M. Riefqi Muna

M. Riefqi Muna

Member, Supervisory Group
Global Facilitation Network for
Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)
riefqi@gmx.net
Jakarta

Indonesia is the largest maritime or archipelagic state in the
world. The legal framework recognizing this status follows
Indonesia's ratification of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982.

UNCLOS provided a legal foundation for Indonesia to exercise
its sovereignty over its entire, internationally recognized
territory. Before the ratification we did not have fixed borders
except for the islands scattering from Sabang, in Aceh, to
Merauke, in Papua.

That the country is an archipelagic state with thousands of
islands should have direct implication on its defense policy. Yet
our defense system is based on the principle of continental
defense, called the Major Islands Defense System (Sistem
Pertahanan Pulau Besar), considered by many to be the best
approach for our defense. Yet the land-based strategy has been
contaminated by the economic adventures of the army.

The major islands defense system is believed to be greatly
influenced by the classic or "traditional" land-warfare
principle, which relies on guerrilla activities, dating back to
the struggle for independence since the 1940s. This is totally
incompatible with the promotion of a professional military
orientation, which aims to prevent even a single enemy
trespassing our soil.

Continuing the land-based system is also outdated from the
view of what is called the revolution in military affairs. The
theory of war itself is changing -- while officers from the air
force or navy do not have courage to criticize the army
domination. The objectives and orientation of the new system
should be changed by leaving behind the army's hegemony over the
country's political sphere.

In early 2002 the House of Representatives (DPR) passed into
Law No. 3/2002 on National Defense. Article 3 of the Law states,
"The defense policy has to consider the geographical reality that
Indonesia is an archipelagic state".

This article should become the legal basis for the future
defense system, which comprises the doctrine on national defense
and the organization of the defense forces. The defense system
must be based on proper defense requirements, instead of mere
historical romanticism of the revolutionary period.

The nation's history will influence the culture relating to
strategy. Any military doctrine should recognize such a culture,
and that it is subject to revision. History is a matter of fact,
not an entitlement; a military doctrine is not static and is not
an ideology. The doctrine is subject to evaluation and revision
in the face of the need to adapt to a new international or
domestic environment, which includes the technological side.

The law on national defense is thus a wake-up call to our
strategic planners. A defense policy of any state must consider
the type, nature and the degree of threats. This condition will
also influence the doctrine at all levels, from the combined
operational doctrine to the doctrine of each unit in the defense
apparatus.

Further, the defense posture and structure should always be
adapted to possible changes in the security environment. Yet the
strategic thinking during the New Order period still has a strong
influence over the culture and mentality of top military
officers.

The development of a proper defense system that gives more
attention to the navy and air force still faces resistance
particularly from the army, whose officers say that our major
threats are still internal threats. They also argue that the navy
and air force require expensive equipment.

This is true, while it still shows the remaining dominance of
the army over the blue-print for our defense policy. This year
the army proposed a further increase of soldiers, which entirely
contradicts our actual defense needs.

Instead of more troops we need more rapid deployment forces
(RDF) that are mobile and ready to be deployed across the
archipelago whenever needed.

Moreover, the world political context is changing and so is
that of Indonesia. The types of threats are proliferating, beyond
classical military duties. Officers are now expected to pay close
attention and be professional in regards to human rights. They
represent the state; soldiers must hence protect all Indonesians,
not only the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Human security therefore cannot be violated at the expense of
"state security" -- as is still understood by many civilians as
well as military officers. Changing that mentality, in many cases
that the people are the enemy, is perhaps the hardest task in
reforming the armed forces.

We now lack adequate power and capability to encounter major
threats at sea. First, the sea-based threats are mostly of
transnational security threats -- such as individual smugglers
and terrorists. Secondly, our navy has very limited equipment,
even in guarding our territorial boundaries. Our waters are a
haven for foreign illegal fishing -- leading to an estimated loss
of US$3.5 billion this year so far due to illegal fishing. Worse,
air surveillance is lacking.

The threat of piracy has also increased and we have the
world's most sea crimes. The International Maritime Bureau
reported that from 285 cases of piracy this year, 117 were
committed in Indonesian waters.

Other rampant crimes in our waters are illegal migration, drug
trafficking, and smuggling of small arms and other commodities.

The Ministry of Defense is now formulating three major reports
for our defense policy. The first is the Defense White Paper, a
short-term policy on our defense for the next two years.
Secondly, the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) is being prepared,
aimed to prepare Indonesia's defense forces for the next 10 to 15
years.

Third, the ministry will review the draft of the bill on the
TNI to replace the outdated Law No. 1998.

The SDR is the most crucial and basic policy review regarding
Indonesia's defense. It will evaluate in detail our current
policy and will take into account threat scenarios and normative
calculations for defense planning. The SDR will have to paint a
broad picture of the identity of the maritime state in its
defense policy. The review will also recognize that the economic
burden to develop sea potential and air power is the most crucial
compared to developing other areas of defense.

However, the approach has to be directed not to enhance the
deployment of warships, but rather the basic need for our navy to
guard our territory. High speed patrol boats could better secure
our Exclusive Economic Zone.

Additionally, our air force must be developed modestly.
Indonesia's security will rely more on naval and air power. The
air power could help the navy and army in surveillance. We do not
need dozens of air-attack squadrons such as F-16s or even more
sophisticated fighters. Indonesia needs more C-130 cargo and
troop carriers to deploy our troops and police personnel whenever
and wherever needed in a very short time. Better surveillance
technology will help the navy patrol the boundaries.

Indonesia remains vulnerable to communal conflicts and
separatism. The orientation of the army's operation needs to be
changed, an effort which should refer to the government
agreements with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

The use of force which is increasingly unpopular must become
the last resort and must be carried out through a political
decision.

Indonesia is also a member of the international community that
must guard global peace through peacekeeping missions.
Consequently, Indonesia should develop special training in
peacekeeping operations especially for its army. Those with good
skills, a high level of professionalism and good command of
English could be standing forces for missions of the United
Nations.

Those lacking necessary language skills could serve in
military operations other than wars such as humanitarian
assistance, search and rescue, and other models of civic mission.

Proper reform of a defense system requires time and serious
cooperation between the army, air force and navy -- and indeed
the civilian authority who must determine the relevant policies.

The writer is also Executive Director of The Ridep Institute, and
a researcher at the National Institute of Sciences (LIPI),
Jakarta.