Looking toward a transatlantic relationship meltdown

Looking toward a transatlantic relationship meltdown

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor 'The Indonesian Quarterly',
Centre For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta,
bandoro@csis.or.id

The emergency summit in Azore, Portugal, on Sunday between the
U.S. president and the British and Spanish prime ministers
produced a 24-hour deadline for the United Nations to enforce its
own Iraq disarmament resolution or accept war within days. Bush's
statement that "the U.S. will go to war with or without the help
of the UN" has become reality, as the diplomatic process to avert
war ended in a deadlock.

The diplomatic process was considered over when the French
declared it would veto any new UN resolution.

It is not only a war game that the world community is
beginning to witness, but also a deeper fracture in the
relationship between the U.S. and its European allies -- which
has become more evident since last year when the two sides tabled
strategies on how to resolve the Iraq issue.

As war became more imminent, Britain accused France of
"poisoning" the diplomatic process at the UN, saying the actions
of the French had made it more difficult to avoid war. The French
and Germans had organized the opposition to U.S. efforts to bring
the current crisis to a definitive conclusion.

Thus, postwar Iraq will witness a moment when the U.S. and its
European allies will need to overcome further frictions in their
transatlantic relationship. Foreign policy will then be the next
front the U.S. and its European allies will have to face to
prevent further disarray in transatlantic relations.

The reluctance of the Germans and French to support the U.S.
military approach to Iraq has drawn bitter criticism from the
U.S. and some of its European partners.

During the diplomatic process, France in particular was seen
as the most resistant to the U.S. war policy. Paris lobbied the
nonpermanent members of the Security Council against the Anglo-
American second resolution and declared its willingness to veto
that resolution.

France also sought to block NATO assistance to one of its own
members, Turkey, forcing the other members of that organization
to neutralize France's obstructionism by moving to an alternate
venue.

Washington and Paris differ on a number of issues, such as
global warming and the missile defense system. Their differences
on certain issues have led them to view their respective
international positions from their own standpoints.

Being "old Europe", French opposition to the U.S. war approach
is simply meant to prevent an enlarged Europe from being
politically dominated by U.S. interests.

It is highly likely that postwar Iraq will see further
deterioration in U.S.-French bilateral relations. Thus, the
daunting challenges for U.S. policymakers after the war will
include rebuilding U.S. trust relations with Europe, particularly
France.

The war in Iraq will not automatically outdate the European
preference of multilateralism in resolving international
problems. Europe will perhaps say no to U.S. requests for an
increase in European armaments in case of a future crisis like
the current one. Support for multilateralism in Europe will
become stronger, thus rebuffing the unilateral approach the U.S.
is likely to adopt in the future.

The immediate impact of war will be a serious rift between
Europe and the U.S. The already unequal relationship between the
two will become more transparent, and perhaps they will require
more time to put their transatlantic relations back on the right
track. As a result of the war, Europe will demand a more equal
partnership with the U.S.

Obviously, equalization is more developed in some spheres than
in others. In particular, the U.S. remains unchallenged as a
military superpower. But perhaps it would be foolish to expect
even in a crisis of this magnitude to deflect such powerful
trends. Rather, the challenge will be to harness these trends
constructively. A U.S.-Europe coalition cannot be sustained
without a more equal transatlantic relationship.

Iraq after the war will see Europe enjoying some competitive
advantage at the regional and global levels as transatlantic
equalization proceeds. The EU will operate in a multilateral
fashion based on the rule of law. Its chosen method of governance
will be more in harmony with a changing world than hard-nosed
military unilateralism. European leaders will be more assertive
about these methods and interests should the U.S., in the future,
again be tempted to insist on hegemonic multilateralism.

With the beginning of the war, and the crisis that will ensue
over the role and position of the UN, it should be clear that it
is the U.S. that has insisted that it will not be bound by the
UN, that has undermined the UN's credibility and chosen the path
of unilateralism. This will be extremely damaging to the UN's
credibility and in the long run also for transatlantic relations.