Low-cost military engagement for Aceh settlement sought

Low-cost military engagement for Aceh settlement sought

Imanuddin Razak, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta,
iman@thejakartapost.com

By the time this newspaper reaches readers on Monday, the two-
week deadline set by the government for the separatist Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) to accept special autonomy for Nanggroe Aceh
Darussalam province and voluntarily disarm also ends.

The Indonesian government's chief negotiator for the
settlement of the Aceh conflict, Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, has
indeed argued that as the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
(COHA) provides for a five-month period during which the
placement of arms is to be accomplished, and theoretically the
government should wait until after July 9 before it can be
justified in carrying out a military operation in the province.

But as the government has publicly given the go-ahead for a
military campaign, it is highly improbable that the planned
military operation to quell the separatist movement in
Indonesia's easternmost province immediately after the May 12
deadline passes will be canceled.

It is therefore hardly possible to ask the government, or in
this case, the Indonesian Military (TNI), which has lost patience
with dialog and with pursuing a peaceful settlement to the Aceh
issue, to cancel the attacks on the separatist movement's bases.

The only remaining possible thing to do is ask whether the
government can avoid a full-scale military operation, but instead
conduct a limited one in Aceh, considering that the country does
not have such a vast amount of money to finance a military
operation, including post-operation restoration and
rehabilitation programs.

A rough budget calculation for a conventional military
operation, involving 50,000 troops plus several jet fighters and
other combat equipment, and the cost of subsequent restoration
programs in the province could reach hundreds of billions of
rupiah. The required budget for the planned military operation
would be huge, especially when the whole military campaign could
take months to complete.

There are some unexplained reasons for the TNI to hastily
deploy 50,000 troops and immediately start the military campaign
in Aceh.

There remains questions of why the TNI has readied two F-16
and four Hawk-200 jet fighters, besides other military aircraft,
for the military operation. It is difficult to understand the
logic behind using jet fighters to quell GAM, which according to
the TNI has 5,000 members.

Is it because the TNI anticipates possible external threats to
the province in the wake of the military campaign?

It is also questionable why the TNI has to deploy the Navy's
elite troops, the marines, and the Air Force's elite Paskhas
troops to Aceh as they are not familiar with land combat.

Speaking about their specialties, both the marines and Paskhas
have been trained for combat in their respective specific fields
-- respectively securing and taking control of sea areas and
securing and taking control of air space -- and not for land
combat, which is what the Army's Strategic Reserves Command
(Kostrad) and Special Forces (Kopassus) are for.

A similar question is whether both the marines and Paskhas
troops are really being deployed to secure the water and air
space surrounding the province from possible external threat.

Military presence in Aceh is relatively as old as the Republic
of Indonesia itself.

So, it is not understandable if the military does not know
every inch of Aceh land, including GAM strongholds and bases, as
well as the hiding places of its leaders.

It would save much money if the TNI launched a limited
operation focusing on only seizing and taking control of GAM
strongholds and bases, as well as "capturing" its top leader and
regional leaders.

In the majority of battles, once the key leaders are captured
or killed, the war soon comes to an end as their followers'
resistance ebbs in the absence of their leaders.

A limited operation would not need as many as 50,000 troops
and would avoid the use of a vast sum of money if compared with
the amount needed for a conventional military operation.

And a conventional military operation, including possible air
strikes if the jet fighters are used to attack GAM guerrillas,
would be sure to more claim civilian lives than a limited
operation.

One recent example of this is when many civilians were killed
during air strikes at the beginning of the Iraq war,
despite the sophisticated weaponry and detection systems of the
U.S.-led allied forces.

Here at home, the TNI does not have the sophisticated weaponry
and detection systems of the U.S. and its allies and the
possibility of civilian casualties is far greater.

An obvious lesson from the Iraq war is that the United States
and Britain, as the initiators of the war, have to bear the
responsibility of restoring peace and, most of all, reviving the
war-battered Iraqi economy.

As for the Aceh case, it will be the Indonesian government
that will have to restore security and peace after the military
campaign, as well as revive the province's ruined economy.

The question will then be whether the government or the state
has ample money to pay for all the damage and all the post-attack
expenditures.

Or, perhaps the government can save a huge amount of funds and
prevent a great number of civilian casualties by avoiding a
conventional military operation and instead stage a limited one.