (Lattimore, 1940).

A "frontier-style" expansion was therefore adopted and it mainly consisted of non-military approaches such as extending diplomacy, transport routes, trade activities and agricultural settlements. Although the push for expansion was primarily a state effort, the involvement of private and unofficial enterprise was crucial.

Presently, the expansion scheme of the People's Republic of China (PRC) seemingly emulates that of the Qin Dynasty. Indeed, the levels of statehood in China during these two periods are different; the same can be said about the conduct of international relations then and now.

Nevertheless, the above conditions justify interpreting the comparison as a means to understanding China's resolve in situations of military weakness.

Both Inner Asia and the South China Sea are strategically located as platforms for expanding Chinese hegemony and trade.

However, China has neither the political leverage compared to its surrounding neighbors, nor the absolute military power to engage in such a policy. Chinese rulers wanted to expand into Inner Asia partly because of the area's strategic location along the "silk route", which served as a major trade link between China and Europe.

They did not necessarily aspire for direct control over the area, consisting of rugged, uninhabitable land, but rather to make it part of their frontier zone.

The same can be said about the South China Sea where most of its land features are uninhabitable. China's interest mainly lies in establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone surrounding each island or reef.

In spite of the basin's resources such as fish, oil and minerals, China's interest is mainly based on the area's strategic location. The establishment of Chinese hegemony, even through indirect control, will infer domination over these trading lanes as well as allow for potential to expand influence further into the region.

Presently, preference for a "frontier-style" expansion is reflected in Beijing's reluctance to specify claims in the South China Sea. With this strategy, the Chinese avoid limiting their gains to only a particular island or reef.

The most important consideration is to ensure that China's dominance becomes prevalent enough for it to hold sway over most activities within the disputed area. To achieve this, China cannot simply rely on its military might -- doing so would not only impose excessive stress on its limited capabilities, but also cause region-wide alarm. Therefore, the intensified presence of non-military Chinese nationals and the employment of "unconventional" strategies become invaluable.

Beijing has not remained idle in sustaining the consequential benefits of its private citizens' activities. For example, in order to encourage a higher presence of Chinese fishermen around the Spratlys, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has built shelters for them on land features that China currently occupies.

The Chinese have also constructed stations supposedly for scientific purposes; however, when observed from air-surveillance photos, these structures resemble military fortifications.

The most alarming concern, however, is the perception that China is allowing piratical activities to flourish in the area. Between 1994 and 1998, numerous reports noted a high occurrence of piracy committed by Chinese citizens, often wearing military fatigues and carrying small arms.

It is questionable that the pirates conduct their activities with the calculated intention of extending China's maritime jurisdiction; however, the fact that the central government is not doing enough to deter these activities poses a strong cause for concern.

Through establishment of a "reign of terror", Chinese pirates are indirectly exerting Chinese influence over the disputed territory. If these accusations are true, the PRC would not be the first to engage in such a strategy because European colonial powers frequently took advantage of piratical activities for similar purposes in the region.

Although the military plays an important role in consolidating and sustaining state goals, Chinese leaders also value non- military methods which might subdue an opponent without requiring military engagement.

Normally credited to a sixth century strategist, Sun Zi, the above concept has been very popular in East Asia, especially among Chinese, Japanese and Vietnamese, leaders. Although derived from Chinese history, this analogy provides a reference for understanding the China's present strategic behavior.

Deceit, manipulation and other non-military courses allow a chance for the military to build strength. They are also essential elements of delaying tactics, waiting for change in the balance of power, or for the enemy to shoot itself in the foot.

With time, the enemy will hopefully lower its guard -- revealing its intentions, strengths and weaknesses -- thus allowing one's military to exploit available opportunities.

The application of Sun Zi's thinking benefits countries that are politically or militarily at a relative disadvantage. Although China's military power and political influence are growing, it is not yet strong enough to be considered as the undisputed regional power.

The United States has not completely withdrawn from the region, Japan remains an influential economic giant, and China's main rivals in the South China Sea often unite under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Furthermore, despite PLAN's growing potential for projecting power, years of inactivity and lack of government attention have left a large development gap that is only slowly being closed by recent weapons acquisitions and doctrinal changes.

In the past, Chinese policymakers believed that by incorporating Inner Asia into its "frontier" realm, direct hegemony would follow naturally. Physical control of the whole South China Sea is certainly desired, but for the time being, China appears comfortable with aspiring to establish a strong presence through the employment of "unconventional" and non- military strategies.

The attainment of state goals by turning a blind eye on illegal fishing and piracy is a example of the "tao (way) of deception". Without disengaging from the disputed area, the state strengthens its military forces while waiting for the right moment to pounce on favorable shifts in the region's political and security climate.

The writer is a Jakarta-based analyst and researcher of Southeast Asian security issues.