M. Riefqi Muna

Member, Supervisory Group Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) riefqi@gmx.net Jakarta

Indonesia is the largest maritime or archipelagic state in the world. The legal framework recognizing this status follows Indonesia's ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982.

UNCLOS provided a legal foundation for Indonesia to exercise its sovereignty over its entire, internationally recognized territory. Before the ratification we did not have fixed borders except for the islands scattering from Sabang, in Aceh, to Merauke, in Papua.

That the country is an archipelagic state with thousands of islands should have direct implication on its defense policy. Yet our defense system is based on the principle of continental defense, called the Major Islands Defense System (Sistem Pertahanan Pulau Besar), considered by many to be the best approach for our defense. Yet the land-based strategy has been contaminated by the economic adventures of the army.

The major islands defense system is believed to be greatly influenced by the classic or "traditional" land-warfare principle, which relies on guerrilla activities, dating back to the struggle for independence since the 1940s. This is totally incompatible with the promotion of a professional military orientation, which aims to prevent even a single enemy trespassing our soil.

Continuing the land-based system is also outdated from the view of what is called the revolution in military affairs. The theory of war itself is changing -- while officers from the air force or navy do not have courage to criticize the army domination. The objectives and orientation of the new system should be changed by leaving behind the army's hegemony over the country's political sphere.

In early 2002 the House of Representatives (DPR) passed into Law No. 3/2002 on National Defense. Article 3 of the Law states, "The defense policy has to consider the geographical reality that Indonesia is an archipelagic state".

This article should become the legal basis for the future defense system, which comprises the doctrine on national defense and the organization of the defense forces. The defense system must be based on proper defense requirements, instead of mere historical romanticism of the revolutionary period.

The nation's history will influence the culture relating to strategy. Any military doctrine should recognize such a culture, and that it is subject to revision. History is a matter of fact, not an entitlement; a military doctrine is not static and is not an ideology. The doctrine is subject to evaluation and revision in the face of the need to adapt to a new international or domestic environment, which includes the technological side.

The law on national defense is thus a wake-up call to our strategic planners. A defense policy of any state must consider the type, nature and the degree of threats. This condition will also influence the doctrine at all levels, from the combined operational doctrine to the doctrine of each unit in the defense apparatus.

Further, the defense posture and structure should always be adapted to possible changes in the security environment. Yet the strategic thinking during the New Order period still has a strong influence over the culture and mentality of top military officers.

The development of a proper defense system that gives more attention to the navy and air force still faces resistance particularly from the army, whose officers say that our major threats are still internal threats. They also argue that the navy and air force require expensive equipment.

This is true, while it still shows the remaining dominance of the army over the blue-print for our defense policy. This year the army proposed a further increase of soldiers, which entirely contradicts our actual defense needs.

Instead of more troops we need more rapid deployment forces (RDF) that are mobile and ready to be deployed across the archipelago whenever needed.

Moreover, the world political context is changing and so is that of Indonesia. The types of threats are proliferating, beyond classical military duties. Officers are now expected to pay close attention and be professional in regards to human rights. They represent the state; soldiers must hence protect all Indonesians, not only the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Human security therefore cannot be violated at the expense of "state security" -- as is still understood by many civilians as well as military officers. Changing that mentality, in many cases that the people are the enemy, is perhaps the hardest task in reforming the armed forces.

We now lack adequate power and capability to encounter major threats at sea. First, the sea-based threats are mostly of transnational security threats -- such as individual smugglers and terrorists. Secondly, our navy has very limited equipment, even in guarding our territorial boundaries. Our waters are a haven for foreign illegal fishing -- leading to an estimated loss of US$3.5 billion this year so far due to illegal fishing. Worse, air surveillance is lacking.

The threat of piracy has also increased and we have the world's most sea crimes. The International Maritime Bureau reported that from 285 cases of piracy this year, 117 were committed in Indonesian waters.

Other rampant crimes in our waters are illegal migration, drug trafficking, and smuggling of small arms and other commodities.

The Ministry of Defense is now formulating three major reports for our defense policy. The first is the Defense White Paper, a short-term policy on our defense for the next two years. Secondly, the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) is being prepared, aimed to prepare Indonesia's defense forces for the next 10 to 15 years.

Third, the ministry will review the draft of the bill on the TNI to replace the outdated Law No. 1998.

The SDR is the most crucial and basic policy review regarding Indonesia's defense. It will evaluate in detail our current policy and will take into account threat scenarios and normative calculations for defense planning. The SDR will have to paint a broad picture of the identity of the maritime state in its defense policy. The review will also recognize that the economic burden to develop sea potential and air power is the most crucial compared to developing other areas of defense.

However, the approach has to be directed not to enhance the deployment of warships, but rather the basic need for our navy to guard our territory. High speed patrol boats could better secure our Exclusive Economic Zone.

Additionally, our air force must be developed modestly. Indonesia's security will rely more on naval and air power. The air power could help the navy and army in surveillance. We do not need dozens of air-attack squadrons such as F-16s or even more sophisticated fighters. Indonesia needs more C-130 cargo and troop carriers to deploy our troops and police personnel whenever and wherever needed in a very short time. Better surveillance technology will help the navy patrol the boundaries.

Indonesia remains vulnerable to communal conflicts and separatism. The orientation of the army's operation needs to be changed, an effort which should refer to the government agreements with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

The use of force which is increasingly unpopular must become the last resort and must be carried out through a political decision.

Indonesia is also a member of the international community that must guard global peace through peacekeeping missions. Consequently, Indonesia should develop special training in peacekeeping operations especially for its army. Those with good skills, a high level of professionalism and good command of English could be standing forces for missions of the United Nations.

Those lacking necessary language skills could serve in military operations other than wars such as humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, and other models of civic mission.

Proper reform of a defense system requires time and serious cooperation between the army, air force and navy -- and indeed the civilian authority who must determine the relevant policies.

The writer is also Executive Director of The Ridep Institute, and a researcher at the National Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta.