Make the best of broadcasting body
Bayu Wicaksono, Civil Society Alliance for Democracy (Yappika), Jakarta
What fear do practitioners and businessmen actually have about the broadcasting bill? Businessmen tend to fear the implementation of this law, especially regarding the articles on cross ownership, capital and the establishment of a working agency, which some say is likely to act like a "monster" owing to its unlimited authority and obligations.
Articles 34 - 36 of Chapter V of the broadcasting bill set forth in great detail the tasks, obligations and rights of this agency, the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, or KPI.
In Indonesia, a commission is commonly plagued by corruption, collusion and nepotism. It works just like a handful of people enjoying full power and legitimacy from the state. Fundamentally, many commissions are legally flawed in their establishment. Just look at the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) or the rampant rumors of corruption in the National Commission on Human Rights.
To date, only the National Law Commission is still free from rumors about corruption and the like, but it is not unlikely that there are also loopholes for such bad practices. Aren't members of a commission selected on the basis of their individual capacity? In their routine job, commission members only represent the community but is not morally accountable to the community, who have reportedly made them commission members.
KPI will also be in a similar situation. If it is not clear who has selected and appointed its members, it is often the case that these members will not be able to tell which community they represent. Besides, they cannot give their accountability report as the House of Representatives, the body doing the screening for candidate members, know next to nothing about these people and in what interest they have applied to be KPI members. If they are nominated, who nominated them? Then, to whom is a KPI member accountable to?
The broadcasting bill has, of late, become one of the hottest topics of discussion involving even the National Commission on Human Rights. KPI has often been called a terrifying monster. In fact, the motive for the establishment of the KPI is to empower civil society and make them capable of taking care of themselves. This means that the state delegates all the rulings to the community by according legal legitimacy to a commission which can play a full role. Article 34 sub-article (1) states that "The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission draws a guideline of conduct for broadcasting practices called a broadcasting conduct guide."
Given the poor performance of commissions in Indonesia, it is only proper to find a breakthrough in the establishment of the KPI. The risk of collusion and corruption would be minimized because the membership of the KPI comprises institutions which have been statutory bodies for a minimum of two years. If individuals are to be appointed members of the KPI, the candidates must be nominated by at least two institutions under the same criteria. When an institution has become a statutory body for two years, this means that it has been legally validated and recognized by the state for two years. The period of two years has been included merely to avoid any illegal freeloaders with their personal interests.
If there is insistence that members of KPI must be individuals, the regulation and requirements referred to earlier must continue to be enforced. If someone wishes to be a member of the KPI, he must be proposed by at least two institutions which have become statutory bodies for two years.
The broadcasting bill does not explicitly mention the mechanism of the appointment of the KPI members. That is why suspicion has arisen. Who will be members of this commission? The articles about the KPI do not state who is entitled to be members of the KPI, let alone the mechanism of their appointment.
The fear about the KPI has come only from capital owners. As this commission will have great authority, rights and obligations, it has come as no surprise that there are people who will be worried about the performance of this commission later. Then this worry will finally become a fear and this fear will turn into a rejection. Rejection will lead to constraints.
Therefore, the selection process of the KPI members, either individual or institutional, must be strict. Since the KPI will always be linked with the likelihood of collusion and corruption, the fit and proper test for its candidates should be held as soon as this bill is ratified. Article 61 sub-article (3) of Chapter IX on Transitional Stipulation states that "The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission must be established, at the latest, one year after the promulgation of this law."
The most important of all is that if the KPI does not come into being, it would be the state that has the authority and power to control the broadcasting business. If this happens, we will witness history repeating itself as the press will be in the clutches of the state.